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Preface
In the Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992, Congress charged the
President with reviewing and reporting on federal activities in the west that
affect the allocation and use of water resources. The legislation directed the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission to advise the President,
considering many specific facets of western water issues. The Commission
has done this in a wide-ranging series of studies, addressing west-wide water
issues, questions related to specific themes, and analyses of the unique
experiences in several western river basins. This study is in the last
category.
When the Commission first raised the possibility that I undertake the study
of the Columbia River Basin, I felt that I could evaluate water issues through
the lens of the salmon controversies. For twelve years, I have been a lawyer
for the Northwest Power Planning Council, working directly on Columbia
River Basin fish, wildlife, energy and water issues. I thought I could cover
these issues with some degree of thoroughness, but could not range into the
many other water issues that face the Basin. The resulting study is a hybrid.
It is not exactly a study of salmon policy because the main point is water and
how we manage it. There are many elements of salmon policy that I mention
only in passing because they are tangential to water policy. There are many
elements of water policy that I do not explore because they are tangential to
the salmon issues. The study looks out at the basin from a particular point
where water policy and salmon policy meet, and asks how water programs,
especially federal water programs, are holding up.
I carried out the study while on leave from my job with the Power Planning
Council. The study is entirely my own, and the Council bears no
responsibility for the statements I make. At the same time, my background
and experience is rooted in my work for the Council, and that lends a
particular slant to my view of these issues. While I have tried to be objective
in my analysis, that slant is no doubt there. There are certain issues, such as
the way the Council itself has measured up against the challenge of the
salmon declines, that I decided would be foolish for me to address.
Even with these limitations, I believe there is much that can be learned from
the Columbia Basin’s experience, and I hope the Commission and other
readers agree.
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I. Introduction
William Jackson Turner may have had it wrong when he announced at the
1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago that the American frontier had closed,
at least if he intended to include the Columbia River Basin.1 In the Columbia
Basin, the frontier arguably didn’t close until the 1990s. In 1993, the water
agencies of Idaho, Oregon and Washington announced they would no longer
issue permits for new water diversions in the Basin’s salmon streams. In
1996, one of the federal agencies that manages the Columbia River’s
hydropower system said that breaching some of the federal dams on the river
is a serious thing to consider. Western state water agencies have always
issued new diversion permits. The federal agencies have always built and
operated dams. These are their oldest and most ingrained functions. If the
West is defined by its connections to water, these may be the announcements
that closed the frontier in the Columbia Basin.
The development that precipitated these announcements was the realization
that we, the federal government, the states, the tribes and the rest of us,
have to decide what to do about the impending loss of Columbia River
salmon, a key part of the Basin’s natural world and cultural life. The
Columbia is a big river basin whose parts seem to have little in common, but
this threat resonates through much of it. Few among us are willing to say we
will stand idly by while salmon fall off the edge of the world.
Beginning with this dilemma, this study explores the fact that water policy in
the Columbia River Basin is no longer limited to consideration of traditional
claims to water for irrigation, hydropower, municipal and industrial uses.
Indian treaty claims, the Northwest Power Act, the Endangered Species Act,
and the increasing awareness that humans need sustenance from the
natural world are pulling the water needs of salmon from the fringes to the
center of water debate. The study surveys the contribution water
development has made to the salmon declines, the roles federal water
agencies have played in recovery efforts, and the directions water policy
might take to deal with such dilemmas in the future.

A. The Problem
The first part of the study (sections II-III) tells the story of the Columbia as a
working river, and as a natural system in decline. It describes the
development of the rivers, the laws and institutions that accompanied water
development, the effects on salmon, and efforts to remedy the salmon losses.
This survey leads to several observations:

1
F. Turner, The Frontier in American History (Tucson, 1986). Richard White, Patricia
Limerick and other thoughtful western historians have already pointed out the other ways in
which Turner had it wrong. See J. Grossman, ed., The Frontier in American Culture, Essays
by Richard White and Patricia Limerick (California, Newberry, 1994).
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First, 150 years of water development have fragmented the Basin’s rivers
among federal, tribal, state and private interests. The operation of the dams
on the mainstem of the Columbia and Snake rivers is federal; water
diversions, especially from the tributaries, are mainly the jurisdiction of the
states and the Bureau of Reclamation, within a system of private property
rights. This arrangement worked well enough for the purposes for which the
rivers were developed: hydropower, irrigation, flood control and navigation.
However, the consensus on which these arrangements were based on has
eroded with the salmon declines. The old foundations for the Columbia
Basin’s relationship with the river are no longer serviceable, and new ones
are needed.
For purposes of salmon recovery, the complexity posed by different bodies of
law on an interconnected river system is itself a problem. Federal operations
in the mainstem respond to federal mandates such as project authorizations,
Indian treaty obligations, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act
and other laws. The property interests that have been granted by the states
to private parties respond to non-governmental interests and values, further
from the reach of policy. So, not only are the mainstem and tributaries
subject to different regulatory regimes with different constraints, but the
tributaries are largely fractionated into private ownerships. The possibility
that a whole river system can move in a coordinated direction seems, to say
the least, optimistic.
Another less discussed source of jurisdictional fragmentation in the
Columbia River system is that the Columbia is an international river. It is
managed according to the terms of a treaty with Canada that is aimed at
optimizing hydropower and flood control, and which does not account for
ecosystem values in the river. Rather, ecosystem values are managed in
economic trades. In this respect the treaty regime is not unlike traditional
operations of the mainstem dams on the United States’ side of the border.
However, as domestic policy shifts domestic management objectives, the
international treaty’s focus remains static. Shared management of the river
as an ecosystem has not been explored by the two nations.
A second observation: Although the Basin has had more than fifteen years
experience with large-scale salmon recovery programs, the salmon declines
seem to pose questions for which there are few good answers. The most
recent, comprehensive scientific advice is that salmon recovery programs
cannot reverse the salmon declines with the approaches taken to date.
Salmon recovery programs have tried to work around the edges of power
generation, navigation, irrigation, flood control, timber harvest and other
uses, providing technological fixes where natural processes are gone.
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Ecosystem scientists are suggesting that this approach cannot succeed, and
that another model, in which human activities would be managed to protect
ecological processes vital to salmon, will be required if healthy salmon
populations and other fish and wildlife species are to be maintained. This
suggests the idea that ecological functions in mainstem and tributary rivers
should become baseline parameters in water policy and management. Until
now, however, the Basin has given only limited consideration to ecological
models for water management.
The third observation is that the federal role in the Columbia River will be
affected not only by the needs of species, but also by market forces that have
never before played much of a role in the river. Federal hydropower
development created an enormous series of economic assets, the “cash
register” dams. Efforts to offset the effects of the dams on salmon are
financed in large part by the dams’ own power revenues. The power industry
and the federal hydropower system recently began a rapid transition to
market competition. In a competitive market, the costs imposed on the
hydropower system, including the cost of salmon mitigation, can affect
hydropower’s ability to compete in the market. If costs are too high,
paradoxically, this can threaten funding for salmon recovery. In short, if the
river can no longer be managed to optimize economic values, neither can it be
managed in isolation from market conditions. These equations need more
stable footing than they have now.
The last observation should now be clear: Although the Columbia Basin
salmon issues have a great deal to do with water development, solutions to
the ecological problems to water development take us well beyond the
traditional boundaries of water policy. Ecosystem scientists tell us that
rivers are ecological templates into which species fit themselves, and that
rivers are simplified by development. If we want salmon populations that
will survive over time, these scientists are telling us, we need to allow rivers
to reestablish a more complex template. Whether, where and how we allow
the basin once again to weave natural patterns will depend on the way we
manage dams in two countries; private water diversions in at least three
states; federal, tribal, state and private land in much of the basin; fish
harvest in the ocean and in-river; the world’s largest hydroelectric system; a
major artery of navigation; a regional flood control system; and a sprawling
system of fish hatcheries. Each of these factors is connected to all of the
others, and so water policy in the Columbia River becomes part of an almost
unimaginably complex calculus.
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B. Policy Issues and Recommendations
From these observations, the study turns to four major policy issues and then
makes a series of recommendations:

1. Ecosystem Management
The first major issue relates to how we define and measure success for water
management that aims at ecosystem recovery. The Basin is a big ecological
template, and if we shift it, we will shift it in small ways whose ecological
significance is debatable. Thus, water management initiatives have to fit
into a series of measures which, collectively, add up to healthy ecosystem
conditions. But how do we define what those “healthy” conditions are? How
do we measure the contribution of individual initiatives? How do we link
them analytically with a large collection of other measures to determine
whether they add up, or even if we have a solvable problem?
These are complex scientific questions. They have to do with how much we
know about ecosystems work and respond to human interventions.
Ecosystem science is itself a peculiar science—more like economics or
weather prediction than chemistry or physics, and so it is likely that we will
never have precise answers to the problems we face. The fact that the
science is murky makes these issues more complex from a policy perspective.
We have to make judgments about tradeoffs and risks based on a body of
knowledge that is, at best, evolving. Communities, dams, farms and powerful
economic networks are in place. They can change, but can they change in a
way that is ecologically relevant? Thus do questions of science become
questions of policy.
One Columbia River Basin model for dealing with these problems is called
adaptive management. Adaptive management proposes a way to make
political decisions in a scientifically credible manner. In substance, it means
that whatever we decide to do, we must treat our actions as hypotheses,
monitor them carefully, and change our approach if we find that it doesn’t
work. The logic of this approach is unassailable; the problem is
implementation. Implementing a rigorous monitoring and evaluation
program in a world of fragmented jurisdictions and political pressures
requires a much more serious commitment to scientific methods than the
region has so far been able to muster. To this point, it has been relatively
easy for one or another set of interests to side-track adaptive management
initiatives, and the questions posed by ecosystem recovery have been hard to
address.
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Recommendations regarding ecosystem management: If managers are to have
a meaningful management guide, ecosystem science must produce a more
coherent picture of relevant ecological objectives. Because this picture must
be a policy guide, it must be developed in a public policy process, of the kind
described in the adaptive management model. Because ecosystems are so
complex and our knowledge of them so scant, this policy guide will
necessarily be subject to change as more is learned. Federal water policy
should actively encourage efforts to develop and improve these tools and
methods. Federal agencies should lend data and expertise to help develop
ecosystem models and a long-term research and evaluation program. As
investment in salmon recovery increases, these initiatives will be more and
more important in building accountability in ecosystem management.

2. Collaboration
A second major issue is more recognizable as one of water policy, although it
involves a more disparate set of problems: How can we achieve the degree of
coherence that an ecosystem approach to water policy suggests, given the
current degree of fragmentation in water management?
Some of this fragmentation might be eased by decisions involving the river’s
mainstem. The major mainstem issue is whether to draw down some of the
major, run-of-the-river reservoirs on the Snake and Columbia Rivers, or to
rely instead on a combination of fish barging, bypass screens, and flow
augmentation. This is where most of the scientific and policy debate takes
place. From a water policy perspective, this choice could dictate a direction
for water policy in many other areas. If we draw run-of-river reservoirs
down, we may not need so much water from the Snake River Basin or from
headwater storage in Canada and Montana. On the other hand, some
drawdowns could jeopardize some power generation, irrigation and
transportation, and so the ultimate choice is anything but obvious. However,
the longer we avoid this choice, the more pressure and uncertainty there will
be in headwater areas.
Government policy has a looser foothold in tributaries compared to the
mainstem, and curing fragmentation in tributary water policy requires a
different set of strategies. Tributary streams have largely been dried up by a
combination of state-sanctioned water rights and federal reclamation
programs. Faced with the need to restore water to these streams, federal
and state policy are currently very close to being high-centered. Federal
water policy gave away much of the water with the land 100 years ago and
cannot simply take it back. State policy has been historically dedicated to
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protecting private water uses, and responds to environmental pressures
largely within that framework. And private water users still have multiple
incentives to take water out of streams, notwithstanding the growing
awareness of the costs of out-of-stream uses. These cross-currents are a
prescription for gridlock, but they also can be an opportunity for new kinds of
collaboration. The hope, obviously, is for the latter, and the question is how.
Many people are looking to local watershed-based efforts to build this
collaboration. This report makes two major suggestions for federal support
of such efforts: one is that government policy needs to find a way to speak
with one voice to the watershed groups, and it needs to be a clear voice. This
is a tall order, because it requires not just water agencies, but land agencies
to speak together, and not just federal agencies, but state agencies.
However, one of the easiest ways government agencies can frustrate progress
in resolving watershed conflicts is to send mixed or conflicting messages. The
second suggestion is that government should not burden watershed efforts
with unrealistic expectations. Tributary water issues are difficult;
government initiatives have failed to resolve them so far and we cannot
expect watershed groups to find solutions quickly or easily. If too much is
expected too soon, watershed efforts may only be hobbled.
Whether we put a lot of weight on watershed efforts or not, however, it is
unlikely in the short term that they alone will be able to identify and protect
baseline ecological functions. Policy decisions will continue to be required at
higher political levels, and federal agency programs, subject to ecosystem
recovery mandates, will remain important backstops for state and local
efforts.
In the area of inter-jurisdictional collaboration, the report has several
recommendations. The division of federal, tribal and state authority over
water raises several interrelated problems, none of which can be addressed
by any single government working alone:
Ecosystem recovery efforts can be undermined by state water rights systems
that support water diversions. This problem has been addressed in part by
state moratoria on new water diversions. However, the moratoria are limited
in some respects, and their fates are uncertain. These uncertainties need to
be addressed by the states in collaboration with federal agencies.
Issues of interstate water management, such as finding ways to protect
instream water in interstate transactions, need to continue to be addressed.
Pending mainstem decisions, interstate transactions can be treated as pilot
efforts. To avoid surprises stemming from lack of coordination between state
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and federal processes, state and federal water agencies should consider
ongoing meetings to coordinate operations, air issues of common concern, and
determine whether an interstate compact is needed.
In many watersheds, local interests are working with tribes, states and
federal agencies to restore habitat consistent with local values. While these
efforts are still young and untested, they should be encouraged, and federal
agencies can help in a variety of ways. For example, the Bureau of
Reclamation’s water conservation pilot projects in the Columbia Basin,
Bonneville’s funding of monitoring and evaluation methods in the Grande
Ronde, and other federal and state initiatives make real contributions to
watershed efforts. In the Umatilla Basin, the Bureau has brought parties to
the table to address obdurate water spreading problems. However, these
efforts can also be undermined by inconsistent signals from federal and state
agencies. Federal water and land agencies need to work among themselves
and with tribes and local watershed groups to arrive at a clear set of
expectations for watershed efforts. Local communities need assurance that
federal water and land management agencies and their state counterparts
will learn to speak with one voice.
Over the longer term, watershed efforts will require more stability in
funding. Currently, funding for watershed recovery projects is a patchwork
that begins with government funding and tries to expand outward. With
innovative state and watershed experiments, it is possible to imagine
leveraging these funds more widely; government programs should encourage
such efforts.
Both the United States and Canada see signs of strain in current approaches
to Columbia River management: not just the dilemmas posed by the salmon
declines, but demands for participatory management, pressures from
traditional constituencies, and the rights and concerns of native people. The
two countries need to explore ways of incorporating ecological considerations
into river operations on both sides of the border.

3. Financing Ecosystem Recovery
The third major issue is financial: what should be the balance between
economic uses of federal dams and ecological recovery? The issue arises on
the Columbia most of all, because it is one of the world’s major hydropower
rivers. But it is likely to arise in one form or another on most of the west’s
big rivers.
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During the 1980s, the Northwest Power Act gave the Columbia Basin a way
to get at this question, by calling for a rough balance between species
recovery and power system needs. In the 1990s, Endangered Species Act
listings and the emergence of a competitive electric energy industry upset
this balance. The Basin needs a new equation for this relationship, and if it
does not come from the Basin, Congress may impose a solution in national
energy restructuring legislation. A new regional balance is likely to require
at least three elements: some predictability and stability in hydropower’s
financial contribution to ecosystem recovery; improved accountability in
ecosystem recovery programs; and some broadening of the financial basis for
ecosystem recovery.

4. Governance
The last major issue is that of river governance. The debate over Columbia
River governance began in the 1930s and is still underway. Over the
decades, there have been proposals for federal basin management and an
interstate water compact. River basin commissions have been established
and allowed to lapse. Ad hoc forms of collaboration have been worked out,
and these arrangements have shifted with the times and subject matter.
Currently, the river is shaped in a collection of power centers:
• Much of the management of the river’s mainstem is oriented to the
traditional purposes and coordination arrangements, which are largely
federal or federally-administered.
• Since 1980, an interstate body, the Northwest Power Planning
Council, has developed a plan to mitigate the fish and wildlife effects
of the federal power system, ensure the region’s power supply, and
guide the investment of federal hydropower revenues in fish and
wildlife mitigation.
• Since 1990, the federal Endangered Species Act program has largely
eclipsed the Council program in river management. The Endangered
Species Act program also encompasses federal habitat, fish harvest
and hatchery management. These issues increasingly end up in
federal court.
• Finally, Indian tribes who do not see their interests adequately
protected in federal or state forums have their own mitigation plans,
which they use in asserting treaty and other rights.
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The question is whether this disparate collection of forces can accommodate
the idea of ecosystem management, and if not, whether a more integrated
governance structure is feasible.
It is possible to generalize about governance arrangements that might reflect
ecosystem characteristics better. Several models for reform have been
suggested. A National Research Council report, Upstream suggests that
government for ecosystem problems should focus on three ideas: governance
should follow natural rather than political boundaries; it should build in a
broad range of interests, recognizing that no government can truly control an
ecosystem; and management must find ways to learn from its actions.
However, the Research Council concluded that there were real tensions and
conflicts in applying these abstract principles, and finding ways to
incorporate them in river governance is a political chore for which the Basin
shows little relish. Since the Research Council’s report, there have been a
number of governance proposals in the political arena, but consensus has
remained elusive. People are generally clear about the failings of the status
quo, but unclear about what to do about it.
The changes suggested in the recommendations of this study would push
traditional political boundaries incrementally toward the National Research
Council model: toward more coincidence between governmental and
ecological systems, more effective cooperative efforts backed by a government
that is actively looking for ecosystem solutions, and toward systematic,
organizational learning. Bolder reforms are possible, but at this point the
region is far from consensus on a more integrated governance model.

C. Overview
The Columbia River is the Northwest’s primary power plant, central
navigation channel, biggest irrigation ditch, and storage facility for flood
waters. The river and its tributaries work hard, and federal water policy
plays a major role in putting them to work.
The questions that now face the Columbia are whether the river can also be
allowed to work as a natural system, and these questions will shape the
federal government’s role on the river in the next century. In some ways,
these challenges bear little resemblance to the traditional mainstream of
water policy: the protection of the water resource base, the development of
supplies, the management of demand, and the like. Yet, water policy has
never been a thing unto itself, and it could never be addressed by attending
to water alone. The Columbia River issues draw water policy onto ground
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where federal water policy mixes with emerging ecosystem science, land
management and energy economics.
These issues are not just salmon issues, nor are they Endangered Species Act
issues per se. Rather, they raise a broader problem: whether we can use
rivers without destroying the natural processes that support not just one or
two species, but many. If Columbia River salmon go by the boards, the
Northwest will be the poorer, but the underlying conflict between a
burgeoning human community and the natural world that supports it will
persist. The question is whether water policy can help to integrate this
relationship.
If we are to unravel such questions, we have a great deal to learn. The
Columbia River is not going to be set to rights as a salmon river, just as the
rest of the west is not going to come to grips with its water problems, in five
or ten years. There is evidence that we are groping our way toward healthier
relationships with rivers and diverse species. But no one should think that
shifting an ecological template is anything but heavy work. It is slow,
difficult and risky. And it will take a brand of patience and good will that
seems all too rare in western water issues.
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II. The Setting
A. The Physical Environment
The headwaters of the Columbia River are in Canada, near the Selkirk
Mountains, the “high roof of the continent.”2 The river is 1,214 miles long,
measuring from the Canadian headwaters.3 By the time it has collected
contributions from all its tributaries, the Columbia carries almost 200 million
acre-feet of water. On average, the Columbia carries ten times as much
water as the Colorado River and 2.5 times as much as the Nile.4 It is the
fourth largest in the United States, and the eighteenth largest river in the
world, ranked just behind the St. Lawrence.5 The Columbia River estuary,
where all of this water mixes with salt water, covers about 95,000 acres (150
square miles), the ninth largest in the United States. The estuary extends to
river mile 46, although salinity rarely goes beyond mile 23.6
Geographers can point to single places where the Columbia River begins and
ends, but the Columbia River Basin (figure 1) has a more complex outline. It
starts at places like “The Rim,” a curving ridge that divides the Columbia
River watershed from the Colorado River watershed. Runoff to the east of
The Rim drains into the Green River, then to the Colorado and so to the Gulf
of California. On the western side, water drains into small streams like Sour
Moose Creek, a seasonal brook that barely aspires to the status of mud
during the summer. Water from Sour Moose Creek merges with the Hoback
River near the town of Bondurant, Wyoming. The Hoback joins the Snake
River near the Idaho border. The Snake crosses southern Idaho to the
Oregon border, travels north into Washington and then empties into the
Columbia’s mainstem.
Thousands of such tributaries flow around the edge of the Basin. The
southern rim runs through southwest Wyoming, southeast Idaho, the corner
of northwest Utah, small parts of northern Nevada and California, and most
of Oregon. The northern rim runs from Wyoming along the Idaho-Montana

2

Stewart H. Holbrook, The Columbia at 6 (Rinehart & Co. 1956).

Bonneville Power Administration, Bureau of Reclamation, and Corps of Engineers,
Columbia River System Operation Review: Final Environmental Impact Statement, Main
Report at 1-7.
3

Conflicts Over the Columbia River, proceedings of a seminar conducted by the Water
Resources Research Institute, Oregon State University (July 1980), quoting a Pacific
Northwest River Basin Commission report.
4

5

L. Leopold, A View of the River, Table 6.1 at 99 (Harvard 1994).

R. Moulton, “Concern Over the Columbia Estuary” in Conflicts Over the Columbia River,
proceedings of a seminar conducted by the Water Resources Research Institute, Oregon
State University, p. 13 (July 1980).
6
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border, cuts east past Butte, Montana, heads north into Canada, and loops
back south along the crest of Washington’s Cascade Mountains, then west
across southwestern Washington to the ocean. The basin covers about
259,000 square miles in the United States and Canada.7
In some ways it is hard to think of this sprawling area as having any singular
connection. Clearly, the amount of runoff is not one. Much of the southern
part of the basin is arid, with less than twelve inches of precipitation
annually. The northern part of the basin and some parts of the interior are
deluged with anywhere from 24 to 80 inches of precipitation, most of it snow.
The Cascades generally have more than 80 inches of precipitation and in
some places more than 120 inches. The Willamette Valley and southwestern
Washington are watered with an average of anywhere from 24 to 48 inches of
precipitation, most of it rain.8 Excluding the area west of the Cascades,
44 percent of the runoff is Canadian.9
The geography of the Columbia Basin includes a vast subterranean
component as well. Groundwater connects with surface water in patterns
that are incompletely mapped, measured, and understood in many places, but
nonetheless recognized as critical to water management. In the Middle
Snake River, for example, the relationships of surface flows, aquifer
discharge and recharge, flood irrigation, hydropower generation,
groundwater pumping, and new irrigation efficiencies are crucial
considerations in water allocations.10

B. The Cultural Communities
The Basin is also diverse culturally. Sour Moose Creek comes from an area
circled by mountains, well along in the transition from ranching to recreation.
In nearby Jackson Hole, locals say that the millionaires are being squeezed

Columbia River System Operation Review, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Main
Report at 2-1 (November 1995).
7

Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission, Water Today and Tomorrow: A Pacific
Northwest Regional Program for Water and Related Resources,” volume 2, figure 3-4
(June 1979).
8

K. Muckleston, “International Management of the Columbia,” in Conflicts Over the
Columbia River, at 72.
9

See Fereday and Creamer, "Swan Falls in 3-D: A New Look at the Historical, Legal and
Practical Dimensions of Idaho's Biggest Water Rights Controversy," 28 Idaho L. Rev. 573
(1991-92).
10
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out by the billionaires. Idaho Falls, a largely Mormon community across the

Figure 1.- The Columbia River Basin
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Wyoming border downstream, is part of an irrigated landscape that covers
much of the Upper Snake Basin. Boise, further west, is one of the country’s
fastest growing urban areas, a place of some sophistication and a noted
collection of water lawyers. Lewiston, at the Idaho-Washington border, is the
Basin’s furthest inland port, 465 miles from the Pacific Ocean. The Dalles,
located where the river penetrates the Cascade Mountains, has an aluminum
plant powered by one of the river’s big dams. It is also where the river
becomes one of the world’s most popular wind-surfing areas. The broad, calm
pools on which the surfers skim lie over the former Celilo Falls, one of the
great Indian fishing and trading sites now inundated by The Dalles Dam.
Traditional Indian fishing sites still mark the mainstem and tributaries, and
reserved Indian lands encompass tributary watersheds interspersed
throughout the Basin. Further downriver, Portland is a major west coast
port, a large wet cosmopolitan city, about as different from Bondurant or
Idaho Falls as could be. We could take a similar trip from the Columbia’s
Montana or Canadian headwaters, and find similar diversity. And it is all
the Columbia River Basin.
The Basin apparently has been occupied by humans for at least 12,000
years.11 Tribal groups on the Columbia Plateau fished, hunted, trapped, and
gathered to sustain themselves.12 They fished for salmon, steelhead,
sturgeon, trout and other species at Kettle Falls, Priest Rapids, Celilo Falls,
Five Mile Rapids, the Cascades, and elsewhere on the Columbia River, and
Salmon Falls and various rapids on the upper Snake River.13 Following the
Lewis and Clark Expedition from 1804 to 1806, Euro-Americans began to
populate the area as fur trappers, traders, missionaries, homesteaders,
farmers, miners, ranchers, and loggers.14 Of the 9.5 million people currently
living in the four Northwest states, about 5 million (53 per cent) live in the
Columbia River Basin.15 Much of that population is concentrated in the
developed urban areas that comprise less than four per cent of the Basin's

11

See U. S. Department of Agriculture and U. S. Department of Interior, Interior Columbia Basin
Ecosystem Management Project, Status of the Interior Columbia River Basin: Summary of Scientific
Findings 29 (Nov. 1996).
12

Id. at 29-30, 61.

13

Id. at 29-30.

14

Id. at 30-33.

Bonneville Power Administration, Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engineers,
Columbia River System Operation Review: Final Environmental Impact Statement, Main
Report 2-35 (Nov. 1995).
15
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land on the United States side of the Canadian border.16 Those areas include
Portland-Vancouver, Spokane, Boise, Eugene-Springfield (Oregon), Bend,
and Yakima, as well as Missoula and Kalispell in Montana, Nampa and
Caldwell in Idaho, Lewiston and Clarkston on the lower Snake, Wenatchee
in the mid-Columbia, and Kennewick, Richland and Pasco, "the Tri-Cities,"
near the confluence of the Columbia and the Snake.17
Population in the Northwest is expected to increase by 30 percent between
1990 and 2010.18 Much of that growth will come in the urban areas, in and
out of the Basin.19 Nevertheless, the rate of population growth in the Basin
may outpace the rates of growth elsewhere in those states,20 with significant
increases in counties where outdoor recreation and tourism play a large role
in the economy, as well as in more densely populated metropolitan areas.21
As of 1996, the Basin was experiencing rapid growth, with many small rural
communities undergoing significant social and economic changes.22
Outside urban areas, the basin is sparsely populated, with about half of the
land in the U.S. portion of the Columbia Basin in forests; about 33 percent in
rangeland; and about 13 per cent in crops.23 Irrigated crops include potatoes,
sugar beets, hops, mint, and fruit, as well as other vegetables and hay;
irrigated crop values range from about $150/acre for hay up to about
$6000/acre for apple orchards and vineyards.24

16

System Operation Review at 2-32.

17

Id. at 2-34, 2-35; State of the Interior Columbia Basin at 14-15.

18

Id. at 2-36.

Most of Washington state's growth, for example, is expected in the Puget Sound area.
Mull, Transfers through the Water Code at 1, Third Annual Sinking Creek Water Law
Symposium (Written Materials, Washington Law School Foundation, Seattle) (Jan. 26,
1996).
19

For example, the rate of population growth in eastern Washington is outpacing the rate in
western Washington, with population estimates indicating that 22 per cent of Washington
residents live east of the Cascade Mountains (in the Columbia Basin) where population
gains recently accounted for one-third of the state's total growth. Forecasting Division, Office
of Financial Management, 1994 Population Trends for Washington State (1994).
20

21

Status of the Interior Columbia Basin at 35.

22

Id. at 14, 35.

23

Id. at 2-32.

24

Id. at 2-33, 2-37.
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However, agricultural employment is declining in the Basin, as is
employment in other "extractive" industries such as mining, fishing, and
logging.25 Throughout the Northwest, the economy is become more diverse,
with notable growth in technology, transportation, trade, and service
sectors.26 The growth at the regional and basin levels, of course, is not
shared equally among all communities and industries.27 Moreover,
development in the "recreation counties" is "threat[ening] the qualities that
make such places attractive for recreation, retirement and new businesses."28

C. The Natural Heritage
When Lewis and Clark first encountered the Columbia River, they were
looking for a path to the sea. What they found was a river of salmon. “The
multitudes of this fish are almost inconceivable,” they wrote in their journal.
“The water is so clear that they can readily be seen at the depth of 15 or
20 feet; but at this season they float in such quantities down the stream, and
are drifted ashore, that the Indians have only to collect, split, and dry them
on the scaffolds.”29 Native people numbering in the tens of thousands were
living off the bounty of something like ten to sixteen million salmon that
returned to spawn every year.30
Historically, salmon reached far into the Columbia’s Canadian headwaters to
the north and Idaho’s Sawtooth Mountains to the east. “June hogs,” huge
chinook salmon weighing as much as 100 pounds, migrated to the upper
reaches of the Columbia. Salmon were a mainstay in the Northwest
aboriginal societies' cultures, religions and economies. As a turn-of-thecentury U. S. Supreme Court opinion put it, “The right to resort to the fishing
places . . . was . . . not much less necessary [to the native tribes] than the

25

System Operation Review at 2-38 to 2-39; Status of the Interior Columbia Basin at 41, 56.

26

System Operation Review at 2-38; State of the Interior Columbia Basin at 15.

27

Status of the Interior Columbia Basin at 57.

28

Id.

Coues, ed., M. Lewis and W. Clark, The History of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, vol. II at
p. 641 (Dover).

29

See Northwest Power Planning Council, “Compilation of Information on Salmon and
Steelhead Losses in the Columbia River Basin,” Appendix D of the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program (March 1986). For an excellent account of Columbia River salmon
issues generally, see C. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future
of the West 175 (Island Press 1992).
30
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atmosphere they breathed.”31 When in the 1850s, Isaac Stevens negotiated
for treaties to clear title to land for a northern railway route, the tribes took
care to protect their right to fish at “all usual and accustomed places” outside
reservation boundaries “in common with citizens of the territories.”32
As "anadromous" fish, salmon connect the Basin to an even larger and more
diverse ecosystem which includes the Pacific Ocean. They are born in creeks,
rivers and lakes and migrate downstream as juveniles. In the estuary at the
river’s mouth, they transform from freshwater fish to saltwater fish, then
enter the ocean where they migrate far north or south, feed and mature for
several years. They then return to the mouth of the river, swim upstream to
their natal areas, where they spawn and die.
This cycle has ecological significance. Salmon take nutrients from the ocean,
and carry them to inland headwaters, where a complex of other species feed
on the bodies of spawned-out salmon. The cycle has also made salmon a
regional symbol. Salmon are viewed as national, even international,
treasures, part and parcel of the Columbia River Basin's natural endowment.
The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area, the Hells Canyon National
Recreation Area, a variety of wild and scenic rivers, all are part of a salmon
river, and all are affected by water policies developed by federal stewards.

D. The Federal Presence
While states issue rights to water and manage fish and wildlife under state
law, the federal government’s influence over the mainstem of the Columbia
River Basin and salmon is pervasive. Consider: the Department of State and
other federal agencies negotiate and carry out the American obligations
under international treaties related to hydropower production in the Basin
and the harvest of fish produced in the Basin.33 The Bureau of Reclamation
and Army Corps of Engineers operate 14 large-scale mainstem water
31

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).

32

See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakamas, June 9, 1855, art. 3, 12 Stat. 951, 953.

See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters,
and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, 35 Stat. 2448 (1909); Treaty
Between Canada and the United States of America Relating to Cooperative Development of
Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin; Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Treaty
Doc. No. 99-2, 16 U.S.C. 3631-3644. See also Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801-1882; Salmon and Steelhead Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
3301-3345.
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projects, allowing navigation, flood control, irrigation, hydropower generation
and recreation, and affecting salmon productivity.34 The Federal Energy
Regulation Commission licenses the nonfederal use of Basin water in the
mid-Columbia, the Snake, and elsewhere for the production of power.35 The
Bureau of Reclamation operates 10 water-storage reservoirs in the upper
Snake River, 16 reservoirs in the Middle Snake River, and a number of other
storage projects that irrigate some 3 million acres of land:36 53.9% of all
Washington’s irrigated land, 41.8% of Idaho’s, and 22.5% of Oregon’s.
The U.S. Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the Army Corps of Engineers affect water quality in the Basin through
operation of such federal facilities as the Hanford Nuclear Reservation,
administration of the Clean Water Act, and regulation of dredging, fill, and
other activities in navigable waters.37 The Bureau of Land Management, the
Forest Service and others manage federal lands which account for 55 percent
of the total land area in the Basin, determining the land management
practices which can harm or protect salmon habitat in tributary streams.38
The Bonneville Power Administration generates billions of dollars in
hydropower revenues, which support salmon rehabilitation and other public
purposes.39 The National Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service determine whether to list a species as endangered and
consult with federal agencies to avoid jeopardizing listed species, thereby
potentially affecting a broad range of water-related actions.40 And Congress
funds, or declines to fund, projects and activities with a variety of
implications for how water is used in the Basin.

34

See System Operation Review, at 1-8, Fig. 1-1, 3-1.

Federal Power Act, as amended. Within the next 25 years, the FERC will make relicensing decisions on nine mainstem Columbia and Snake hydroelectric dams and more
than 20 tributary projects within the Basin. Information from Peter Paquet, Northwest
Power Planning Council (Jan. 1997).
35

System Operation Review, Appendix F at 2-3 to 2-7; Bureau of Reclamation, Working Paper:
Potential Options for Consideration of Development of a Management Plan to Address Issues
Related to Columbia and Snake River Salmon, at pp. 22, 45 (Sept. 1990).
36

37

33 U.S.C. 403, 1251 et. seq., 1344.

38

System Operation Review at 2-31, 2-32, 2-33; Status of the Interior Columbia Basin at 47.

39

See Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 839 et seq.

40

16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.
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The federal presence is formalized in a series of laws and agreements, some
of which are now beginning to expire. Some of the understandings on which
the United States shares the Columbia’s management with Canada, and
with public and private electric utilities, are lapsing. Licenses for many of
the Basin’s non-federal hydropower facilities are coming up for review. The
laws that govern federal hydropower operations on the river are
overshadowed by salmon protection and water claims under the Endangered
Species Act, Indian treaties, the Northwest Power Act and other laws.
Insofar as prior agreements represented consensus that governed federal
operations on the river, that consensus has eroded. Any new consensus must
take into account not only the long heritage of river development, described
in the next section, but the importance of Columbia River salmon.
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III. Putting the River to Work
In its undeveloped state, the Columbia was the mainstay of a well-developed
salmon culture, and the center of a far-flung trading network. Non-Indians,
however, wanted to use the river in different ways, and felt themselves
constrained by the river’s wild variability. The amount of water that reaches
the estuary varies a great deal from season to season and year to year. Much
of the basin's precipitation is snow, which falls in the mountains from
October to May. With the spring freshets, the rivers swell to massive size.
On average, the Columbia's flow measured at The Dalles is a little more than
100,000 cubic feet per second before the freshet in February and more than
400,000 cubic feet per second during the freshet in May and June.41 Before it
was buried by a reservoir, Celilo Falls, once one of the river's major cataracts,
could disappear from view during the spring freshet and rise as high as
22 feet above the river during low water.42 Year-to-year variations can be
even more extreme. Peak flows have been as high as 1,240,000 cubic feet per
second at The Dalles (in 1894), and low flows as little as 35,000 cubic feet per
second (in 1937), a thirty-five-to-one variation.43
To the new settlers, the pre-development river was problematic. Nineteenth
century sternwheelers ran the undammed river, but with difficulty. Ships
could travel upriver as far as the Cascades, but then passengers and cargo
had to take a portage train past the big rapids at the Cascades and The
Dalles.44 Until dams were built, river navigation was eclipsed by trains.45
From an energy standpoint, the natural river was “180 degrees out of phase”
with human needs.46 It discharged 73 percent of its flow in the six summer
months and only 27 percent in the fall and winter months when power is
most needed.47 The thirty-five to one variation between peak flows and low
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flows meant flooding. Re-engineering the river to knock off these rough
edges involved what one writer called “ironing out the hydrograph.”48

A. Early Tributary Development
Early in the 19th century, the Hudson’s Bay Company, arriving from
Canadian possessions in the north, began trading in furs. Soon the Company
undertook a policy of over-trapping in the Wallowas and other mountains
south of the Columbia River, trying to discourage the American fur
companies from crossing the Rockies. The policy, and the overall economic
pressure to strip streams of beaver, caused a collapse in beaver populations
from which they have never recovered. Throughout the Columbia Basin,
“trapping reduced or extirpated most beaver populations, with resulting
widespread loss of structural elements, floodplain processes, and vegetative
diversity that had developed as a result of centuries of ongoing beaver
activity.49 “Because of their mediating role in the dynamics of streams and
wetlands, creating storage and backwaters, and manipulating water levels,
beaver were especially important factors in the hydraulics of tributary
streams in the arid parts of the Columbia Basin.50
As settlers arrived, the Basin’s Indian tribes were pushed out of their
homelands and the landscape began to change. The pattern in Northeast
Oregon was characteristic. Permanent settlement in the Grande Ronde Basin
in Northeast Oregon commenced in 1860. From west across the Blue
Mountains, one group found, “There were no lands in what is now called
Umatilla County worth taking. All the creek bottoms had been taken.”51 In
1861, Judge Benjamin Brown and Stephen Coffin founded LaGrande and
brought in cattle and horses to exploit the grass. Soon they were complaining
that the grass had become “less abundant,” while the Nez Perce and Umatilla
Indians visiting the valley would bring “vast herds of ponies with them which
sometimes trespassed on what the settlers conceived to be their rights.”
“[B]efore the dawn of the seventies, the pasturage of the Grande Ronde
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Valley commenced showing signs of exhaustion.”52 The less-accessible
Wallowa Valley remained in Nez Perce control until 1870, when settlers
pushed over the passes and down the Minam River. In 1872, the first cattle
grazed the Wallowa bottom lands. The Umatilla Tribe lost possession of its
lands in the middle and upper Grande Ronde by signing its 1855 Treaty with
Territorial Governor Isaac Stephens. The Nez Perce also signed an 1855
Treaty but their chief, Old Joseph, reserved his band’s rights in the Wallowa
Valley. Under settlement pressure, other Nez Perce leaders executed
amendatory documents in 1863, ceding the Wallowa lands. Tribal leaders
challenged their validity and nearly succeeded when white settlers were
ordered to leave the Valley. However, the order came under fire and was
vacated. The Wallowa Band left the valley for good as Young Joseph and the
Nez Perce embarked upon their fabled retreat through the Rocky Mountains,
falling just short of Canada in 1877.53
The United States offered land and water cheap or free; federal and state
water laws mostly supported control of water for mining, irrigating, and
producing power. A mining boom hit many parts of the basin in the 1860s,
which generated demand for food: Grain, sheep and cows. Livestock
production began to take off in the 1850s and 1860s, and it boomed through
the end of the century.54
Crops required irrigation in the Basin's dry interior. Marcus Whitman
diverted water from Doan Creek to irrigate his wheat fields in 1846, and the
Oblate Fathers took water from Ahtanum Creek for their mission near
Yakima at about the same time.55 In the Grande Ronde Valley in the 1860s,
settlers drained Tule Lake, and excavations began for what would become
the State Ditch, to reduce spring flooding. Over time, the ditch deepened,
eventually capturing the entire Grande Ronde River. Four miles of State
Ditch cut off 33 miles of circuitous river channel and flood plain,
disconnecting them from their recharge waters. The best alluvial fish habitat
in the basin was diminished dramatically.56
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Most water in streams in eastern Oregon was claimed by the early part of the
20th century: The upper Deschutes was fully appropriated by 1913;
approximately 40 percent of non-tribal water rights in the Umatilla Basin
were initiated before 1909; more than half the appropriations in the John
Day River were initiated before 1920.57 There were significant early
diversions from the Boise, the Hood, the Wenatchee and other rivers as well.
During the 1880s, Oregon, Washington and southern Idaho opened up
2.5 million acres of land for irrigation.58 The Yakima Valley had a boom of its
own between 1890 and 1910, when 5000 new irrigated farms sprouted. By
1902, it had the Northwest's largest irrigation project, sponsored in large
part by railroads promoting settlement.59
With many of the Basin's streams fully appropriated, demand for storage
projects grew. Conceding that private capital was insufficient to finance
most large-scale irrigation projects, Congress supported irrigated agriculture
in the Columbia Basin and elsewhere. In 1894 Congress approved the Carey
Act which authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant up to a million
acres of federal land to each arid western state for irrigation, reclamation,
cultivation, and occupation of those lands.60 In 1902 Congress approved the
Reclamation Act, providing federal financing for large-scale irrigation
development in the Yakima and other basins.61

B. Mainstem Development
1. The Columbia and Lower Snake System
Development of the Columbia’s mainstem initially lagged behind
development in the tributaries. Navigation locks had been installed at two of
the river's most difficult rapids around the turn of the century. Construction
of Cascade Locks began in the 1870s and was completed in 1896; the Celilo
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Canal was begun in 1903 and finished in 1915.62 But river navigation
petered out during the railroad era in the early part of the century, and there
was little rationale for damming the river. As historian Richard White put it:
Dams would improve navigation on a river where existing navigational
improvements went unused. They would bring more land into production
in a country where farmers were already plagued by overproduction and
low prices, and they would provide immense amounts of power which no
one wanted to buy.63
The river was uniquely suited to hydropower production, however. It is a
relatively steep river, dropping an average of about two feet per mile
(compared to Mississippi's six inches per mile). It flows in a solid rock
channel suitable for dam foundations. It is generally free of silt, assuring
long reservoir life. Indeed, the Columbia has been seen as a nationally
unique source of hydropower. Some have said it potentially could produce
about 40 percent of the nation's hydropower, at the lowest development cost
of any large power source in the country.64
In 1925, the Rivers and Harbors Act instructed the Army Corps of Engineers
to survey and report on the Columbia's potential for electric power,
navigation, flood control and irrigation development. Completed in March
1932, the report was the Columbia's first “308 Report,” named for the House
Document that first proposed such studies.65 The 1845-page document
characterized the Columbia as the “greatest system for water power to be
found anywhere in the United States,” and recommended ten dams for
navigation and electricity production.66 In other circumstances, the Report
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might have gathered dust. But coming in the midst of the Depression, it
became part of the New Deal agenda.67
Construction of the first federal mainstem projects recommended by the 308
Report, Bonneville and Grand Coulee, began in 1933. The non-federal Rock
Island project near Wenatchee, Washington had begun two years earlier. It
was the beginning of the Dam-Building Era, an era that changed the Pacific
Northwest "as nothing else since the coming of the covered wagon trains.”68
Grand Coulee was built for flood control, navigation, and reclamation “and
for the generation of electric energy as a means of financially aiding and
assisting such undertakings.”69 The irrigation component is called the
Columbia Basin Project. The project’s pumps lift water 280 feet into Banks
Lake, a 27-mile long irrigation reservoir.70 Irrigation works take the water
from there. The project first began irrigating fields in 1951.71 It now
irrigates about 560,000 acres with canals as big as rivers. It has a huge
drainage system to keep the land from being waterlogged. O'Sullivan Dam
and the Potholes Reservoir to capture return flows in the middle of the
project. As large as the project is, there could be more. It is about half the
size it was designed to be, and proposals to complete the project have never
entirely died.72
With construction of Grand Coulee and Bonneville underway, between 1935
and 1937, Congress debated a series of bills concerning the marketing of the
dams' electricity.73 One alternative was a “valley authority,” a Columbia

R. White, The Organic Machine at 55; Blumm, “The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage,”
58 Wash. L. Rev. at 193-95.

67

68

69

Holbrook, The Columbia River at 323.
Act of August 39, 1935, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., Pub. L. 409, sec. 2.

70
U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Working Paper: Potential Options for Consideration of
Development of a Management Plan to Address Issues Related to Columbia and Snake River
Salmon, at 85 (September, 1990).
71

Dietrich, Northwest Passage at 271; Holbrook, The Columbia River at 318.

U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Working Paper: Potential Options for Consideration of
Development of a Management Plan to Address Issues Related to Columbia and Snake River
Salmon, at 85; Dietrich, Northwest Passage at 291-95. In August 1994, the Bureau of
Reclamation abandoned an environmental impact analysis of a proposal to complete the
project. Columbia River System Operation Review, Final Environmental Impact Statement,
Appendix F at 1-2.
72

73

Blumm, “The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage,” 58 Wash. L. Rev. at 198.

25

A River in Common: The Columbia River, the Salmon Ecosystem, and Water Policy

River version of the Tennessee Valley Authority.74 The proposal met with
intense opposition from private utilities, the Corps of Engineers and
“chamber of commerce groups throughout the region.”75 Another alternative
was to divide power marketing between the Army Corps of Engineers (for the
Bonneville project) and the Bureau of Reclamation (for Grand Coulee), each
selling power to local markets not otherwise served by private utilities. This
approach was favored by business interests. During the summer of 1935, the
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission proposed an integrated
transmission grid from which power would be sold at uniform rates regionwide.76 The Commission, a New Deal product of the National Resources
Board of the Public Works Administration, played an important role in
federal inter-agency coordination and federal-state-local coordination from
its birth in 1934 to its termination in 1943.77 The Commission’s proposal for
an integrated grid led to a debate over the appropriate form of governance for
the Columbia River. The ensuing debate led to a compromise, an agency
created in 1937 within the Department of Interior, and called the Bonneville
Power Administration. The agency was charged with marketing power
output from the federal dams on the Columbia, giving preference to public
customers. The BPA was “intended to be provisional pending the
establishment of a permanent administration for Bonneville and other
projects in the Columbia River Basin.”78
World War II renewed the pressure for development. Numerous defenserelated industries located in the Northwest, including several aluminum
plants and a mysterious facility located on what became the Hanford Nuclear
Reservation. All of these installations took their power from Bonneville and
Grand Coulee dams. By 1942, 92 percent of the Bonneville Power
Administration’s load was committed to industry.79 From the onset of the
war through the mid-1940s, spurred by a marketing directive from the War
Production Board calling for utilities to interconnect transmission facilities to
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increase efficiency,80 BPA and the Army Corps of Engineers cooperated
closely to meet these requirements.81 Demand was projected to grow,
however, and in 1944 and 1945, Congress authorized a number of water
projects for the Basin, some of which, like the Lower Snake River projects,
would take 30 years to complete.82
Peace also spurred water development. In the five years following the war,
Congress authorized Chief Joseph Dam just below Grand Coulee83 and
Albeni Falls, Libby, John Day and The Dalles dams.84 In 1948, the Corps'
308 report proposed a high dam in Hells Canyon, on the Idaho-Oregon border
upstream from Lewiston, and a dam on the mid-Columbia at Priest Rapids,
above the confluence of the Snake and Columbia.85
With the change in federal administrations in 1953, support for federal dams
in Hells Canyon and the mid-Columbia faded. The Idaho Power Company
applied for licenses to build three non-federal projects in Hells Canyon, and
ultimately the Federal Power Commission granted a license over
opposition.86 On the mid-Columbia, Congress authorized Grant County
Public Utility District to file a application for a license to build a dam at
Priest Rapids.87 That license was followed by licenses for Wanapum Dam,88
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Rocky Reach Dam89 and Wells Dam,90 all to be operated by mid-Columbia
public utility districts.
Hydropower development had accelerated, but still could not keep up with
projected energy demand in a booming postwar economy. The problem was
perceived to be the lack of upstream storage. As one public power advocate
put it, “[s]torage is the key to complete development of the Columbia River . .
. without storage only about 20% of a hydroelectric power site's potential firm
capability can be realized . . . 80% of the potential power depends on
storage.”91 The 308 report of the 1940s proposed 20 million acre-feet of
storage for the United States part of basin. Yet, by the 1960s, only 13 million
acre-feet of hydropower storage had been developed. Plans for major storage
development had to contend with disagreements between upstream and
downstream states, competition between public and private utilities, and
growing environmental concern over proposed projects like Glacier View on
the Flathead River and high dams in Hells Canyon.92 So, without the
additional storage, energy output followed the vagaries of the unregulated
river, still out of phase with seasonal energy demand.
Faced with obstacles to further storage development in the United States,
the region looked to Canada. In 1944, the International Joint Commission
had been asked to “determine whether a greater use than is now being made
of the Columbia River system would be feasible and advantageous.”93 The
Joint Commission delegated the task to the Columbia River Engineering
Board, which filed a 1959 report identifying three alternative plans for
development and storage sites in Canada that could be operated to benefit
both countries. The Commission also proposed certain principles for
calculating and apportioning the costs and benefits of cooperative
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development.94 Based on these principles, the Columbia River Treaty was
signed on January 17, 1961 and ratified by the United States Congress on
March 16, 1961.95 Canadian ratification came three years later.96
From the United States' perspective, the treaty enabled the United States to
build Libby Dam in Montana, which backed up the Kootenay River into
Canada; Canada to use American money to build Mica, Duncan and Arrow
Lakes dams; and both countries to enjoy the benefits of power and flood
control. From the Canadian perspective, the Americans got 30 years of
optimized flows at little cost.97 In addition, there is an ongoing debate in
Canada regarding whether treaty storage prompted an increase in American
irrigated agriculture that competes with Canadian agriculture.98
The Canadians acquired rights to power made possible by the Canadian
storage, and half of this power is generated at United States dams. Yet,
Canada would not need this power for decades. Accordingly, Canada agreed
to the treaty only with the Americans' promise to buy back the Canadian
power entitlement. The Northwest states had no use for so much power
either, but California and the Pacific Southwest did. In 1964, Congress
authorized the sale of surplus Columbia River power outside the region,
along with construction of a Pacific Northwest-Pacific Southwest transmission line (“the intertie”), as long as the power could be called back if the
Northwest needed it. A Southwest consortium put up the money, the treaty
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projects were built, and headwater storage on the Columbia more than
doubled.99
The treaty went a long way toward ironing out the hydrograph. In the river’s
natural state, streamflow begins to pick up in the spring, as the snow pack
melts and runs off into streams. It peaks in May and June and begins to fall
off after mid-July (see the “1885-1964" line on Figure 2). Unregulated flow in
the October-February period (measured at The Dalles, in the lower part of
the river system) was only about 20 percent of that in the middle of June.100
The Treaty knocked the top off of the spring-summer peak. The Treaty
projects, together with the storage projects built before the Treaty, nearly
equalized fall-winter flow and spring-summer flow (see Figure 3). That part
of the peak would be stored in the treaty project reservoirs and spread out to
the fall and winter, when its value for hydroelectric generation would be
higher.
The Columbia River Treaty addressed only two water uses: hydropower
generation and flood control. Flow for salmon, water quality enhancement,
irrigation and recreation were not specifically addressed. As a result, there is
no formal way to incorporate the needs of salmon or other environmental
considerations into river management other than through economic trades.
The implementing entities under the treaty are, predictably, power
marketers and flood control engineers: British Columbia Hydro, Bonneville
Power Administration, and the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Adjustments
can be made in system operations to accommodate such concerns, but the
treaty’s hydropower generation and flood control purposes require
compensation for these changes. Thus, in the low-flow year of 1977 when
fish interests sought water for salmon flows, Canadians were willing to help
out at $6 per acre-foot. United States interests declined the offer at that
price, and tried to make do.101 The fact that the Treaty makes river
operations for fish and wildlife a cost rather than a value is a subject that
has yet to be addressed in negotiations between the two countries.
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Figure 2.—Changing the shape of the hydrograph.
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Figure 3.—The effect of storage projects on the river’s seasonal flows.
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2. The Snake River and the "Two Rivers” Concept
The Snake River, the Columbia's largest tributary, drains more than
40 percent of the surface area of the Columbia Basin, yet supplies only
about 20 percent of the Columbia's flow.102 Most of the Snake Basin lies
in southern Idaho and the easternmost part of Oregon, a dry region whose
development has been almost totally dependent on water availability. A
lesser part of the basin drains western Wyoming and small pockets of
northern Utah and Nevada.103
Although the Snake is a hydroelectric river in its middle reach in Idaho,
irrigation dominates the Snake Basin in eastern Idaho and eastern Oregon.
Even in its middle reaches in Idaho, the Snake River is not part of the
Columbia/Lower Snake hydropower system. In fact, as important as it is, the
Snake River is almost aqua incognita for purposes of federal Columbia River
power system planning. In that context, the river above Hells Canyon is
simply “treated as a ‘hypothetical reservoir’ that could supply varying
amounts of river flow at different times of the year.”104
The Upper Snake Basin. Hundreds of thousands of acres of cropland were
developed in the Upper Snake Basin between 1880 and 1899. By the turn of
the century, however, surface streams were fully appropriated during most
summers.105 Decreed surface water rights in the Upper Basin increased from
204 cubic feet per second in 1880 to 25,527 cubic feet per second by 1925.106
It became essential to build irrigation storage facilities.107
Idaho had a relatively high degree of success developing private irrigation
facilities under the Carey Act. Two-thirds of all claims filed under the Carey
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Act were in the Snake Basin, some 414,000 irrigated acres.108 With the
passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, the first major federal reclamation
projects in the state were authorized: Minidoka in the Upper Snake Basin
(1904) and the Boise Project in the Lower Basin (1906). Managing new
storage water rights with existing surface water rights created new complications, and in the 1920s irrigators and federal officials banded together to
create a “Committee of Nine” to oversee Upper Basin water management.109
By the 1930s, 31 large irrigation storage projects were in place. In dry years,
all of the Snake's water could be controlled by storage,110 and nearly
2.2 million acres were under irrigation in the Snake River Plain.111 Today,
Idaho is forty-first in population nationally and fourth in irrigated land. The
Snake Basin uses more than fifteen percent of the total agricultural water in
nation.112
While most of the storage projects in the Snake system are in Idaho, part of
the Upper Snake River (more than a million acre-feet) originates in
Wyoming. Jackson Lake, part of the turn-of-century Minidoka Project, has
an active storage capacity of 847,000 acre-feet of water. Under the
provisions of a 1949 compact between Wyoming and Idaho, Wyoming water
users are entitled to divert up to four percent of the river's flow measured at
the state line. A recent estimate showed that Wyoming's allocation would
have averaged about 170,000 acre-feet per year since the compact was
signed, enough to meet Wyoming's Upper Snake Basin's projected needs
until the year 2020.113
Operations of the Upper Snake projects are premised on a “Two Rivers”
concept, the idea that the Snake is one river in the Upper Snake Basin and
another river in the Middle Snake Basin. The Two Rivers concept is
explained by the river's unique geography. A dam in south-central Idaho

Tim Palmer, The Snake River, Window to the West 54 (1991); Fereday and Creamer,
“Swan Falls in 3-D,” 28 Idaho L. Rev. at 581.

108

109
M. Fiege, “Creating a Hybrid Landscape: Irrigated Agriculture in Idaho,” 11 Illahee 606264 (1995).
110

Chapman, supra, at sect. A, 17.

Hydrosphere, Water Supplies to Promote Juvenile Anadromous Fish Migration in the
Snake River Basin, citing Goodell, S. A., Water Use on the Snake River Plain, Idaho and
Eastern Oregon, U. S. Geological Survey, Professional Paper 1408-E (1988).
111

112

Id., Sect. A at 17.

See Hydrosphere, section A at 30; U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Working Paper: Potential
Options for Consideration of Development of a Management Plan to Address Issues Related to
Columbia and Snake River Salmon, at 23.
113

34

Putting the River to Work

35

Figure 4.—Snake River Basin.
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called Milner Dam, built in 1905, is the last place in the Upper Snake Basin
where gravity diversion is practical. Downstream of Milner, the Snake
enters a deep canyon that precludes gravity diversions. For this reason, early
irrigation development in the Snake Basin was primarily in the Upper Snake
Basin above Milner, and that part of the river was managed regardless of
what happened to the river downstream. The Two Rivers idea was first
formalized in an agreement between Idaho Power and the Bureau of
Reclamation regarding development of the American Falls Project in the
1920s; it was adopted by the Idaho legislature in the 1970s and 1980s. At
first as a matter of practice and later as a matter of policy, water
administrators have tried to operate the upper basin facilities so that no
water passes Milner during irrigation season.114
The Bureau of Reclamation occupies a strategic place in the Upper Snake
system, where it controls more than four million acre-feet of storage in ten
reservoirs.115 Bureau storage is largely contracted to 63 entities.116 These
spaceholder contracts each carry a priority date, and holders may use all,
part or none of their stored water. If the water goes unused it may be held
over until the next year, or it may be leased through the Upper Basin's water
bank.
The Upper Basin's water bank originated in informal arrangements by which
an irrigator with more water than needed could rent to water-short irrigators
in dry years. The system was institutionalized by statute in 1977, following a
severe drought. The bank has its own rules, developed under a state statute
that recognizes water leasing as a beneficial use of water.117 Under the rules,
water users must decide by July whether to commit water to the bank.
Those seeking water for irrigation in the Upper Basin have first priority on
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leasing. The date the water is made available determines its leasing priority
date. During the 1980s, water in the water bank ranged from slightly less
than 15,000 acre-feet to more than 360,000 acre-feet. The Bureau controls
the price and time period for these leases. During the 1980s, the price was
$2.75 per acre-foot, of which 75 cents was taken for administrative expenses
and two dollars went to the lessor.118
The Middle Snake River. The Middle Snake, the “second river” below Milner,
arises from the unique connections between surface water and the Snake
Plain Aquifer, which is located largely in the upper basin. The volcanic soil
that overlies the aquifer is porous, so irrigation water percolates into the
aquifer relatively quickly. As surface irrigation increases, so does aquifer
recharge. The Snake Plain Aquifer, one of the world's most productive,
discharges much of its water at a place below Milner called Thousand
Springs, and this is the source of the Snake River's rebirth. From Milner to
Swan Falls, the river gains almost six million acre-feet of groundwater.119 In
the past, as irrigation in the upper basin increased, so did discharges from
the aquifer and so did flows in the river below Thousand Springs.120
This effect, increasing surface irrigation producing more aquifer recharge and
more discharge below Milner, grew during the early part of the century,
leveled off after World War II, and then began to reverse itself. The reversal
was due to growing groundwater pumping and increased irrigation efficiency
in the Upper Basin. Between 1945 and 1966, 700,000 acres were put into
production with groundwater, causing a jump in irrigated acreage from
2.5 million acres to 3.2 million acres. In the decade following 1966, irrigators
began to improve the efficiency of their water use, converting hundreds of
thousands of acres from flood irrigation to sprinklers: two-hundred thousand
acres by 1976 and more than a million more by 1990. Further efficiencies
were instituted by canal companies and irrigation districts after the 1977
drought, reducing diversions from surface and storage water by almost a
million acre-feet by 1983. These efficiencies tended to reduce the amount of
water spread on fields, which in turn reduced aquifer discharge and flows
below Milner.121
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The Middle Snake is also the territory of the Idaho Power Company. The
Company developed the Swan Falls Project in 1901 and later developed
another ten dams on the Snake and five on tributaries.122 After World War
II, when irrigation boomed, Idaho Power doubled its generating capacity
through the development of the Hells Canyon Complex and other facilities in
the Middle Snake.123
The development of Hells Canyon raised major issues and extended debate:
whether Hells Canyon should be privately or federally developed; what
development would do to anadromous fish; whether development would
foreclose later upstream irrigation development in Idaho; whether federal
marketing and transmission responsibility in the Snake River Basin should
be assigned to the Bonneville Power Administration or the Bureau of
Reclamation; whether downstream federal dams should compensate Idaho
Power for downstream benefits; and others.124 The outcome of the debate
had important consequences. The choice of private development is one
explanation for the limited coordination between Middle Snake hydropower
and the federal power system. The Idaho Power Company's three-dam Hells
Canyon proposal was chosen in part because the dams were lower in height
than other proposals,125 and the lower height was thought to be more
consistent with anadromous fish passage. The irony was hard to miss later
when fish passage facilities in Hells Canyon failed and large areas of fall
chinook spawning and rearing habitat were lost, apparently irretrievably.
Yet, other proposals would have been worse from a salmon's-eye view. The
combination of the proposed High Mountain Sheep Dam on the Snake and
the big Nez Perce Dam on the Salmon River could have compounded these
effects.126
The post-World War II period also brought new irrigation development to the
Middle Snake, part of a West-wide irrigation boom.127 The Bureau of
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Reclamation developed a number of storage projects below Milner: sixteen
reservoirs controlling more than 3,700,000 acre-feet of water to irrigate
600,000 acres of land. Of this, about 3,100,000 acre-feet is actively managed
for irrigation and flood control.128 In addition, high-lift pumps made it
practical to take water directly out of the Snake River below Milner.
Hundreds of thousands of acres of desert land also were developed for
irrigation under the Desert Land Entry Act and the Carey Act from the mid1960s to 1980.129
Growing energy demand and continued expansion of irrigation sowed the
seeds of what has been called Idaho's biggest water-rights controversy.130
The Idaho Power Company's Swan Falls Project was the first hydropower
project on the Snake (completed in 1910). The project would be affected by
later upstream diversions, but the effects were neither simple nor obvious.
By the early 1950s, however, flows at Swan Falls began to reflect the
increased groundwater pumping and reduced aquifer recharge from more
efficient use of surface waters. Aquifer discharge began to drop off, reducing
flows at Swan Falls while the demand for electric energy to power irrigation
pumps climbed. Demand grew even more with high-lift pumps below Milner.
This pumping was depleting Swan Falls flows even more directly than
groundwater pumping did. To meet this growing energy demand, which was
simultaneously reducing generating capacity, Idaho Power Company first
developed hydroelectric projects in Hells Canyon and then proposed to build
a coal-fired generating plant.
It was in the debate over the coal plant that it began to occur to some Idaho
Power ratepayers that growing irrigation was putting upward pressure on
power bills. If Swan Falls had an early water right (1901 and thereabouts),
why was the Company allowing junior upstream irrigators to take its water
and drive up power rates? From one perspective the answer was that it had
always been that way. From early on, the Idaho Power Company and
virtually everyone else subscribed to the Two Rivers concept. It was accepted
that irrigation development in the Upper Snake Basin above Milner would be
of no concern to water users below Milner, including the Idaho Power
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Company. In effect, the Company had developed a policy of “subordinating
the need of water for power to that of water for irrigation” upstream.131
Some ratepayers saw no reason to accept this, however, and they sued the
Company to force it to assert Swan Falls' water rights. In defense, the
Company filed suit and won judicial recognition of its early Swan Falls
rights.132 The court left open, however, the question of whether the Company
had abandoned any of those rights by acquiescing in irrigation development,
so both sides saw sense in settlement negotiations.
Under the ensuing settlement, signed in October, 1984, Idaho Power kept its
Swan Falls water rights, but subordinated a portion of them to future
upstream water rights with a caveat: any future rights that would have a
significant effect on hydropower production could be granted by the state
only if consistent with a new set of criteria designed to recognize a public
interest in water, including hydropower generation and other values. Beyond
a certain level of future development, the Company retained the right to
assert its senior priority.133 The settlement was approved by the Idaho
legislature,134 and, after a skirmish before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, by the U. S. Congress.
According to some observers, what some people expected from the Swan Falls
settlement – that it would clear the way for significant new water
development in the Upper Basin – has not been borne out. As two
knowledgeable commentators observed in the early 1990s:
Development of irrigated acreage in southern Idaho will continue to be
driven not by the availability of water under the Swan Falls arrangement,
but by the dictates of agricultural economics. Indeed, to the extent the
availability of water is an issue in any proposed new “trust water”
diversion, the tension is most likely to arise between the proposed new
appropriation and the rights of existing irrigators, not between the
applicant and Idaho Power.135
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The conflicts in the upper part of the basin, particularly those between
surface and ground water users, seem to bear this observation out. The
limitation on water use in the upper basin is more the result of objections by
water users who were not party to the Swan Falls, than by the Swan Falls
settlement. Indeed, the more significant developments may be emerging
from the surface-ground water conflicts. For example, in Musser v.
Higginson, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered the state Department of Water
Resources to regulate pumping by junior ground water users on the Snake
Plan aquifer to protect senior surface water users.136 The Department had
argued that it need not undertake to regulate ground water users pending
formal determination of conjunctive management in the area. Following the
Supreme Court opinion, the Department proposed administrative rules that
might have been considered revolutionary in a pure, prior appropriation
state. Under the new rules, surface water users may be limited to
“reasonable use” to protect competing ground water uses,137 notwithstanding
the amount of water they might be able to assert in a stream adjudication.138
Thus, while the Swan Falls settlement produced innovation in Idaho water
policy and settled a potentially explosive suit, its practical effect may be less
important than the developments that are occurring entirely outside the
framework of the settlement.

C. The Law of the River
1. Interactions Between Federal and State Law
It would be misleading to call the laws and agreements that control Columbia
and Snake River water the “law of the river” if that implied an integrated
body of rules. Major parts of the river were developed in accordance with the
Corps of Engineers' 308 reports, which have been called “comprehensive,”139
but the 308 reports did not cover the whole river, or all issues. The
reclamation projects in the Upper Snake, after all, had been built for decades,
and their place in the system may have seemed an academic point to those
writing the 308 reports. Even for those parts of the system covered by the
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308 reports, the reports were “comprehensive” only in an engineering sense.
Similarly, the Columbia River Treaty “comprehensively” reduces the river to
hydropower and flood control issues.
These plans and arrangements did not address many of the values that are
driving the debate over the river now. Rather, planning meant development
planning. Governance was reduced to the idea that the agency authorized to
build a project also operated that project: The Corps of Engineers managed
the projects in the lower part of the Basin where navigation was possible; the
Bureau of Reclamation managed the projects in the upper parts of the Basin
where irrigation was more significant, and the Bonneville Power
Administration marketed the power generated at both Corps and Bureau
dams. Allocation of authority was often worked out among the agencies amid
flying elbows. Gifford Pinchot's characterization concerned a different set of
agencies, but there was a parallel to the Columbia:
[E]very separate government agency having to do with natural resources
was riding its own hobby in its own direction. Instead of being, as we
should have been, like a squadron of cavalry, all acting together for a
single purpose, we were like loose horses in a field, each one following his
own nose. Every bureau chief was for himself and his own work, and the
devil take all the others. Everyone operated inside his own fence, and few
were big enough to see over it. They were all fighting each other for place
and credit and funds and jurisdiction. What little co-operation there was
between them was an accidental, voluntary, and personal matter between
men who happened to be friends.140
Moreover, even if the 308 reports had been more comprehensive and federal
agencies less competitive, only some of the arrangements that govern the
river were federal. Others were determined by state law, which allocated
many surface streams long before federal development. Congress intended
the reclamation program to fit itself to state water law, but the fit has often
been uneasy.141 The Bureau of Reclamation projects in the Upper Snake
Basin, discussed above, are evidence of the complex relationships that
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resulted. The Grand Coulee Project is another example. There, water is
stored in accordance with Washington law, which provides a procedure by
which the Bureau may notify the state that it is studying water for certain
uses. The notice reserves this quantity of water from allocation.142 Yet, the
project’s operations for hydropower, flood control, and salmon are governed
by a separate complex of federal laws. Bureau of Reclamation projects on
other tributaries, such as the Yakima and the Umatilla rivers, are subject to
their own set of rules under federal and state laws.

2. The Columbia Valley Authority
The impulse to establish a more encompassing framework in which to
manage the river has emerged repeatedly over the last 60 years. The Basin's
first brush with the idea of comprehensive river governance ended in
stalemate in 1937, when the BPA was created as a “temporary” entity to
market the dams' energy output. But the 1937 compromise was only a short
intermission in the debate. The idea of creating a comprehensive federal
agency to plan for the development of the Basin was still alive. The original
proposal envisioned an agency called the Columbia Valley Authority. The
Columbia Valley Authority would have been less powerful than the
Tennessee Valley Authority, but still it would have ruled the region's federal
dams, transmission system, the Columbia Basin reclamation project, and any
subsequent federal dam or water control project. It would have inherited
general jurisdiction over development for navigation, flood control, power
generation, reclamation and recreation in the Basin. It could have engaged
in mining development and encouraged soil, forest and range land
conservation. It also would have had the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service's
authority in the Basin. Moreover, it would have been authorized to plan for
“the unified development of the Columbia Valley region,” including virtually
all aspects of federal natural resource development and conservation.143
The Columbia Valley Authority proposal generated opposition, in part due to
local concerns about federal intrusion into water-rights administration144 and
in part due to fear of an autocratic super-agency. As one opponent put it:
“The Authority derives its powers from the Federal Government and thereby
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political control is welded with economic and social control and creates a
perfect set-up for autocracy.”145 The initial proposal was abandoned in the
1937 compromise. Subsequent proposals responded by including stronger
state water-rights disclaimers, restricting the Authority’s power over water
planning and development, and finally limiting the agency's authority to
hydropower alone.146 These proposals persisted through the 1950s, but they
bore no fruit. Instead, the 1950s were a time when the idea of
comprehensive federal river development went into eclipse, most notably in
the decision to allow private development of Hells Canyon.

3. The Columbia River Compact
The federal government was not the only possible vehicle for coordination.
The states too attempted to write a chapter in river governance, in
negotiations for a Columbia River Compact.147 The first proposal for an
interstate compact was made in 1911, by Oregon Governor Oswald West.
Congress passed enabling legislation in 1925. The governors of Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming formed the Northwest States
Development Association in 1943, in part to evaluate potential for a water
compact. The upswing in federal water development that followed the war
gave the idea new impetus. As one state water administrator put it, the
“states started to feel very much left out of the action.”148 In 1949, several
governors asked Washington's Governor Langlie to lead an effort to develop
a compact. The compact commission met in 1950, beginning nearly two
decades of active negotiations.149
Hydrology and politics posed formidable obstacles to agreement. Forty-four
percent of the river flow originates in Canada. In the United States, 70
percent of the flow comes from headwater states (Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Utah and Wyoming). Yet, during the early negotiations, 63 percent of the
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population was in the lower basin, Oregon and Washington. In some ways,
the numbers themselves best explain the parties' positions:
Table 1 150

State

Percent
of water

Percent of
population

Idaho

47.6

9.4

Montana

17.1

9.5

Nevada

1.0

2.5

Oregon

12.9

24.5

Utah

—

11.8

Washington

15.3

38.3

6.1

4.0

Wyoming

The upstream-downstream dynamic was hard to miss: Water originates in
upstream states; most of the votes and most of the power consumption are in
the downstream states. The rational upstream state will seek a quid pro quo
for every drop of water it can control.
Building storage projects to control water posed complex problems.
Upstream states need the cooperation of downstream states to finance such
projects. Downstream states want the storage, but cannot secure it without
upstream cooperation. Both upstream and downstream interests have
trouble developing such projects on their own:
Headwater storage projects are distant, involve difficulties with local
officials and residents, and, as multipurpose projects of a comprehensive
development plan, are ordinarily too costly to be justified by power alone.
In addition, there has been no way for nonfederal investors to recoup their
investment from values produced for downstream federal generating
projects in the case of power, or from the public treasury or otherwise for
flood control, navigation, and other non-reimbursable benefits. Consequently, such projects have not ordinarily been commercially attractive.
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Thus, headwater developments, serving essentially multi-purpose values,
have lagged.151
Although the value of cash, power supply and increased state control of the
river were apparent, Montana was skeptical of upstream development. In
later years, after the construction of large federal facilities, Montana's
willingness to participate in development seemed to dry up altogether. In
1975, the director of the state's Department of Natural Resources observed
that “many of the residents in Western Montana indicated they don't want to
see any more mainstem dams. If we read the public correctly, they would just
as soon the Corps stayed in Seattle, Portland, or wherever.”152
In contrast to water compacts where water allocation is the central question,
the proposed Columbia River Compact raised more diverse issues. One was
the allocation of electric power generated by the dams. Upstream states
regarded power generation as an important benefit of collaboration.
Montana wanted the downstream states to pay cash for use of Montana
water, together with a block of power to be used for the state's later use.153
Downstream states, where most of the energy demand was, wanted
flexibility on the issue.
The negotiations also addressed water allocation issues in the Snake River.
The Columbia River had enough water that a specific allocation was not
thought to be needed. In the Snake, however, Idaho argued for the
subordination of downstream non-consumptive uses to upstream irrigation.154 The United States insisted on preventing upstream depletion in order
to protect federal projects downstream.
Ongoing compact administration was another issue. There was extended
debate over the need for and powers of a permanent commission. Should a
compact have power to issue bonds? Should it have authority to build water
projects? What should be the allocation of voting strength among the states?
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In addition to these issues, the compact negotiations became a forum for one
of the electric utility industry's favorite pastimes: jousting between public
power and private power, the scars of which were fresh from the Columbia
Valley Authority debates and the Hells Canyon battles. Supporters of the
compact were those who opposed a valley authority, including private
utilities, business interests and others. Opponents of the compact, especially
public power advocates, supported a federal valley authority and saw the
compact negotiations as a conspiracy. As one opponent said:
The study of this compact and of the record in the minutes and news
reports cannot but leave one with the uncomfortable feeling that the whole
effort has been a conspiracy, financed by public tax funds, to rig the rules
on use of Columbia basin water resources in favor of special power
monopoly and to prevent public development of the great public
resources.155
Given the difficulty of the issues and the complexity of the politics, it may not
be surprising that the negotiations ultimately failed. Indeed, perhaps the
surprise is that the compact negotiators themselves succeeded in coming to
any kind of agreement, which they did on a limited basis in 1955 and again in
1963. But the Washington legislature, responding to public power concerns,
refused to ratify the compact the negotiators agreed on, and the states began
to see the negotiations as futile. The compact commission's last meeting was
in 1968. There has been occasional interest in reopening the negotiations
since then, but nothing has come of it.

4. The Columbia River Treaty and the Coordination Agreement
Negotiations with Canada had proceeded on a parallel track (see
pages 28-30). The Columbia River Treaty committed the United States
to coordinate operations on the U. S. side of the border in order to take
full advantage of the new storage. In 1964, the Corps of Engineers, BPA
and the region's utilities entered into an agreement called the Pacific
Northwest Coordination Agreement, which still governs power operations in
the system.156 The Coordination Agreement built on 20 years of voluntary
cooperation through the Northwest Power Pool (begun in World War II). The
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agreement was premised on the fact that the Columbia River power system
is hydraulically and electrically connected, and so upstream storage
operations affect downstream generation. Coordinating these facilities as
though they had a single owner would enable all parties to benefit more than
if each were acting for its own account.
The coordinators assume flows always will be at the lowest level recorded in
the last 50 years, and translate those levels into "firm power" projections
used in attempting to address each party's needs and operations.157 The
Agreement requires an Annual Operating Plan for the entire Basin, and
coordination of the parties' operations to maximize power production after
meeting non-power water uses. The agreement obliges parties to cooperate
in times of shortage, regulates payments for upstream water releases that
benefit downstream generators, and calls for “in-lieu” energy payments when
water held at one dam decreases generation at another.158
With the development of the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement,
most of the pre-1976 institutional arrangements for the Columbia and Lower
Snake were in place. The fourteen federal dams that dominate the Columbia
and Lower Snake rivers are called the “Federal Columbia River Power
System.” The Coordination Agreement requires coordination of these dams
with those of the utilities which operate the river's non-federal dams.
Mechanisms to coordinate hydropower and flood control, navigation and
irrigation were hammered out over a period of many years.159 Various
statutes fixed Bonneville’s power marketing obligations, requiring the agency
to encourage the widest possible use of federal power,160 give preference to
public customers,161 and sell power outside the region only if it exceeds the
demands of regional customers.162 Bonneville’s ability to finance its
operations out of its own revenues, conferred by a 1974 statute,163 gives it
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and the Columbia River system an unusual degree of autonomy.164 While
federal laws, agreements and projects play an enormous part in this
structure, it would be misleading to say that the river had been federalized.
In addition to non-federal development in the Mid-Columbia, the
Coordination Agreement is a contract whose principals include mostly nonfederal entities, and Bonneville’s own operations are unusually free from
Washington, D. C. oversight.
The Upper and Middle Snake rivers, having survived a major challenge in the
Swan Falls litigation, also had workable institutional arrangements. In the
Upper Basin, the compact with Wyoming, the Committee of Nine, the water
bank, and the severance of the Snake at Milner had established the Upper
Basin as a more or less stable, self-sufficient hydrologic unit. In the Middle
Snake, irrigation and hydropower had achieved a balance of their own. If the
Snake and the Columbia seemed unconnected institutionally, it was the
logical result of the different patterns of development in the two rivers.
The arrangements that characterized the Columbia River's governance in
1976 were in some respects ad hoc, but in many respects they worked, at
least from the point of view of development. Arrangements had been
developed to plan and coordinate flood control and power generation.
Navigation facilities were in place. Irrigation was managed as a selfcontained system. This was not a comprehensive or fully integrated system
of river governance, but by and large it suited the river's development.
For those looking for integration, however, these arrangements remain a
patchwork of federal and state laws, varying from place to place and from
subject to subject. Federal laws generally govern the licensing of most
nonfederal hydroelectric projects and the management of federal dams, but
require both types of project operators to obtain water rights under the terms
of state laws.165 Federal laws devoted to hydropower, flood control and
navigation govern the mainstem Columbia and Lower Snake, while state
laws often dominate the tributaries. State law is focused on irrigation in the
Upper Snake and on private hydropower and reclamation in the Middle
Snake, with both unrelated to the federal law that rules the Lower Snake.
The unique Idaho arrangements and institutions, the Two Rivers concept,
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the Committee of Nine, the rules for canal companies and irrigation districts
are creations of state law.166
The Basin entered the 1970s with a river from which a measure of flood
control was extracted, a good river for navigation, but a river that otherwise
was managed to optimize power generation, particularly in the Columbia and
Lower Snake. Optimizing the river for hydropower produced a situation in
which the United States, like Canada, treats “natural flows” as a cost. While
the economic rationale for this is clear enough, it made the Columbia yet
another example of “a part of nature that had died and been reborn as
money.”167

5. Financial Interdependence Between Hydropower and Reclamation
One of the few points of institutional interaction between the Columbia and
irrigation tributaries like the Snake is the financial interdependence between
the federal hydropower system and reclamation projects. Hydropower
generation started out as an incidental benefit of reclamation dams, but later
assumed major importance.168 Although the Reclamation Act originally
required water users to repay reclamation project costs, this requirement
was gradually diluted, so that in most cases irrigators pay only a fraction of
the cost of their water.169 Instead, repayment obligations have been
determined by the users' perceived ability to pay, with payments spread over
lengthy repayment periods at no interest. Costs not paid by irrigators are
financed by hydropower revenues and federally appropriated funds.170 In this
manner, hydropower, once viewed as a minor incident of federal projects,
became a primary part of reclamation's economic justification.
The hydropower system's financial commitment to reclamation is significant.
In 1985, the General Accounting Office estimated that $14.1 billion in
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irrigation costs were scheduled on paper to be recovered through power revenues.171 However, because of long and flexible repayment terms for
reclamation projects, and because as a general matter hydropower revenues
are not used to actually repay the costs of reclamation facilities until after
the irrigators have repaid their share of those costs, no hydropower revenues
had actually been used to repay reclamation costs prior to 1985.172 One
power marketing administration made its first irrigation repayment in 1985,
and another plans to begin in 1997. As of the mid-1990s, hydropower had not
yet repaid any of the reclamation costs in the Columbia River Basin.173
Nevertheless, the reclamation system has unquestionably been the
beneficiary of a vital set of financial incentives and benefits.174 A 1996 study
by the U. S. General Accounting Office characterized the nature of the
benefit from a national perspective: Long-term (typically 40 years), interestfree repayment schedules; repayment obligations shifted to other project
beneficiaries, usually power generation, through “irrigation assistance;" and
specific repayment relief statutes. Nationally, the aggregate benefits are
considerable:
The Bureau has determined that $16.9 billion, or 78 percent, of the
$21.8 billion investment in water projects is reimbursable to the federal
government. Of these reimbursable costs, the largest portion,$7.1 billion,
has been allocated to irrigators. However, when the repayment obligation
is adjusted through irrigation assistance and charge-offs, the irrigators are
scheduled to repay on $3.4 billion. On the basis of a determination that
the irrigators are unable to pay the full amount of $7.1 billion, $3.4 billion
of their obligation has been shifted to the projects' other beneficiaries for
repayment, primarily through power revenues. In addition, irrigators have
been relieved of $373.1 million of their repayment obligation through
charge-offs.175
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The financial interdependence between reclamation and hydropower has not
had the effect of integrating federal law and state law, however. The fault
line between federal and state law, which divides the mainstem from each of
its tributaries, is yet another boundary with consequences for salmon.
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IV. Restoring the River of Salmon
A. Salmon and the Effects of Development
The developed river is a far cry from the river that saw the dawn of the 19th
century. Storage projects have evened out the extreme year-to-year
variations in flow. Calm pools backed up by a series of run-of-the-river dams
now cover the cataracts at the Cascades and The Dalles. Navigation to the
Idaho border is not only common, but barges can transport loads that once
were unimaginable. The river that was 180 degrees out of phase with power
needs now runs one of the world’s great hydropower systems. The Basin is
settled, and the Columbia River has been yoked to generators, mines, farms,
ranches, industry, and human habitations.
Development of the Columbia and Snake River hydropower system tells only
part of the story, however. Tributary and watershed development have also
played a significant role in changing the Basin’s ecology, as has the
commercial salmon harvest. All of it has combined to create a fundamental
change in the Basin’s aquatic ecology. The law of natural selection, “ecology’s
first law,” decrees that successful living populations adjust themselves to the
demands of their environment; therefore all populations are evolving and all
organisms are a template of their environment:
A corollary of the law of natural selection is that any direction change in
the environment will force a population’s genetic template out of focus. If
the change is gradual, as in the case of some past climatic changes, a
population may become refocused by the development of a new balance of
characteristics through natural selection. Alternatively, the population
may become extinct or it may be redistributed to more favorable
locations.176
These changes are by definition complex and various, but they have been
anything but gradual. The span of time between now and the first major
disturbances in the Basin’s pre-settlement ecology is less than 200 years, and
the pace of disturbance has accelerated in the last 50. This section sketches
the nature and pace of development, to provide a context for the salmon and
water policy mitigation experiments of the last 20 years.
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1. Loss of Tributary Habitat
Salmon are particularly sensitive to habitat degradation. They need cool,
clean, running streams and healthy alluvial floodplains in which to reproduce
and grow.177 They require streamside riparian cover, large, woody debris in
the stream channel, adequate food sources (such as insects), and pools in
which to hide and rest. In the first half of the 19th century, stream ecology
first began to change when beaver were trapped and their dams largely
eliminated. Settlers began major logging operations in some parts of the
Basin by the 1880s. They dammed and built reservoirs to hold huge logjams
which were sometimes cleared with dynamite. Stream flows fluctuated
wildly, banks eroded, streams widened, and pools were buried in sawdust.178
Miners' dams and ditches blocked and drained streams, rearranged habitat,
rerouted water into nozzles and washed hillsides into streams. Spawning
areas in the John Day, Grande Ronde, Yakima and Owyhee rivers and many
streams in Idaho were buried under tons of hydraulic mining runoff. Salmon
were eliminated from the Boise River by 1865.179 Early overgrazing caused
some grasses to disappear, soil to compact, water tables to drop,
streambanks to erode, streams and spawning beds to silt up.180 Only three
percent of interior Basin lands retain a landscape pattern similar to
historical patterns.181
A number of salmon runs were wiped out by over-fishing in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, particularly after the first cannery began
operations on the Columbia in 1866. By the late 1800s, over-fishing was
blamed for declines in chinook salmon runs; in 1894, a federal fisheries
official said it was "beyond question" that the numbers of salmon returning
to their natal streams were "insignificant in comparison with the number
which some years ago annually visited and spawned in these waters;" and
by 1900, certain fishing gear had been banned to protect spawning runs.182
The drop in returning salmon meant that some streams were deprived of the
nutrients that were formerly released by the decay of spawned-out salmon.
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The cycle in which salmon transported energy from the ocean to headwater
areas began to erode.
Throughout much of the Basin, the greatest change in land patterns came
from the expansion of agriculture.183 Irrigation diversions in the 19th century
often blocked migrating salmon. Diversions usually lacked screens to keep
juvenile fish from being diverted onto fields; irrigation return flows warmed
streams and loaded them with silt.184 Even before federal reclamation
development, the Basin's salmon rivers were degraded. In 1893, the Yakima
River's temperature reached 60 degrees in the summer. In the summer of
1906, its flows had dropped from an average of 3900 to 105 cubic feet per
second.185 Salmon declines were noticed in the Umatilla River in the 1870s
and in the Deschutes in the 1880s. By 1892, much of the Umatilla was
blocked to salmon migration.186 In areas of the Basin that could still be
reached by salmon, irrigation diversions eliminated populations in the lower
reaches of many tributaries like the Boise, John Day, Umatilla and Walla
Walla rivers.187
Today, irrigation from surface and ground water is far and away the
dominant off-stream use of water in the Basin.188 Large areas of the Basin
have been converted to irrigated farming: 7,324,000 irrigated acres,
including Canada. Idaho has the largest irrigated area with 3,330,000 acres
(45 percent of the total basin), Washington next with 1,879,000 acres (25
percent), Oregon with 1,310,000 acres (18 percent) and Montana with
433,700 acres (6 percent). Of this, 3 million acres are watered by Bureau of
Reclamation projects.189
Comprehensive data on streams that are dried up by irrigation and other
diversions are unavailable, but there is no reason to dispute the conclusion of
the federal agencies’ System Operation Review: “Most streams in the Pacific
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Northwest are fully or over appropriated.”190 Low-flow problems exist in
many parts of the region east of the Cascade Mountains.191 For example, fish
and wildlife agency and tribal and conservation group experts estimated in
1993 that 80 percent of 153 Oregon tributaries had low-flow problems (twothirds of which were caused at least in part by irrigation withdrawals).192 A
1992 analysis of water problems affecting fish production showed similar
problems in many Idaho, Oregon and Washington tributaries as well.193 The
National Marine Fisheries Service has contracted with the Bureau of
Reclamation to develop more comprehensive data on the extent of the
problem.194
After the dam-building era began, so did the era of big timber harvest. A
1941 observer pointed to the intensity of timber harvest and the “constant
reduction in the available spawning area.”195 In 1944, the Roosevelt
Administration decided that national forests should be timber sources rather
than timber reserves;196 postwar harvest boomed.197 Between 1945 and 1970,
harvest increased about five percent per year, half again as fast as the
national economy.198 Sedimentation, turbidity, flow alteration and stream
temperatures increased. Grazing, fire management, conversion to crop and
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pasture, roads, dams, diversions and pumping all added to the problem.199
The U. S. Forest Service compared 1936-1942 stream surveys with current
conditions and found that large pool habitat has decreased by 50 to
75 percent.200 A recent report concludes that “[m]any, if not all of the larger
tributaries are degraded.”201 Of 137,100 miles of rivers in eastern Oregon
and Washington, more than ten percent are considered “water qualitylimited” under the Clean Water Act, due to sedimentation, turbidity, flow
alteration and high temperatures.202 Many of these streams have lost their
capability to support salmon and other cold-water fish.203
The Environmental Protection Agency has found high water temperatures to
be a persistent problem on the mainstem Snake and Columbia.204
Throughout the Basin, water-quality problems include point-source effluents,
impoundments, water withdrawals, and nonpoint source pollution,
particularly from irrigation.205 Water quality in the Snake River is
considered to be degraded, in significant part because of return flows from
irrigation.206 A study of the Lower Columbia and Columbia Estuary jointly
conducted by the states of Oregon and Washington, revealed potentially
harmful levels of heavy metals, pesticides, dioxin/furans and other organic
compounds in the water and sediment in the densely populated and
industrialized stretch of the Columbia from Bonneville Dam downriver to the
Pacific Ocean.207 Fish-eating wildlife and some humans were found to be at
risk from the pollutants.208 The report also found that more than half of the
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tidal swamp and marsh area of the estuary had been lost since dredging,
filling, diking, and channeling of the estuary began in the 1880s.209

2. Mainstem Effects
If they reach the mainstem of the Columbia, juvenile fish encounter slowmoving reservoirs held back by the dams. The resulting physical changes are
easier to see than are the effects on salmon. The spring freshet has been
reduced and pushed back a month. So, the freshet that historically flowed in
June now flows in May. In late summer and fall, water in the reservoirs is
warmer than it would be if it were a free-flowing stream.210 Habitats in
alluvial reaches of the river’s mainstem have been inundated. Fluctuating
reservoir levels can preclude food production at the river’s edge.211 Scouring
flows that create salmon gravels have been eliminated. Migratory conditions,
water salinity and temperature in the estuary and ocean have been
changed.212 A juvenile fish starting in the Sawtooth headwaters now must
pass not just one or two hydropower dams and reservoirs, but eight. On
average, it now takes this fish more than 50 days to reach the mouth of the
Columbia, compared to 22 days before the dams.213
While there is unending controversy about the precise impacts that these
changes have had on salmon, there is little dispute about two things. First, a
few mainstem projects eliminated a lot of salmon habitat. The development
of Grand Coulee, Hells Canyon, Dworshak and other projects blocked an
estimated 18,700 miles of historically accessible streams in the United States
portion of the Basin alone, almost 38 percent of the historic 49,300 mile
range.214
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Another effect that is hard to dispute is that the mainstem dams have
fundamentally altered the riverine ecosystem, its temperature, chemistry,
turbidity, and nutrients, and the timing and nature of its flow. While it is
difficult to tie any one of these changes to specific changes in salmon
survival, they clearly have ecological consequences. With respect to
regulated streams, ecological laws have an axiom. Regulated flow,
temperature and nutrients favor some species, often non-native ones, and
disfavor the native species that are evolutionarily adapted to the unregulated
stream.215 In short, the Columbia River has in some respects become a better
habitat for squawfish and other predators of salmon than for salmon. These
changes in the mainstem combine with changes in other parts of the
ecosystem to create a vast network of effects on salmon populations.

3. Cumulative Impacts
All of these developments have fragmented the Columbia River salmon’s
habitat and destroyed connections among local populations. Scientists
theorize that connections among salmon habitats and populations is
important in this sense: Local populations will first occupy the most
favorable habitat available, then seek out progressively less favorable niches
in which survival and reproduction are achievable. These niches may move
upstream where food supplies may be sparser, always adapting to local
conditions. In the event a local population is weakened or destroyed by a
natural event, a mudslide smothering spawning beds or a late snowmelt or
flood, it can be rebuilt by recruitment from the population’s center or from
the edges. These collections of core and outlying populations are
characterized as “metapopulations.” Lack of connection among habitats
compromises interchange among local populations and reduces the resilience
of the population as a whole.216
Habitat degradation is also a cumulative problem. Declining habitat
conditions are interactive: high temperatures, for example, are a function of
low flows, loss of vegetation and woody debris, and loss of pools.
Temperature in turn may interact with pollutant loads to support algae

215

Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River at 148.

See generally National Research Council, Upstream, Salmon and Society in the Pacific
Northwest, pp. 58, 135 (1995); Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: Restoration
of Salmonid Fishes in the Columbia River Ecosystem, at p. 76 (pre-publication copy, Sept. 10,
1996); Interior Columbia River Basin Ecosystem Management Project, Eastside Draft
Environmental Impact Statement, Draft at 2-156.
216

59

A River in Common: The Columbia River, the Salmon Ecosystem, and Water Policy

growth, which in turn reduces dissolved oxygen required by salmonids and
their food web. Habitat changes ripple throughout the local ecosystem.
The salmon resource was so large that any one of these developments might
have been less dramatic. But cumulatively, they led to declines by the early
part of this century. Some scientists point to 1921 as the year in which
Columbia River salmon started their slide,217 but other turning points could
be argued. In 1911, the Columbia River salmon catch hit a record 49 million
pounds that would never be reached again.218 The runs were still relatively
large in the 1950s, but with the closing of the floodgates at the last Snake
River dam, accelerated timber harvest, and all the other changes, Snake
River salmon populations went into serious decline. The declines became
“synchronous” and widespread in the late 1960s.219 From historic peaks
ranging from ten to sixteen million adult fish, the Columbia runs declined to
something like a million (see Figure 5). As bleak as this number is, it
understates the decline of the wild salmon stocks that scientists see as the
“seed corn” for the salmon runs. By the late 1980s, wild salmon populations
up and down the Pacific Coast were reported to be at critically low
numbers.220 Only a handful of populations, the Hanford Reach fall chinook,
the Wenatchee River sockeye and several summer steelhead stocks in
Oregon’s John Day River, for example, are still considered healthy.221
One of the continuing controversies in salmon policy is the argument over the
relative contribution made by tributary and mainstem development to the
salmon declines. Idaho’s Salmon River Basin is one of the set pieces in the
argument. The Salmon River breaks off from the mainstem of the Snake in
Hells Canyon. It drains a significant part of central Idaho’s mountains.
Historically, the area was an incredibly prolific salmon area; it is thought to
have produced more than 40 percent of the Columbia River Basin’s spring
and summer chinook salmon.222 The Salmon is one of the few tributary
basins that escaped significant development, and much of it is now preserved
as wilderness.
So, goes the argument, the fact that the Salmon Basin’s salmon stocks are
now on the Endangered Species list is an unmistakable indication that the
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Figure 5.—Commercial landings (pounds) of salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River, 1866-1993.
(Source: WDFW and ODFW 1994)
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federal dams, not tributary problems, are responsible for salmon declines.223
Wrong, say others: Look at the effects of eliminating beavers, the extensive
sedimentation from logging, pollution from mining, ocean and terminal
fisheries, and other damage. Salmon populations had declined significantly
by mid-century before the major post-war spurt in hydropower
development.224 Hydropower is only one of the causes of the declines, and it
came after the salmon declines were already well underway.225
Notwithstanding the quantity of ink that has been spilt over such questions,
only a few things are clear. There was significant over-fishing and habitat
disturbance in the Columbia River Basin long before the mainstem dams
were built. Snake River populations were depleted to a considerable extent
before hydropower development. At the same time, the runs that survived
the development of the first half of the century have fared even worse in the
second half. The Snake runs of the 1950s were still well above the
Endangered Species Act listing threshold. It is surely not fair to ascribe all of
the post-1950s decline to hydropower development, but there is little
question that hydropower played a very large role. The causes of these
declines, however, are “complex and manifold”226 and attempts to put a fine
point on degrees of fault is likely to do little but keep lawyers happy.

B. Early Mitigation
The first attempts to address the declines began only a few decades after
non-Indian settlement, in the form of fish hatcheries. The rationale for fish
hatcheries is primarily social and economic: Habitat degradation is
unfortunate but inevitable; mitigation must aim for habitat substitutes; and
hatcheries are the substitute.227 In theory, hatcheries compensate for lost
habitat by putting salmon eggs into a controlled environment, eliminating the
natural forces that limit the number of eggs that hatch and survive in the
wild. Hatcheries allow more intense fish harvest because harvesters only
have to let enough fish escape to supply eggs for hatcheries, rather than let
pass the comparatively large number of adult fish that must spawn in the
wild in order to produce self-sustaining populations. It is no wonder, then,
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that hatcheries took a firm grip on the imaginations of dam builders and fish
harvest managers.228
In the dam-building era, the need for mitigation was obvious. Bonneville
Dam was equipped with a ladder to allow returning adults to pass the dam,
but no provision was made for juvenile fish migrating downstream. Grand
Coulee proved to be an even more formidable barrier, and fish and wildlife
managers decided that it would be easier to transplant its salmon stocks
than to try to get them past the dam. The managers relocated the upper
Columbia salmon stocks into other tributaries and a hatchery at
Leavenworth, one of the first of many.229
The Lower Columbia River Fishery Development Program, funded by the
Mitchell Act,230 relocated stocks from upriver areas to areas below McNary,
and gradually became dominated by hatcheries.231 Mitigation programs
associated with the Mid-Columbia public utility district dams, the Idaho
Power Company’s Hells Canyon Dam, and the federal Lower Snake dams
more or less followed suit.232 Hatchery programs became the primary
mitigation for the effects of dams. None of them, however, accounted for the
Columbia River tribes’ salmon culture. 233
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the tribes’ fishing sites. Increasingly, the tribes saw the combination of nonIndian fishing, dams, habitat destruction and lower-river hatcheries as lethal
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to their treaty fishing rights. In the late 1960s they went to court. In a series
of cases on fish harvest in the Columbia River and Puget Sound, the tribes
established the right to harvest up to half of the salmon runs, including
hatchery populations.235
In addition to harvest rights, the treaty fishing cases suggested two concepts
that figured in later salmon recovery efforts. First, the cases established
principles for allocating “the conservation burden” between Indians and nonIndians, that is, the relative responsibilities of the two groups to limit salmon
harvest. Under these principles, the tribes are free to fish unless a state
demonstrates that tribal fishing would destroy a run of salmon.236 State
harvest regulations must be equitable; they can only be “the least restrictive
[limits] which can be imposed:”
If alternative means and methods of reasonable and necessary conservation
regulation are available, the state cannot lawfully restrict the exercise of off
reservation treaty right fishing, even if the only alternatives are restriction
of fishing by non-treaty fishermen, either commercially or otherwise, to the
full extent necessary for conservation of fish.237
Second, the cases have begun to address the tribes' assertion of a right to the
environmental conditions salmon need.238 The claim is that “implicitly
incorporated in the treaties’ fishing clause is the right to have the fishery
habitat protected from man-made despoliation.”239 Arguments about this
principle have not been entirely resolved, but the concept bears on all
activities that affect salmon habitat, including the operations of the
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Columbia River dams.240 Together with the conservation principle quoted
above, the tribes can argue with some force that treaty fishing rights cannot
be limited unless non-Indian activities that destroy salmon habitat are
limited first. These principles are the bedrock for the tribes’ considerable
and growing involvement in all subsequent developments in Columbia River
salmon policy.
Tribes also are making substantial claims to water rights in the Columbia
River Basin, as elsewhere in the West, under a doctrine first recognized by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1908. In Winters v. United States,241 the Court
laid the foundation for Indian tribal claims to the water rights needed to
support the purposes of their reservations. Water rights recognized under
this doctrine can include water to support hunting and fishing, and carry
priority dates as of the date of the treaty with the tribe or, in some cases,
from “time immemorial.” In other words, tribal water rights potentially could
be senior to all or most state-based water rights in the Basin, depending on
the particulars of each claim. Tribes are asserting these water rights in the
Yakima and Snake adjudications (as discussed elsewhere in this section) and
in negotiations with the states and local water users in the Umatilla and
other watersheds in the Columbia Basin.242 As with the fishing-based
conservation principle, the full power of these water-rights claims has yet to
be realized, and many legal and policy arguments remain. The potential
weight of the claims adds nevertheless to the increasing status of the tribes
as players in water-policy development in the Basin.
As the tribes were pursuing recognition of their conservation and waterrights claims, the State of Idaho began to press its interest in salmon
harvest. The Idaho headwaters were historically the source of a large portion
of the Columbia River salmon runs. When adult fish return from the ocean,
however, Idaho fishermen take only from what is left of the runs after they
have run a gauntlet of ocean and downriver fishermen and hydropower dams.
There is sometimes too little to permit much fishing in Idaho at all, and Idaho
determined to seek an equitable share of the fish. In 1975, Idaho sued the
states of Oregon and Washington in the U. S. Supreme Court under the
“equitable apportionment” principles of interstate water law.243 The court
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agreed that equitable apportionment applies to salmon in principle: “At the
root of the [equitable apportionment] doctrine is the same principle that
animates many of the Court’s Commerce Clause cases: A State may not
preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its
borders.”244 However, the court concluded that Idaho had not proved that it
had been damaged by the harvest practices of the lower river states, and so
dismissed the suit.245

D. Remedial Programs, Circa 1980
1. Salmon Legislation
Even as the tribes were pressing treaty claims and Idaho was asserting its
equitable apportionment suit, Congress was enacting a collection of remedial
statutes to address salmon and salmon-related problems.246 Congress passed
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act247 in 1976 to
regulate fish harvest in the ocean. In 1980, Congress enacted the 1980
Salmon and Steelhead Conservation Act248 to address the chaotic system of
salmon harvest management, and to provide federal funding for habitat
restoration.
At the same time, the region’s energy demands once again had outrun the
Columbia River power system’s generating capacity. In the late 1970s,
Northwest utilities went to Congress to ask for authority to use revenues
from the Columbia River dams to help finance new power development.249
Congress responded with the Northwest Power Act.250 The Act declared that
the region’s energy future should be planned in a public process that would
consider the full environmental and economic costs of energy alternatives;
emphasize energy conservation, renewable energy development and high
efficiency generation; and include a program to offset the effects of the dams
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on salmon and other fish and wildlife populations.251 Plans would be made in
public and guided by the Northwest Power Planning Council, composed of
representatives of the Northwest states. The Council’s fish and wildlife
program would be based on recommendations of the region’s fish and wildlife
agencies, Indian tribes and others. The Act obliges the Council’s program to
complement the activities of the agencies and tribes.252 The program would
be financed by BPA hydropower revenues and implemented by the federal
agencies that control the hydropower dams.
This is not the place to review the region’s experience with these fish and
wildlife mitigation efforts in detail. However, it is important to understand
something about them to provide context for the review of salmon-related
water management initiatives. First, following passage of the Northwest
Power Act, the region’s fish and wildlife managers gained ground in harvest
management. In large part, these efforts were impelled by rulings in the
Indian treaty fishing cases. The states and tribes proposed a management
plan to coordinate fragmented harvest authorities under the Salmon and
Steelhead Conservation Act.253 The United States and Canada negotiated a
treaty designed to protect each country’s ocean salmon populations from the
other country’s fishermen.254 In 1986, the Northwest states and the region’s
Indian tribes negotiated a settlement of harvest issues in the Columbia River
itself.255 The resulting Columbia River Management Program included a
comprehensive set of rules and processes to deal with salmon harvest. The
tribes and fish and wildlife managers were also active in the river, pushing
for structural solutions at the Mid-Columbia hydropower projects and
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securing flow protections for Hanford Reach fall chinook, one of the most
productive populations in the river.256
Seeking to complement these activities, the Northwest Power Act forged a
link between regional energy development and fish and wildlife recovery. At
a conceptual level, the Act aimed for a power system that would meet energy
demands through measures that impose the least economic and
environmental cost on the region, while taking pressure off Columbia River
fish and wildlife. For the power system, moving ahead would require
modified operation of the Columbia River dams and financing for measures
to offset the dams’ effects on fish and wildlife. For fish and wildlife interests,
mitigation would require a healthy hydropower system capable of generating
sufficient revenues to finance energy and fish and wildlife conservation
measures. Perhaps neither fish nor power interests perceived the connection
clearly, but it is apparent in hindsight: Under the terms of the Northwest
Power Act, neither fish and wildlife conservation nor power development
could proceed without the other.
The Northwest Power Act led to a series of fish and wildlife programs, the
first of which the Northwest Power Planning Council adopted in 1982. 257
The 1987 version of the program, which was the most fully developed
program before the Endangered Species Act listings, aimed to double the
salmon runs through a series of measures affecting all stages of the salmon
life cycle: Mechanical screens and bypass channels at the dams, flow
augmentation, habitat restoration projects and other initiatives. The
program was to be implemented consistent with the principle of “adaptive
management,” the idea that fish and wildlife mitigation will be effective and
sustainable only with extraordinary effort to learn from the implementation
of remedial programs and to adjust subsequent efforts accordingly.258
Because of concerns over the effects of hatcheries, adaptive management was
especially important in implementing artificial production projects. Other
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parts of the program called for aggressive research, monitoring and
evaluation. The Council also launched an initiative called “system planning,
” an exercise in which Indian tribes and other fish and wildlife managers
would coordinate mitigation activities under Council and other programs.259
The process called for a reversal of the bias toward lower-river hatchery
production, and a priority on preserving the genetic integrity of the Basin’s
remaining wild salmon runs.260 Over a three-year period, the tribes and fish
and wildlife agencies gathered and analyzed data in the Basin’s 31 biological
provinces, ultimately producing an “Integrated System Plan” that proposed a
wide-ranging restoration program, still premised in significant part on
artificial production.
Perhaps the program’s final landmark before the Endangered Species Act
listings was the designation of “protected areas,” which called for protection
of specified stream miles from future hydropower development.261 Protected
areas were based on a comprehensive survey of fish and wildlife habitat to
identify particularly important habitat where hydropower development
would pose unacceptable risks. In 1988, the Council listed some 44,000
stream miles of habitat, including virtually all anadromous fish habitat, as
protected areas. BPA agreed to deny access to the Pacific Northwest-Pacific
Southwest intertie transmission line to power from facilities located in
protected areas, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has used
the protected-area designations in deciding whether to license new facilities.

2. Key Water and Watershed Initiatives
The Water Budget. Of the major water initiatives launched under the
Northwest Power Act in the 1980s, one the best known was the 1982 “water
budget.” For five years following the drought of 1977, the debate over
Columbia River flows had centered on the concepts of “minimum” and
“optimum” flows for salmon, each of which would involve significant shifts of
water from hydropower operations. Both concepts “evoked bitter feelings
and controversy within the river management community.”262 The water
budget was the Power Planning Council’s attempt to side-step this debate.
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The Council, adapting an idea offered by the tribes, proposed a volume of
water that would be stored in federal storage projects and managed by fish
and wildlife managers. Flow augmentation would not be provided month-in,
month-out, but only when fish managers judged there were enough fish in
the river to justify expenditure of the water budget. The water volume was
measured in two parts: 3.45 million acre-feet of water from the upper part of
the Columbia, measured at Priest Rapids Dam in the Mid-Columbia reach;
and 1.19 million acre-feet, measured at Lower Granite Dam in the Lower
Snake reach. The budget could be used only in the April 15-June 15 time
period, when 80 percent of the juvenile spring salmon migration moves down
the river.
The water budget was a compromise: It supplied significantly less water
than optimum or minimum flows. Its innovation was in suggesting that flow
augmentation water could be used with discrimination, as fish needed it, and
that a fixed program of flows was unnecessary. While at the time the water
budget was judged “politically astute,” 263 in later years some commentators
found it to be “seriously flawed.”264 The federal agencies did not manage the
Snake River storage projects to supply specified water budget volumes.
Instead of 1.19 million acre-feet of Snake River storage water, about
400,000 acre-feet, was supplied. BPA secured another volume of water from
Idaho Power Company’s Brownlee Project in Hells Canyon by guaranteeing
to make up any power losses the Company might experience. No water was
released from the reclamation storage projects in the Snake Basin. The
remaining water was to be comprised of uncontrolled natural runoff, at least
as the Corps and BPA saw it. Consequently, the Snake fell well short of the
prescribed water budget. A second problem with the water budget was that
its flow augmentation period covered only the middle 80 percent of the spring
salmon runs. Thus, it focused on the larger populations favored by fishery
managers and neglected the “tails” of the migration, which tended to be wild
fish. It also provided no flow augmentation for summer-migrating salmon
and fall chinook.
The Vernita Bar settlement. One of the important water initiatives of the
1980s involved flows in the Hanford Reach, the last free-flowing stretch of
the Columbia in the United States. The Hanford Reach “upriver bright” fall
chinook population (so called because they are an unusually bright silver
color when they enter the mouth of the Columbia on their upstream
migration) is the Columbia’s most productive remaining salmon population.
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The brights enter the river in August and September and migrate to the
Hanford Reach by November. The place where most of these fish spawn,
Vernita Bar, is one of the last remaining spawning areas in what was, before
the dams, an extensive spawning area.265 Spawning is influenced by dam
operations, however. If river flows are high in the river during the fall, as
they are likely to be for power operations, the brights will spawn high on
Vernita Bar, in nests called “redds.” To survive, the eggs deposited in redds
have to stay under water. If flows are low in the winter and early spring,
which is preferable for power operations, the redds will be uncovered and no
juvenile fish will emerge. Coordinating fall and spring flows to respect the
brights’ natural cycle is therefore vital: if fall flows are high during the
spawning period, they must stay high through the spring emergence period.
If flows are low during the spawning period, they can be correspondingly low
in the winter and early spring.
Because Priest Rapids Dam, the dam immediately upstream from the
Hanford Reach, is licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
federal, state and tribal fishery managers took the issue to FERC as part of
the Mid-Columbia proceeding. On the FERC equivalent of the courthouse
steps, the fishery parties and hydropower operators reached a settlement.
Power operators agreed to hold flows down during spawning times in the fall,
and to provide flows in the winter and spring to keep the redds covered with
water.266 The agreement covers only the area at the upper end of the
Hanford Reach and expires in 1998, so it falls short of comprehensive, longterm protection. But it was one of the signal accomplishments in salmon
protection in the 1980s.
Spill. One of the ways to allow juvenile fish to get past dams safely is to send
them through the dam’s spillway instead of through the turbines. Serious
problems with nitrogen super-saturation caused by spills in the early 1970s
were addressed by installing “flip lips,” so spill became a logical means of fish
passage.267 The practice is costly to the power system, however. In
developing its program in the early 1980s, the Council rejected
recommendations for increased spills, on closely divided votes. Finally, in
late 1988, tribes and fish and wildlife agencies reached a settlement of the
spill issue in litigation with the BPA,268 and the Council adopted the
agreement into its fish and wildlife program in 1989. Although the Army
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Corps of Engineers, which operates the dams, was not party to the
agreement, it abided by its terms.269
The Snake River. Much of the action in the Snake River during the 1980s
was controlled by the Swan Falls Agreement and its aftermath. From the
very beginning of the agreement’s implementation, it bumped into fish and
wildlife issues. Because Idaho Power's Swan Falls Project is licensed by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Commission approval was required.
What the agreement’s proponents may have thought would be a formality
turned into a controversy. The U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Deer Flat
Wildlife Refuge lies downstream from Swan Falls. The Service claims
reserved water rights with a 1937 priority date, which is when the refuge was
established. The Service and others intervened in the FERC process to
express their concerns that the Swan Falls Agreement did not provide
enough water in the river to protect the refuge’s reserved claims. The
National Marine Fisheries Service also intervened to assert the downstream
needs of salmon.270 Ultimately, the agreement’s proponents secured federal
legislation requiring the FERC to approve the agreement, but called for
studies of environmental issues.271 A studies committee was established
with representatives of the Idaho Power Company, and fish and wildlife,
tribal, federal, state and water-user interests.272
One of the Swan Falls studies evaluated potential sources of water for
anadromous fish flows in the Snake River from existing storage, water
marketing and transfers, changes in reservoir operations, and irrigation
water conservation. The study, by Hydrosphere, a Colorado consulting firm,
was completed in 1991.273 The study analyzed potential water sources and
the laws and agreements that govern water use in Idaho. “At this
reconnaissance level of analysis,” the study concluded that a combination of
such sources apparently could supply the 1.19 million acre-feet Snake River
Water Budget in dry years and could exceed 2.0 million acre-feet in average
and above-average water years, without substantial adverse impacts on
other water uses. Moreover, the consultants said such forms of instream
enhancements also would enhance water-marketing opportunities for
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irrigators, and would provide them with new economic incentives for water
conservation.274
The Swan Falls agreement had also called for a comprehensive adjudication
of Snake River Basin water rights in Idaho.275 In 1985, the Idaho legislature
adopted the Snake River Basin Adjudication Statute to carry out this part of
the agreement.276 The statute was clearly not calculated to foster more
efficient water use. It established a series of presumptions, one of which
conferred amnesty on water users who had expanded their use in violation of
“mandatory permit requirements,” in the absence of harm to third parties.277
Allowable consumptive use for irrigation rights is “the most water
consumptive crop that can be grown in the area during the period of the year
when water is used for irrigation.”278
The adjudication began in 1987. Its boundaries encompass about 87 percent
of the state (all or part of 38 of 44 counties), including the agricultural
kingdom of the Upper Snake Basin. By 1990, 90,000 claims had been filed,
and the State was negotiating with the United States regarding federal
reserved rights claims.279 Beginning in the early 1990s, the Idaho
Department of Water Resources began a series of basin reports with
recommendations regarding appropriative water rights and abstracts of
reserved rights claims. The adjudication court also began dealing with
certain “basin-wide issues.” The court has established that Idaho statutes do
not allow for a partial forfeiture of water rights (so that, apparently, water
rights retain their maximum size notwithstanding subsequent diminution of
use).280 It has also rejected application of the public trust doctrine.281
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Tribal and federal reserved water rights claims in the adjudication are
considerable. One group of claims, those of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes for
the Fort Hall Reservation in eastern Idaho, has been settled.282 The Tribes
had initially sought to lease out (to others) a substantial part of this water
for salmon flows.283 However, the settlement that quantified the tribe’s
water rights imposed significant restrictions on transferability. The
restrictions depart from the State’s “Two Rivers” concept only by allowing the
Tribe an opportunity to market, through a tribal water bank, about 40,000
acre-feet of water below Milner Dam.284 The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes also
have off-reservation water claims, relating to water in the Salmon River
drainage, stemming from the 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger.285 They succeeded
initially in forcing the United States to file these claims in the adjudication,
but the United States later was held not to be obligated to represent the
claims, so the tribes are now asserting them on their own.286 The Northwestern Band of the Shoshoni Nation and the Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the
Duck Valley Indian Reservation have also filed claims.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the Nez Perce Tribe, whose reservation
is on the Clearwater River in Idaho, claims entitlement under an 1855 treaty
to reserved water rights, in addition to environmental protection related to
reserved fishing rights.287 To meet a court-imposed filing deadline, the
United States filed extensive claims on the tribe’s behalf, asserting tribal
rights to virtually all of the flow of the Snake, Salmon and Clearwater
drainages. The litigation was stayed to permit the parties to pursue a
settlement, but without success. These claims, which clearly overlap flowrelated questions under the Endangered Species Act and Northwest Power
Act, appear headed for adjudication in the next year or two.
The Yakima River Basin. As many as 800,000 adult salmon may have
returned to the Yakima River (in south-central Washington) before nonIndian development.288 Now, about 2.4 million acre-feet of water are diverted
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from the Yakima Basin’s rivers in an average year, and about one percent of
the pre-development number of salmon manage to return.289 Many irrigation
diversions were unscreened, or their fish passage facilities were outdated or
in bad repair. In low water years, sections of the river are dried up,
completely blocking fish migrations. Irrigation return flows create high
water temperatures and contribute a load of sediment and agricultural
chemicals to the river.290
Despite the starkness of the salmon declines in the Yakima, three factors
made the basin an important place to restore fish. First, the Yakima River
and its fish run through the Yakama Indian Reservation.291 The moral and
legal force of the Yakama Nation’s treaty rights are potent, as water users
had learned in litigation. In 1985, federal courts authorized the Bureau of
Reclamation to operate Cle Elum Dam, part of the Yakima Reclamation
Project, on an emergency basis to protect salmon redds at the expense of
carryover irrigation storage.292 Moreover, the tribe claimed reserved
instream flow rights whose quantification was pending in a general stream
adjudication for the Yakima River Basin.293 The Tribe and its legal claims
were not going away. Second, while there were many obstacles to fish
production in the Yakima, lack of good spawning and rearing habitat was not
one of them. Much of the fish habitat in the upper reaches of the Yakima
Basin is in a national forest, while west of the river is the Yakama Indian
Reservation. As a result, outside irrigated areas, much of the basin’s habitat
is relatively intact.294 Finally, the mainstem hydropower dams did not pose
as significant an obstacle to Yakima fish as they did to fish further up in the
Columbia/Snake Basin. Yakima fish have to pass only four Columbia River
dams after they leave the Yakima, rather than the eight dams Snake River
fish must negotiate. While none of these considerations made the depth of
the problems facing salmon easy to solve, it was a good list of reasons for
investing in salmon mitigation in the Yakima Basin.
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A variety of initiatives were begun in the Yakima in the 1980s. Under the
Northwest Power Act, a substantial investment of BPA funds was dedicated
for diversion screens, fish passage facilities and an experimental artificial
production facility aimed at supplementing, rather than supplanting
naturally spawning fish. These structural improvements would not be of
much use on a dried-up river, however, and leaving more water in the river
was one objective upon which the tribe and others made little progress
during the 1980s. Instream flow issues extended through the 1980s and into
the 1990s.

3. Evolution in State Water Programs
There was also ferment in state water law. All of the Northwest states are
prior appropriation states, but the original miner’s rule that actual
appropriation gives the only valid right to water quickly grew into a more
complicated body of law.295 Most of the Northwest states have public trust
doctrines, instream flow laws, basin-planning processes and various
innovations to deal with instream flow problems.296
Oregon’s 1987 Instream Water Rights Act allows out-of-stream private water
rights to be converted to instream water rights with the same priority as the
original right.297 A conserved water statute298 permits Oregon water users to
dedicate 75 percent of saved water to new consumptive uses, while requiring
at least 25 percent of the savings to be restored to the stream.299

Water codes were enacted in Idaho in 1881, Montana in 1885, Oregon in 1909 and
Washington in 1917. Pacific Northwest River Basin Commission, Water, Today and
Tomorrow, Volume II, The Region, at 3-69 (1979). For the original miner’s law, see C. Jack,
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Interest to Miners, With Directions for Locating Mineral Ground at 76 (1902). For a view of
modern western water law, see A. D. Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources, sec. 5.01, et
seq. (1995).
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Washington’s “Trust Water Rights” program is intended to “facilitate the
voluntary transfer of water and water rights, including conserved water, to
provide water for presently unmet and emerging needs.”300 Under the
program, water users may transfer their water or water rights to the State.
The transferred water keeps the priority date of the original water right, so
the water user with the next junior priority has no right to take it.
In Idaho, development of “public interest” criteria, which also have evolved in
other states, evidence a growing sense that “traditional” water uses are not
the only important consideration in water allocation decisions. During the
1980s, the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted the public interest to require
consideration of minimum stream flows, water conservation, aesthetic and
environmental values and an assessment of the appropriation’s effect on
local fish and wildlife and recreation.301 These criteria led to the denial of at
least one permit for a hydropower project because of its local fish and wildlife
and recreational impacts.302
Idaho also was one of the first states to develop water banking to facilitate
water transfers among users. It has attracted attention for its potential to
help with salmon,303 though its rules currently are designed to maximize its
usefulness to irrigators in the Upper Snake Basin. Agricultural uses inside
the district have first claim on the water bank; non-agricultural uses outside
the district have last priority. Water cannot be rented until July, which
minimizes its usefulness for spring flow augmentation. While rental outside
the district is allowed, the rental price is about three times higher than for
in-basin rentals. Moreover, any water user who rents water to a user outside
the Upper Basin is relegated to last refill priority in the next year. In
addition, Idaho law requires legislative approval of any change in water use
for more than 50 cubic feet per second or 5000 acre-feet for more than three
years.304 The water bank is organized to ensure that water is used as
efficiently as possible in the upper basin, and as little as possible outside the
upper basin.
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Indian treaty rights litigation in Washington state’s Puget Sound produced
two major agreements concerning fish and wildlife habitat restoration, both
related to water-management issues. One, the Timber, Fish and Wildlife
Agreement, focused on watershed problems and aimed primarily at
correcting problems caused by timber harvest in western Washington, though
it could serve as a model for similar agreements elsewhere.305 The second,
called the Chelan Agreement,306 provided a framework for developing water
policy in Washington according to hydrologic boundaries. The Chelan
Agreement emerged from a mediation among a wide range of interests in the
late 1980s. The Agreement called for five public caucuses and three
government caucuses (tribal, local and state) to make water planning
decisions for different areas of the state, in cooperation with local interests.
A Water Policy Forum, with representatives of each of the caucuses, was
intended to shape state policy and address policy issues that arise in
planning. Plans are to encompass groundwater, surface water, consumptive
and nonconsumptive needs, and the relationship between ground and surface
water.307 They are subject to review by the Washington Department of
Ecology, which is also expected to help sort things out if river basin groups
stalemate. The Agreement called on the state to select at least two pilot
planning basins. One is the Methow, located in a headwater area of the
Columbia River Basin.
In Montana, a 1975 law allowed state agencies to petition the State
Department of Natural Resources for a reservation of stream flows for future
uses, including biological, scenic and recreational purposes. While part of the
motivation for the statute was to protect Montana water from downstream
claims, the process also lent itself to river protection. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the Department granted a reservation for the Yellowstone
River.308 Ten years later, the reservation process also figured in the Upper
Clark Fork Watershed. Montana’s water planning process, revamped in the
late 1980s, was credited with facilitating passage of important state laws on
drought management, water right transfers, water conservation and water
storage policy.309 Montana also allows temporary water leases for instream
purposes.310
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These developments in state water law established infrastructure. They
created rules and tools that could be used to put water back in streams. They
did not themselves restore water, however. Because of previouslyestablished consumptive water rights, the amount of water remaining in the
states’ streams has so far been little affected by these developments.311
Instream flow protections usually carry junior priorities in fully appropriated
rivers, enforcement of instream flow protection is spotty,312 and multiple-use
basin plans tend to end up as “shelf art.”313

E. Prospects for River Management in the Late 1980s and the System
Operation Review
By 1989, some observers thought that the Columbia River salmon issues
were well in hand. The water budget was in place; spawning at Vernita Bar
was secure; protected areas limited new hydropower development; the
troublesome spill issue was thought to be resolved; and the hydropower
system was providing important financial support to subbasins like the
Yakima and Umatilla. While not all populations in the Basin were healthy,
in the aggregate the runs were increasing as they had not in years.
Populations that were the subject of bitter fights between Indians and nonIndians in the early 1980s were no longer a concern.314 The Hanford Reach
fall chinook salmon had increased from about 100,000 fish in the early 1980s
to more than 400,000 adults,315 still short of the 1940s level of about 600,000
adults,316 but impressive. Charles Wilkinson described the mood of the time:
By 1988, the legal structure erected during the previous decade and a half,
the Magnuson Act, the Indian treaty decisions, the Northwest Power Act,
the water budget, the protected areas program, and the 1985 treaty with
Canada, had created cautious but widespread optimism.... Representatives
of the utilities, the BPA, and the Army Corps of Engineers were beginning
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to say in private that the problems with the runs had been solved and that
we could begin to think about scaling back the protection programs.317
To be sure, none of the remedial programs had proved flawless, and some
were outright failures. The programs promised by the Salmon and Steelhead
Conservation and Enhancement Act were never funded. The management
proposals of the commission appointed under that Act were rejected by the
Secretary of Commerce.318 The Pacific Salmon Treaty between Canada and
the United States hit a series of potholes and within ten years of its signing
was reported to be in “grave danger.”319 The harvest controls of the 1980s
have since been criticized as suited to the appetites of harvesters rather than
the needs of wild salmon populations.320 State instream acquisition programs
secured little actual water for streams.321 The Snake River still ran dry at
Milner Dam. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s license
modification process in the Mid-Columbia was criticized as ineffective and
untimely.322 The Northwest Power Planning Council was chastised for failing
to insist on more aggressive changes in hydropower operations, deferring too
little or too much to fishery managers,323 and spending too much money.324
While some of these criticisms were off the mark, others were fair, and in
general it was hard to argue with the commentators at the beginning of the
1980s that this plethora of remedial programs was uncoordinated.325
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Nevertheless, taken together, the initiatives of the 1980s comprised a salmon
recovery effort that was unprecedented for the time, and it appeared to be
paying off. With salmon populations apparently on the rise, the hydropower
system turned its attention to the fact that some of the basic agreements
underlying the river’s management would begin to expire around the turn of
the century. The Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement is scheduled to
expire in 2003. Under the Columbia River Treaty, the “Canadian
entitlement,” power that Canada sold to the United States when the treaty
was signed in 1964, was to be returned to Canada beginning in 1998.326 The
allocation agreements between federal and non-federal utilities in the United
States, which govern each parties’ responsibilities with regard to the
Canadian entitlement, expire in 2003.327
The three federal agencies that operate the Federal Columbia River Power
System, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bonneville Power Administration
and the Bureau of Reclamation, decided to stand back from the specific
issues posed by the expiration of these agreements and look at the system as
a whole. They proposed to use the National Environmental Policy Act
process to develop a joint “system operating strategy” for the coordinated
operation of the system; explore an ongoing forum to review and update the
strategy from time to time; and consider issues associated with a new Pacific
Northwest Coordination Agreement and a new set of Canadian entitlement
agreements. With these objectives, the “System Operation Review” began
with scoping sessions in 1990 and included an extensive collection of working
groups to address each task.
The System Operation Review was an analytical process of enormous
breadth and complexity, but with some important limitations including, for
example, the fact that it treated the Snake River system above Hells Canyon
as a “hypothetical reservoir.” Much could be said about the analysis.
However, for our purposes, three points are key. First, the System Operation
Review is another reminder, if we needed one, that the future is
unpredictable. The world the System Operation Review envisioned ceased to
exist while the ink was drying on its scoping documents. The System
In November, 1996, the Bonneville Power Administration and the Province of British
Columbia reached agreement on the value of the entitlement, which British Columbia
believes will total some $5 billion through 2024. The two countries are continuing to
negotiate how much of the entitlement will be sold to the United States for a second 30-year
term. A portion of this money will be committed to the Canadian Columbia Basin Trust, an
independent entity that works with Canadian communities to identify economic and
environmental investments in areas affected by the Columbia River Treaty storage projects.
J. Harrison, “U. S., Canada Agree on Return of Power Under Columbia River Treaty,” Energy
News (1997).
327
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Operation Review was promptly high-jacked by the Endangered Species Act
process. As the final Environmental Impact Statement of the System
Operation Review said in 1995:
While one of the primary goals of the SOR is to decide on a coordinated
operating strategy to balance conflicting demands on the system, the reality
is that the need to help conserve endangered salmon specifically, and all
salmon generally, has taken precedence over all other considerations.
Much of the trading off that will be done in deciding on a system operating
strategy will hinge on what can be gained for endangered salmon at what
cost to other uses.328
Second, the SOR made clear just how well the river had been adapted to
these “other uses,” especially hydropower. An apocryphal story has a System
Operation Review computer modeler complaining that virtually all of the
alternatives that had been identified for analysis hurt the power system. “Of
course,” said his colleagues, “the river has been optimized for power. There
are no alternatives that would leave the power system better off.”
The third lesson is that the Review, despite its being overshadowed by
endangered species concerns, allowed the federal agencies to play a much
more constructive role in the salmon debates than they would have
otherwise. The System Operation Review gave the federal agencies a broad
analytical base with which to understand the consequences of changes in
river operations, and a tool that could help inform the entire region. Its scope
was limited in some ways, especially in omitting most of the Snake River
system, but the breadth and adaptability of its analytical process played an
important role in the Endangered Species era.

F. From the Endangered Species Listings to the Present
1. The Decline of the Wild Runs
Not everyone was enthusiastic about the apparent upswing in the salmon
populations in the late 1980s. By the mid-1980s the replacement of wild fish

Columbia River System Operation Review, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Main
Report at 1-1.
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by hatchery fish was far advanced. The runs were only about 25 percent
wild,329 and wild populations seemed to be careening downhill even as aggregate salmon numbers grew. Decades of expanding hatchery programs meant
that fishermen had grown to expect the large harvests that hatchery fish
allow. At the same time, the fish populations were less diverse genetically,
less adapted to their environment, more prone to disease, and apparently
more vulnerable to changes in ocean conditions. As hatchery production
increased, the Basin was trading vigorous wild fish populations for dullwitted hatchery fish.330
An article in Fisheries, the Journal of the American Fisheries Society, showed
wild salmon populations up and down the Pacific coast at critically low
numbers.331 The message was not entirely surprising; wild fish advocates
had claimed for years that wild stocks were in trouble. The Fisheries article
documented the trend in a way that was impossible to ignore. This
realization was soon followed by the beginning of what turned out to be a
seven-year drought and persistently poor ocean conditions for salmon. Since
1988, the data showed a coast-wide downturn in salmon populations of all
kinds. Populations that had looked healthy in 1988 were weak in 1990, at
critically low levels in 1994, and in 1995 much worse.
Swings in salmon abundance are not themselves a concern. Salmon are
subject to natural cycles. Changes of thousands of percent over two or three
year periods have occurred.332 These swings may reflect the effects of
drought, poor ocean feeding conditions and other natural factors. Robust
salmon runs can survive fluctuating natural conditions. But extremely weak
runs, like many of the wild Columbia and Snake runs, cannot.
2. The Endangered Species Act Petitions and the Salmon Summit

See Northwest Power Planning Council, Compilation of Information on Salmon and
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330
See R. Hilborn, “Hatcheries And The Future Of Salmon In The Northwest,” 17 Fisheries 5,
(1992); M. Goodman, “Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid Stocks: A Call For
Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs,” 20 Envtl L. 111, 148-155 (1990).
331
See W. Nehlsen, et al. “Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks at Risk From California,
Oregon, Idaho and Washington,” Fisheries 4 (Mar./Apr. 1991).
332
See e.g., Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Washington Department of Fisheries,
Status Report, Columbia River Fish Runs and Fisheries, 1938-92, at 56, figure 29 (estimated
numbers of sockeye entering the Columbia River and escapement).
329

83

A River in Common: The Columbia River, the Salmon Ecosystem, and Water Policy

The pervasive weakness in the wild runs prompted several petitions to list
salmon populations under the Endangered Species Act.333 When the ESA
petitions were first filed in 1990, political leaders saw that the salmon issue
had broadened and deepened. During the 1980s, the public debate over
salmon was often approached as one limited to salmon and hydropower.
With the listing petitions, a more encompassing discussion was thought to be
essential. Oregon’s Senator Mark Hatfield proposed a “Salmon Summit,” in
which the full spectrum of interests would explore ways to respond to the
salmon declines.334 The ensuing process in 1991 and 1992 introduced a broad
range of players to the complexity of salmon issues. Representatives of
salmon and hydropower interests found themselves seated next to
representatives of state water agencies, the Forest Service, port authorities,
ranchers and others whose activities affect watersheds surrounding salmon
streams. The summit produced a number of voluntary mitigation efforts by
federal agencies and others.335 At the same time, however, consensus was
missing on the more difficult issues.
During the Salmon Summit, two proposals sparked special interest. The first
was Idaho Governor Cecil Andrus' proposal of what has become known as the
“drawdown strategy.” The drawdown strategy is not to be confused with
“drawing down” headwater storage projects. Releases from headwater
storage projects are flow augmentation releases, which actually increase the
amount of water in the river downstream from the storage project. The
drawdown strategy, in contrast, refers to lowering the operational level of
run-of-the-river reservoirs below the storage projects. The logic of the
drawdown strategy was this: Assume the problem for Snake River salmon is
the mainstem federal dams, which themselves slow the flow of water by
backing the river up into broad, deep and warm reservoirs. Because of the
Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Snake River Sockeye
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11), Endangered and
Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Snake River Spring/Summer and Fall Chinook
Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11). Spring/summer and fall
chinook were later reclassified as endangered on an emergency basis in Endangered and
Threatened Species; Status of Snake River Chinook Salmon and Snake River Fall Chinook
Salmon, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,529 (1994). The National Marine Fisheries Service has proposed to
make the emergency reclassification permanent. See Endangered and Threatened Species;
Status of Snake River Chinook Salmon and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 59 Fed. Reg.
66,764 (1994).
334
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335
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size of the reservoirs, virtually any amount of water that is released from
upstream storage will only spread out over the top of the reservoirs, and
provide exceedingly small increases in flow. Instead of looking for bigger
water releases from storage, the governor argued, the region should lower
the level of the four Lower Snake reservoirs. Drawing the reservoirs down
would create a smaller river channel and increase the speed of the river’s
flow much more than water releases ever could. The deeper the drawdown,
the faster the river would move, the faster the salmon would migrate and,
hypothetically at least, the more salmon would survive. This argument was
appealing to some participants in the Salmon Summit, but others disputed its
scientific merits, its cost, and its practical feasibility. Despite the lack of
consensus, however, the drawdown proposal became central in the
continuing salmon debate.
The Bureau of Reclamation offered a second set of ideas. In response to
Senator Hatfield’s urging, the Bureau prepared a creative working paper
looking at a variety of options for the Snake system, including the proposal
that the Upper Snake Basin might contribute water to salmon flows. The
most promising source, the Bureau suggested, was the Upper Basin water
bank. To steer around the various obstacles imposed by water bank rules,
the river’s hydrology, and the Hells Canyon dams, the Bureau sketched this
scenario: A lessee could rent water in July (which is the earliest permissible
time under water bank rules), move it down river to the Idaho Power
Company’s Brownlee reservoir in the fall, and release it from Brownlee the
following spring, when fish would need it.336 The Bureau also identified
water that could be made available from the Shoshone-Bannock water bank
(assuming it was established), power head storage, off-stream storage
facilities, and other sources.337 These too became continuing subjects in the
salmon debates.
3. The 1992-1993 Biological Opinions and the Strategy for Salmon
The National Marine Fisheries Service listed Snake River sockeye salmon as
endangered in late 1991,338 and Snake River chinook listings soon followed.339
With little time to consult with dam operators on the effects of federal
hydropower operations, the Service had to scramble to establish a framework
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within which to evaluate whether the system’s operations posed jeopardy to
the listed populations. For purposes of the 1992 consultation, the agency
judged that jeopardy would be avoided if operations provided better
conditions for the migration than in 1991. The agency concluded that the
1992 operations passed muster. 340
With the Endangered Species Act process beginning to engage, the region’s
governors asked the Northwest Power Planning Council to take salmon
recovery a step further. The Council began an 18-month process that
produced a revised program called the Strategy for Salmon. The Strategy put
emphasis on protecting weak, wild salmon populations. Among other things,
it called for “no appreciable risk to biological diversity” of salmon and other
fish populations341 and a more cautious approach to hatchery-related
programs.342 It expanded the Council’s original water budget by more than
half, adding three million acre-feet of water to the Columbia River water
budget, with an estimated power impact of $100 million in lost power
revenues annually. The Strategy doubled a $40-50 million per year program
to address habitat, hatchery and other areas, including a large-scale effort to
screen irrigation diversions,343 and endorsed comprehensive watershed
approaches to problems in tributaries. Past habitat efforts had been
characterized by piecemeal measures, bank stabilization projects, placement
of large woody debris in channels, and the like, which the Council concluded
were ineffective. The Strategy called for “ridgetop-to-ridgetop” watershed
efforts that employ natural habitat functions where possible.344 The Strategy
also called for state water management agencies to explore a regional
agreement to protect instream flows for salmon and to deny new water
appropriations that would harm anadromous fish.345
The Council also left some issues open. The Council’s analyses showed that
the measures that could be implemented in the short-term were probably not
enough to allow weak wild populations to recover.346 But the Council saw too
little information to justify more significant measures. Fish and wildlife
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managers and conservation groups had urged the Council to adopt a longterm goal for its flow augmentation program, high flow/velocity levels in both
the Columbia and Snake rivers, and to commit to drawing the Lower Snake
projects down to achieve these targets. The managers based their
recommendations on their own review of the relationship between higher
river flows and salmon survival.347 Finding the information on the flowsalmon survival relationship, drawdowns and other issues still inadequate,
however, the Council called for further evaluations of new mitigation
measures, additional sources of water for salmon flow augmentation, and in
particular, drawdown strategies.
In addition, the Council referred some issues to other forums. One such
issue involved temperature problems in the Snake River. There, fish and
wildlife agencies had detected a “thermal barrier” that they suspected was
killing adult fish returning to spawn in the summer and fall. One of the few
immediate solutions for this problem is to release cold water from Dworshak
Reservoir on the Clearwater River. Yet, without significant increases in
water from the Upper Snake, Dworshak is also the source of most of the
storage available for spring flow augmentation.348 One question was whether
Dworshak should be used to help the spring juvenile salmon migration or the
fall adult migration. Wanting both, the Council assigned this question to fish
and wildlife managers working with dam operators on the Council’s Fish
Operations Executive Committee.
Another problem arose from high levels of spill specified in the National
Marine Fisheries Service biological opinions. The spill levels were high
enough at some times of the year to create gas supersaturation that can be
lethal to salmon. Managers were forced to judge whether the risk of these
mortalities were greater than risks posed by letting fish go through bypass
systems and turbines or loading them into barges. On this issue, the Council
deferred to the fish and wildlife managers and state water quality permitting
entities with jurisdiction over gas supersaturation questions.
The Council looked to the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency for help in
identifying water quality issues in the mainstem. The agency completed a
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summary report of mainstem issues in June, 1992.349 The report
recommended steps to coordinate data collection, institute research and
evaluation basin-wide, and to initiate a pilot project to address water-quality
problems in the Grande Ronde Basin in Oregon.
Finally, the Council’s call for additional water from the Snake River Basin for
flow augmentation raised a variety of concerns regarding interstate
mechanisms to provide and protect water for salmon. If water were leased in
the Upper Snake Basin, for example, could it be protected from diversion in
Washington and Oregon? The Council called on the water managers for the
Northwest states to address these interstate water questions.
In 1993, shortly after publication of the Strategy for Salmon, the National
Marine Fisheries Service issued its 1993 biological opinion on the operation
of the Columbia River dams.350 In the 1993 opinion, the Service refined its
“jeopardy” criterion. The Service would evaluate whether the proposed
operations would reduce salmon mortalities below those seen in a 1986-90
base period. Then the agency would determine whether these operations, in
combination with other actions concerning salmon habitat, fishing, and so
forth, would be likely over the long term to allow the population to survive.351
After evaluating the proposed operations and specifying a variety of
mitigation measures, the agency again concluded that the proposed power
system operations would not jeopardize listed populations. In its listing
decisions, the National Marine Fisheries Service had identified water
withdrawals and inadequate water regulations as factors contributing to
species declines,352 and so, among other things, the 1993 opinion called for
another two million acre-feet of water to be provided for flow augmentation
in the Columbia River, in addition to that identified in the Strategy for
Federal funding problems have hampered progress on these recommendations, but
further steps have been taken regarding high water temperatures in the Columbia. In 1996,
in response to a provision of the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Proposed Recovery
Plan, EPA notified the Corps that persistent high temperatures in the mainstem of the
Columbia and Snake Rivers violated the Clean Water Act.
350
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Salmon. The opinion also endorsed the Strategy for Salmon measures,
including additional water from the Snake River Basin.

4. Implementing the Biological Opinions and the Strategy for Salmon
a. Interstate Water Issues.—The Strategy for Salmon called on the region’s
state water managers to address a variety of interstate water issues,
particularly whether and how water secured in the Snake River Basin for
salmon flows could be protected from downstream diversion. To respond to
the Council’s request, the managers initiated several processes. First, they
formed a “Water Resources Interstate Agreement Work Group,” the purpose
of which was to “formulate consistent and compatible state water policies
which balance, on a sustainable basis, the appropriative uses of water and
the environmental requirements of the Columbia River Basin.”353 One of the
group’s aims was to “reach agreements which will contribute to the
cooperative management of the waters of the Columbia River Basin, with an
initial emphasis on implementation” of the Northwest Power Planning
Council’s program.
The Interstate Work Group discussions centered in three areas: Using state
water-permit processes to protect salmon; locating sources of water for
salmon in the Snake River Basin, relying on nonstructural water
alternatives; and developing an interstate agreement governing water use.
Using water-permit processes to protect salmon. The states’ primary
responses to the Council’s request that water permit processes be used to
protect salmon was to enact various forms of moratoria on new water
diversions.354 Idaho imposed a moratorium on all new diversions from the
Salmon River Basin to avoid harm to salmon. It also closed the Snake River
to new diversions because of a multi-year drought.355 The Idaho moratoria
applied to all new diversions, regardless of whether they were filed before or
after the Endangered Species Act listings. Oregon imposed a seasonal
restriction on new diversions for which applications were filed after the
listings.356 Washington’s moratorium also applied only to applications filed

Water Resources Interstate Agreement Workgroup, Mission Statement, Principles and
Objectives, May 22, 1992.
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after the listings, and only to the mainstems of the Columbia and Snake
rivers.357 Oregon and Washington both had substantial backlogs of diversion
applications, so the moratoria were not expected to cut off all new diversions
right away. The Oregon Water Resources Department may issue new
diversion permits if: (1) the proposed use is consistent with the Power
Planning Council’s fish and wildlife program; (2) there is assurance that the
water applied for will be there at least 80 percent of the time after satisfying
senior priorities, including existing instream flow rights; and (3) the use
meets certain “public interest” criteria.358 In response to a 1994 petition by
Oregon WaterWatch, a public interest organization, the Oregon Water
Resources Commission adopted special rules for “sensitive” fish. Under
those rules, adopted in 1996, no new diversion that may affect species listed
as threatened, endangered or “sensitive” (an Oregon Department of Fish and
Wildlife categorization) will be approved if it would result in a net loss of
essential habitat.359
Washington followed a separate process for its tributaries. There, the
Department of Ecology put diversion applications on hold while it plotted
water availability on maps and asked fish experts to identify tributaries with
weak salmon stocks and water problems. It also identified relatively pristine
streams with salmon that should be protected. As a result, thirteen highpriority streams were recognized as needing either further instream-flow or
water availability studies. Many other streams were being adjudicated,
already had instream flow protection, or were not regarded as vulnerable to
development. For most of the streams requiring further study, the
Department processed diversion applications filed before the Endangered
Species Act listings. Oregon developed a similar process for its tributaries.
The water managers saw these tributary analyses and measures as a more
practical way to ensure water availability than organizing a region-wide
water availability assessment, which the Strategy for Salmon had envisioned.
Finding instream water in the Snake Basin. The first challenge in finding
sources of water for salmon in the Snake River Basin arose not in the work of
the Interstate Group, but in an Idaho water transfer proceeding. The
Strategy for Salmon and the 1993 biological opinion called for 427,000 acrefeet of flow augmentation water from the Snake River Basin. Idaho had
some experience in supplying water for salmon, but it was limited. In 1990,
fish and wildlife agencies and tribes had reached a settlement with the BPA
related to its negotiations with Canada over water in Canadian projects. In a
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Non-Treaty Storage Agreement,360 United States and Canadian operators
addressed control over an additional 2.5 million acre-feet of water not
covered by the Columbia River Treaty or prior agreements. Some Columbia
River tribes and fish and wildlife agencies, objecting that the agreement
might change river operations and harm salmon, sued and subsequently
reached a settlement with Bonneville. Among other things, the settlement
committed Bonneville to supply one million dollars a year for an
experimental program to rent water in the Snake River Basin for salmon
flows.361 The water rental pilot project had given Idaho parties and others
some experience with transactional approaches to securing instream water
by the time the Strategy for Salmon and the 1993 biological opinion were
adopted in 1992 and 1993.
Snake River flow augmentation water identified in the Salmon Summit had
been provided without incident during the 1991 salmon migration. However,
in late 1991 the Idaho Department of Water Resources notified the Bureau
that it would have to comply with Idaho water transfer procedures before
water could be used to augment salmon flows during the 1992 salmon
migration. The Bureau filed a transfer application in early 1992, attracting
more than 600 protests.362 Ultimately, the proceeding was mooted when the
Idaho legislature adopted a law approving this water use on a temporary
basis.363 The legislature also approved a memorial to the Power Planning
Council endorsing a drawdown strategy and construction of new storage
facilities, noting that “in a spirit of regional cooperation we concur that water
for flow augmentation may be needed on an interim basis on a willing sellerwilling buyer basis. However, our willingness to provide water from Idaho
water storage facilities on an interim basis for flow augmentation is
specifically conditioned upon there being a comprehensive effort to
implement the drawdown strategy . . . .”364
At about the same time, the Interstate Work Group organized a Snake River
water committee consisting of fish managers, Indian tribes, water users,
conservation groups and water managers to develop a work plan and retain
an engineering firm to perform a detailed analysis of nonstructural
measures, water use efficiencies, water leasing, conjunctive water
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management and other approaches that could secure at least another one
million acre-feet of flow augmentation water in the Snake River Basin. The
committee and this objective had been specifically outlined by the Council
program. The committee’s contractors, Bookman-Edmonston Engineers,
consulted with a broad array of water users in communities throughout the
Snake Basin. The resulting study, conducted over a two-year period,
identified a portfolio of possibilities, ranging from an ambitious and costly
conjunctive use program in the Upper Snake Basin, to smaller-scale savings
in the Owyhee basin in Oregon, to weather modification projects that might
increase runoff. Taken together, these options could produce more than a
million acre-feet of water, some at higher cost and lower feasibility than
others.365
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Reclamation was implementing the Council’s
1992-93 fish and wildlife program, which called for the Bureau to acquire
water for salmon in the Snake River Basin (the 1993 Endangered Species Act
biological opinion and the Council program called for 427,000 acre-feet; in
1994 the Council called for an additional million acre-feet). Following the
1992 Idaho water transfer proceeding, the Bureau began gaining experience
in acquiring this water.366
To begin with, the Bureau faced a dilemma. Many Snake Basin water users
considered use of this water for salmon flow augmentation a waste. This was
based on the idea that any flow augmentation water would just spread out
over the top of the reservoirs and be of little help to salmon. In truth, this is
a problem that confronts virtually any salmon recovery measure: The
incremental benefit of any remedial action is almost always small. It is only
when the increments accumulate that benefits become significant. But this
was not a very satisfying answer for the irrigators with whom the Bureau
was dealing. Apart from the issue of biological merit, the Bureau faced
adamant legal arguments on both sides. Some water users contended their
water rights and contracts were supreme. Some tribes contended that the
Bureau had a trust obligation to provide water for salmon before providing
water for irrigation. Some environmentalists contended that the Endangered
Species Act trumps irrigation rights.367
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Amid rumors that federal lawyers believed federal obligations superseded
water rights, and faced with what the Department of Interior perceived as
“the specter of an all-out fight over authority in the face of serious declines in
salmon runs,”368 Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt assured Idahoans that
Interior would look for water through voluntary transactions, not
condemnation.369 The Bureau also determined that it would seek the water
only in accordance with state law, for two reasons. For one thing, state water
law and administration would be the best way to protect any water that was
acquired. For another, the Bureau judged that complying with state law
would, over the long term, promote wider consensus over providing water for
salmon.370
Finding this water proved to be anything but straightforward. The Bureau’s
primary sources were to be uncontracted space in Bureau reservoirs, rental
water from the Idaho water banks, and storage space the Bureau planned to
reacquire from water users. However, in the drought years of 1993 and 1994,
these sources were inadequate. The Bureau had to resort to unused “power
head space” in several different reservoirs. By 1995, when the Bureau and
the National Marine Fisheries Service were consulting over Endangered
Species Act compliance, the Bureau was adamant that finding anything more
than 427,000 acre-feet was unrealistic. Not only was the experience of the
two prior years discouraging, but the Bureau expressed concerns that state
water agencies would balk.371 The Fisheries Service’s 1995 biological opinion
said that 427,000 acre-feet would avoid jeopardy to the salmon, more should
be provided if possible, but acquisition should only be from willing sellers and
in accordance with state law.
These are the basic terms of Reclamation’s Snake River water acquisition
program. The Bureau’s experience implementing the program is
characterized in Table 2:
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Table 2 372
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

206,617

285,954

22,396

22,896

Upper Snake
USBR space

15,000

Rentals

84,000

65,000

44,325

232,839

194,667

Subtotals

99,000

271,617

330,279

255,235

217,563

95,000

61,883

94,242

95,000

Payette
USBR space
Rentals
Subtotals

28,874

90,000

73,651

34,971

50,758

56,300

102,523

129,971

61,883

145,000

151,300

23,000

35,950

35,000

38,000

23,000

35,950

27,000

Boise
USBR space
Rentals

2,000

Subtotals

38,000

Oregon Natural
Flows
Skyline

20,073

OR Wtr Trust

64

Subtotal
Grand Totals

20,137
201,525

90,000

424,588

428,112

427,235

427,000

In putting these transactions together, the Bureau cited a number of lessons:
Decisions had to be made about whether to treat an acquisition as akin to a
land title acquisition (logical for acquiring a natural flow right) or a contract
matter (logical for reacquiring a storage right). The Bureau learned that few
title companies will ensure title to water rights; a special arrangement had to
be worked out with a Texas title company. Paths had to be found between
the requirements of state law and federal law, including U.S. Department of
Justice regulations. Conventions had to be developed for valuing water,
which varied with the type of right acquired. Further water-transfer
proceedings had to be initiated. In contrast to the 1992 transfer process, only
90 protests were filed in later transfer proceedings. Again, the Bureau and
the protesters reached a settlement that led to state legislation authorizing
such transactions through 1999.
Protecting interstate water. When the Council asked the water managers to
explore an interstate compact, it was concerned with how the states could
protect additional flows for salmon and against new consumptive water uses.
This turned out to be a question for which the water managers had no ready
answer. They could see ways to ensure that water secured by a lease or
purchase was not diverted at some place downstream, as complicated as that
could be. But the harder problem was fitting such protections into long-term

372

Rigby, “Acquiring Water for Flow Augmentation” at 3.

94

Restoring the River of Salmon

water management. How could they ensure, in effect, that “protected” water
would not be riding on a river that was gradually being depleted by new
diversions over a period of decades? The Interstate Work Group agreed that
it could not protect this water without an interstate water agreement, and
perhaps by permanently closing the rivers to further appropriation.
However, there was continuing uncertainty about mainstem flow objectives
in the Snake. The amount required would depend in part on the outcome of
the drawdown debate. Accordingly, some of the managers saw little point in
taking the interstate water discussions further. With temporary moratoria
in place to protect against additional depletions, further action could wait.
Uncoordinated state policies continue to be a problem in protecting water
secured for salmon. An illustration arose in 1996 with the Skyline Farms
transaction noted in the Bureau table above. The Environmental Defense
Fund, Bonneville, the Bureau of Reclamation and others put considerable
time and energy into a water rights transfer of water owned by Skyline
Farms on Oregon’s Malheur River. The Malheur feeds the Snake River as
the Snake becomes the Oregon-Idaho border. From there, the Snake passes
through eastern Washington and then heads west, where it forms the
Washington-Oregon border. Along the way, there are ample opportunities to
test the states’ ability to protect instream water. The Skyline Farms
transaction began as a lease option between the farm owners and BPA in
1994, brokered by the Defense Fund. In 1996, the Bureau of Reclamation
agreed to pay the cost of purchasing the water rights to help meet its
commitment to supply 427,000 acre-feet from the Snake River Basin.373 The
Oregon Water Resources Department is in the process of approving the
transfer. If it occurs, it could be one of the more significant water marketing
demonstration projects in the region.374
The efficacy of the transaction was called into question by a development
with roots in the early 1960s. The State of Oregon had leased 93,000 acres of
land to the Boeing Corporation in 1963. The land lies along the Columbia
River near Boardman, Oregon. Between 1971 and 1985, a Boeing
agricultural subsidiary acquired nine water use permits to develop 63,000
acres of this land, of which about 28,000 acres were actually developed.
Controversy erupted in 1995, when the Oregon Water Resources Department
extended the time in which Boeing could perfect a water right application to
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develop the remaining 35,000 acres of undeveloped land.375 The Boeing land
is downstream of the Malheur River, which would soon be carrying water
from the conversion of Skyline Farms to dry-land farming. WaterWatch of
Oregon sued the Water Resources Department. Upper Snake Basin
irrigators notified the Oregon Department that they would “be extremely
hesitant to cooperate further with the Bureau of Reclamation in providing
water for future years if the water will simply be used to facilitate
development downstream.”376 Because the diversion would require a Corps
of Engineers dredge-and-fill permit, the National Marine Fisheries Service
and the Corps began an ESA consultation on the matter. Recently the
Fisheries Service ruled that the Corps could not issue the permit if the new
water withdrawal would diminish fish flows (see section IV.F.7, “State Water
Moratoria and the Inland Lands Biological Opinion,” below). The
controversy, which is still brewing, underscores the obdurate issues that face
interstate water transactions that are part of species recovery programs.377

b. Mainstem and Headwater Storage Measures.—The Strategy for Salmon
also called for a number of evaluations. One of the matters that had long
vexed the Council was that scientific data concerning the biological benefits
of flow augmentation were unsatisfactory. The data simply were not very
good and, while the flow-survival connection was intuitively logical, the
Council was uncomfortable relying solely on intuition and judgment. In 1993,
the Council commissioned an independent review of the data by a scientist
outside the region, who concluded that the data, while limited, showed “the
general relationship of increasing [salmon] survival with increasing flow.”378
Immediately following this report, in the spring and summer of 1994, the
Council conducted an administrative rulemaking to put its mainstem
program on an explicitly experimental “adaptive management” footing. The
process was prompted by continuing controversy over the relative biological
value of augmenting flow and leaving juvenile fish to migrate down river
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versus loading them into barges and transporting them downstream.379 To
address the controversy, the Council convened two scientific workshops,
where areas of scientific agreement and disagreement were discussed.
Hypotheses were developed to clarify the assumptions underlying each
approach. In this so-called “mainstem hypothesis” rulemaking, the Council
called for a technical committee with broad expert participation to develop
approaches to test the hypotheses. The hypotheses laid important
groundwork for the Council’s evaluation of further mainstem measures for
the Council’s 1994 program amendments.
Five other evaluations were conducted to clarify choices in the mainstem.
First, the Corps did an extensive series of drawdown studies as part of a
National Environmental Policy Act process concerning operation of the
mainstem dams. To provide non-federal parties with assurance that the
Corps’ studies overlooked nothing important, the Council chartered a
drawdown committee with representatives of fish and wildlife agencies,
tribes, utilities and others, staffed by an engineering firm, to review the
Corps’ work.380 Second, the Interstate Work Group, the Snake River Water
Committee and a contractor had completed their analysis of nonstructural
alternatives for supplying another million acre-feet from the Snake River
Basin (discussed above). Third, the Bureau of Reclamation completed a
study identifying eleven potential water storage sites in the Snake Basin.381
Some of these possibilities would impound free-flowing tributaries, while
others would be off-stream pumped storage sites that could store surplus
water in better water years, to be released for flow augmentation when
salmon need it. Fourth, the Council asked the Environmental Defense Fund
to develop a cost-effectiveness methodology for comparing mainstem
measures. The resulting study put the costs of drawdowns, nonstructural
measures and new storage in comparable economic terms, and ranked each
alternative according to its cost and contribution to increased flow velocity.382
The study concluded that various land-fallowing alternatives would be the
most advantageous economically, but drawdowns would produce the biggest
gains in river velocity.
Finally, as more aggressive salmon measures were adopted, questions were
raised regarding effects on other species. Libby and Hungry Horse reservoirs
in Montana and Grand Coulee reservoir in north-central Washington, for
See Northwest Power Planning Council, Meeting Summary, Flow/Velocity Workshop,
February 22-23, 1994; Meeting Summary, Workshop II, June 17, 1994.
380
Harza and Associates, Review of Reservoir Drawdown, Final Report to the Northwest
Power Planning Council Columbia/Snake Drawdown Committee (April 1994).
381
U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, Snake River Basin Storage Appraisal Study (January 1994).
382
The Environmental Defense Fund, Water for Salmon: An Economic Analysis of Salmon
Recovery Alternatives in the Lower Snake and Columbia Rivers (April 1995).
379

97

A River in Common: The Columbia River, the Salmon Ecosystem, and Water Policy

example, are in areas that either never had salmon or no longer have salmon
because of dam blockages. When asked to contribute water to augment
salmon flows, people in these areas balked. Tribes in upriver areas have not
pressed their interests in court as lower river tribes have, but they have
significant interests in resident fish and wildlife that inhabit the upriver
reservoirs. In many cases, these resident fish populations were all the tribes
had left after salmon were blocked by dams from reaching upriver areas, and
the loss was considerable. As one tribal member put it:
I feel even though we have been moved from one part of the Columbia River
to another part, we had some happiness and we knew that we could live
because we had a food supply. When ‘progress’ came and the dams were
built, progress did not come to the Indian people. It just destroyed our food
sources and it took the purity out of the water, because when water sits it
gets stale. And we've lost the fish; there was nothing provided for them to
continue to the areas where they naturally spawned.383
The dams’ effects in other upriver areas had not been so catastrophic, but
upriver storage reservoirs had been yo-yoed up and down by power and floodcontrol drafting over the years. These effects were somewhat easier for local
areas to accept because power generation and flood control benefitted areas
neighboring the reservoirs. However, salmon flow releases have no
immediate benefit for upriver areas; they only raise concerns. Big “bath tub
rings” exposed by reservoir releases had grown and become persistent
through seven years of drought and the expanding program of salmon flows
on the mainstem.
To address these concerns, BPA, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Confederated Salish-Kootenai Tribes, the Corps of Engineers, the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks, the Northwest Power Planning
Council staff and others worked over the course of seven years to develop
“integrated rule curves” to govern the operation of two of the headwater
reservoirs.384 The integrated rule curves started out as operational rules
designed to protect resident species in and around these headwater
reservoirs by limiting the frequency and duration of deep drafts from the
reservoirs. Limiting these drafts is intended to protect food supply, optimize
water temperatures and ensure tributary passage for fish, including species
Lucy Covington, Colville Tribal Council, in Pacific Northwest River Basins Commission,
It’s Everyone’s River . . . Story of the Columbia, transcript of proceedings at 10 (October 1,
1975).
384
For a description of this process, see B. Marotz, C. Althen and W. Lonon, Model
Development to Establish Integrated Operational Rule Curves for Hungry Horse and Libby
Reservoirs, Final Report (Bonneville Power Administration Project No. 83-467, January
1996).
383
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that either are or appear to be headed for Endangered Species Act protection
on their own. Over a period of years, these rules were adjusted to attempt to
better integrate them with hydropower and other operational needs. This
work also was completed by mid-1994.

c. Water Conservation Pilot Projects.—In many watersheds, government
agencies such as the Bureau of Reclamation and the Natural Resources
Conservation Service, local soil and water conservation districts, state water
agencies and others have supplied important technical expertise to increase
efficiency in water uses. The Bureau of Reclamation’s pilot water
conservation project is an example. The Strategy for Salmon called on the
Bureau to plan and implement tributary water conservation demonstration
projects to help salmon. One purpose of the measure was to learn more
about whether and how water conservation could help fish. Another purpose
was to see whether local landowners and agencies could implement such
measures cooperatively, especially in concert with other watershed
initiatives.
By 1996, the Bureau had gained substantial experience with these measures.
Demonstration projects were implemented in the Wallowa and John Day
rivers in Oregon, the Lemhi in Idaho and the Yakima in Washington. Each
set of projects was shaped by factors unique to each area. In the John Day
River, for example, there are a number of “push up” dams, temporary dirt and
gravel diversion dams that ranchers push into rivers with bulldozers. Very
often, the material for the dam is scraped from the river channel itself. A
single ranch may require several such dams to irrigate different fields. These
temporary dams don’t damage stream habitat just once; they may wash out
several times each year, releasing sediment downstream and requiring
replacement dams that multiply the damage. When they are not washing
out, diversions take water in unlined ditches to fields some distance from the
stream, so that the diversion has to be big enough to account for large
conveyance losses. Water is spread over fields, where it warms up, picks up
chemicals, drains into drainage ditches and returns to the stream. In their
demonstration projects, the Bureau, soil and water conservation districts and
others worked with ranchers to replace “push up” dams with pumps or
permanent diversion structures that wouldn’t wash out. Open ditches were
replaced with closed pipes, and pipe drainage systems were installed to
reduce conveyance losses and warming. The permanent dams do not wash
out, pose less of an obstacle to fish, allow more precise diversions, and carry
less soil and chemicals back to streams. Pipe drainage systems provide
cooler return flows to streams.
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The concern about these projects is similar to the concern expressed about
the Umatilla and Yakima watershed efforts: what assurance is there that
they will restore streamflows, and not simply free up water for more
irrigation? At the same time, however, these pilot projects have benefits
even if they don’t leave more water in rivers. They can remove barriers to
migrating fish, help avoid destructive push-up dams, and produce cooler
return flows. The concern over stream flows merits attention, but these
projects still make a valuable contribution to tributary restoration efforts.

5. Litigation
Although much of the work called for by the Strategy for Salmon had been
accomplished, in other ways neither the biological opinion nor the Strategy
for Salmon fared well. In response to a challenge filed against the National
Marine Fisheries Service’s 1993 biological opinion,385 a federal court faulted
the biological opinion and sent it back for further work. The holding of the
case was technical, based on the court’s finding that the Fisheries Service
had used the wrong baseline from which to measure the species’ decline and
had inexplicably relied on optimistic assumptions about the merits of
mitigation measures. The court did not stop at technical defects, however,
and added far-ranging observations on the underlying substantive issues:
[The biological opinion is] seriously, ‘significantly’ flawed because it is too
heavily geared towards a status quo that has allowed all forms of river
activity to proceed in a deficit situation, that is, relatively small steps,
minor improvements and adjustments, when the situation literally cries
out for a major overhaul. Instead of looking for what can be done to
protect the species from jeopardy, NMFS and the action agencies have
narrowly focused their attention on what the establishment is capable of
handling with minimal disruption.386
The court also counseled the federal parties to open up the closed process in
which the biological opinion had been developed, to ensure that state fish and
wildlife agency and tribal scientists were heard: “The underlying root of the
litigation problem is the feeling of these parties that the federal government
is simply not listening to them.”387 The court noted that the ESA imposes an
Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service, et al., 850 F.
Supp. 886 (D. Ore. 1994). The case was dismissed as moot on appeal in light of the fact that
a new biological opinion already had been developed at the time of the court’s opinions.
Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th
Cir. 1995).
386
Id. at 36.
387
Id., at 36-37.
385
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obligation on the Fisheries Service to consider data from well-qualified fish
and wildlife agency and tribal biologists.388 Following the opinion, the federal
parties organized a large-scale consultation process with the states and
tribes to reanalyze the technical merits of the biological opinion.
The Council was the next to feel the courts’ sting. In Northwest Resource
Information Center v. Northwest Power Planning Council,389 a federal court of
appeals found that the Strategy for Salmon too was procedurally flawed.
Again, the procedural holding was accompanied by expansive dicta, including
an interpretation of the Northwest Power Act under which the Council
should give “a high degree of deference” to the fish and wildlife agencies’ and
tribes’ judgments on fish and wildlife mitigation. The court also criticized the
scope of the Council’s action: “The Council’s approach seems largely to have
been from the premise that only small steps are possible, in light of
entrenched river user claims of economic hardship.”390
The litigation went beyond river operations. In Pacific Northwest Generating
Cooperative v. Brown,391 the federal court of appeals held that utility and
industrial groups had standing to challenge Endangered Species Act
processes affecting fish harvest, land management and hatchery operations.
Simultaneously, however, the court held that the industry claims were moot.
In Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas,392 and Pacific Rivers Council v.
Intermountain Forest Industry Association,393 courts held that the U. S.
Forest Service must consult under the Endangered Species Act on its land
resource management plans. Until consultations occurred, various activities,
including timber sales, grazing and road building, were enjoined. The
injunctions were dissolved when the National Marine Fisheries Service’s
biological opinion on habitat management was issued in early 1995, and the
U. S. Supreme Court declined to review the matter.394
Litigation added another conservation tool in a 1994 decision from the
Supreme Court of the State of Washington. In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County v. Washington Department of Ecology,395 the U. S. Supreme Court

Id., citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(2) (agency “shall use the best scientific and commercial data
available”).
389
35 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994).
390
35 F.3d at 1395.
391
38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994), reversing 822 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Ore.)
392
30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
393
Civ. No. 94-0159-S-HLR (D. Idaho 1994).
394
A newspaper reported that the Service’s biological opinion on habitat management,
issued in the spring of 1995, had been softened at the request of the U. S. Justice
Department in an effort to strengthen the government's position in the Pacific Rivers cases.
See Laatz, “Documents fault salmon decision,” The Oregonian, April 21, 1995.
395
114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994).
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decided that states may deny water quality permits to hydropower projects
based on their salmon impacts. In effect, the lack of flow to support an
existing salmon population is a form of pollution, the court held. Based on
this ruling, American Rivers and other conservation groups petitioned the
Washington Department of Ecology to protect streams from diversions and
restore “flow-impaired” streams. To protect streams, American Rivers
argued, the Department should implement metering programs, and develop
model flow restoration plans.396 The Environmental Protection Agency, the
Washington Department of Ecology and American Rivers have since then
developed criteria for listing “flow-impaired” streams, and gathered data for
listings. In June 1996, Washington listed 48 streams as flow impaired;
Oregon listed 55; and the Environmental Protection Agency has listed 192 in
Idaho.397 The next question is what measures can be adopted to address
these flow problems.

6. New Council, NMFS and Tribal Programs
Bolstered with the evaluations called for by the Strategy for Salmon and
spurred by a rebuke from the court, the Council completed an extensive
revision of its fish and wildlife program in December 1994, three months
after the Northwest Resource Information Center ruling.398 To respond to the
court’s procedural criticisms, the Council took care to explain how the
program responded to fish and wildlife agency and tribal recommendations.
Substantively, the new program endorsed recommendations calling for
reservoir drawdowns at two projects and a 1.3 million acre-feet expansion in
the flow augmentation program for the Columbia River, among other things.
These measures were put in an experimental context: Building from the
Council’s “mainstem hypotheses” rulemaking, each measure would figure in
a head-to-head comparison of the survival of fish that are transported by
barge and fish that are left in the river. Cutbacks in the juvenile fish barging
program were justified in part by experimental design requirements. In this
manner, the Council proposed to implement major changes in the mainstem
of the river without ignoring the underlying scientific uncertainties. To
address concerns about resident fish, the Council adopted integrated rule
curves for Montana’s storage reservoirs and called for the development of
similar rule curves at other storage reservoirs.
Letter from Katherine Ransel, American Rivers, to Mary Riveland, Washington
Department of Ecology, October 22, 1996. See also K. Ransel, “The Sleeping Giant Awakens:
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology,” 25 Env’t’l L. 255
(1995).
397
Personal communication from Katherine Ransel, American Rivers, April 21, 1997.
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Northwest Power Planning Council, Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
(December 1994).
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The Council’s membership changed in January 1995. The new Council was
unfamiliar with the reasoning underlying the controversial 1994 program,
and in some cases represented different governors than those in office in
1994. Accordingly, it called for a scientific review of the 1994 program to see
if it was founded on good science. The review was conducted by the
Independent Scientific Group, a respected group of scientists without
institutional affiliation to the program. Meanwhile, an industry lawsuit
challenging the 1994 program was filed, but then abandoned.399
While the Council was at work, the National Marine Fisheries Service had
initiated two processes under the Endangered Species Act. First, in 1992 it
had appointed a recovery team to develop recommendations for a recovery
plan.400 In a departure from usual Endangered Species Act practice,401 the
team operated almost autonomously, issuing draft recommendations for
public comment, publishing final recommendations,402 lobbying for them in
Congress and elsewhere, and later criticizing the Fisheries Service’s draft
recovery plan. The Service used the Team’s recommendations to develop a
proposed recovery plan, released in March, 1995. The proposed plan is an
ambitious document, addressing not only the mitigation needs of salmon, but
also proposing an institutional structure in which the Service would assume
responsibility for coordinating a wide array of recovery actions.403 In
substantive areas, the proposed plan incorporated the biological opinions the

The amendments initially were challenged by the Idaho Power Company, which operates
the Hells Canyon dams on the Snake River. A coalition of aluminum companies and other
industrial interests moved to intervene in support of Idaho Power’s challenge, while the
Yakama Indian Nation and a coalition of environmental fishing organizations moved to
intervene in support of the Council. After taking a closer look at the Council’s record and the
intervenors, Idaho Power withdrew its challenge.
400
The Service is authorized to retain help from outside the agency, and may form “recovery
teams” to provide advice on recovery plan development and implementation, 16 U.S.C. §
1533(f)(2). Team recommendations are purely advisory. See U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Policy and Guidelines for Planning and Coordinating Recovery of Endangered and
Threatened Species, May 1990, p. II-1. Notwithstanding their advisory function, the Act
provides that recovery teams are not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (16
U.S.C. § 1533(f)(2)).
401
Under U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service guidelines, recovery team draft plans do not
represent the position of the agency; recovery teams may or may not be asked to prepare
final recovery plans; without the approval of the agency, recovery team members may not
seek to influence agency policy outside agency channels; and recovery plans are final only
when they are adopted by the agency (U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Policy and Guidelines
for Recovery Planning and Coordinating Recovery of Endangered and Threatened Species,
Appendix II: Organizing the Recovery Effort: Roles and Options. See also National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service Office of Protected
Resources, Recovery Planning Guidelines, at 3 (October 1992)).
402
Snake River Recovery Team, Final Recommendations to the National Marine Fisheries
Service (May 1994).
403
National Marine Fisheries Service, Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon
(March 1995).
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agency had previously issued for all stages of the salmon life cycle: habitat,
hydropower operations, harvest and hatcheries. In tributaries, the plan
described “habitat conditions such as lack of pools, high water temperatures,
water chemistry, low flows (often associated with water withdrawals and
diversions), poor overwintering conditions for juvenile salmon, and high
sediment loads.”404 It called for “[a]n ecosystem-based approach that
considers entire watersheds and river subbasins,” focusing particularly on
protecting riparian areas and restoring instream flows and other essential
habitat requirements on federal lands.405 The plan also incorporated
hydropower operation standards from a longer term (1994-1998) biological
opinion, which was issued simultaneously.
Next, the National Marine Fisheries Service developed a 1994-1998
hydropower biological opinion in a process intended to respond to the ruling
in Idaho Department of Fish and Game v. National Marine Fisheries Service.
Over the course of several months, federal agencies, state fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes met to develop biological requirements to guide flow
operations. The resulting biological opinion was, for the first time, a
“jeopardy” opinion: hydropower operations would jeopardize listed
populations unless a “reasonable and prudent alternative” operation were
implemented.406 The reasonable and prudent alternative called for even
more storage water to be used for flow augmentation in the Columbia,
continued reliance on barging, and a variety of other measures. It proposed
to defer a decision on reservoir drawdowns until 1999. The biological
opinion’s consideration of resident fish impacts was limited. It was developed
in coordination with the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, however, which has
Endangered Species Act jurisdiction over resident species.407

National Marine Fisheries Service, Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon at V1-2.
405
National Marine Fisheries Service, Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon at V1-7, V-1-9.
406
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act requires federal agencies proposing to take
action that may adversely affect a listed salmon species to consult with the relevant federal
fish and wildlife agency (the National Marine Fisheries Service) to ensure that the proposed
action will not jeopardize the continued existence of the species or its critical habitat. As part
of the consultation process, the Fisheries Service must issue a biological opinion detailing
how the proposed action would affect the species. If the Service believes the action would
jeopardize the species, it must suggest “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that would
avoid jeopardy. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
407
Kootenai River white sturgeon, which are listed as endangered, affect operations at
Montana’s Libby Dam. See 59 Fed. Reg. 45989 (Sept. 6, 1994). Snail species that inhabit hot
springs in central Idaho also are listed and can affect Snake River flow operations; bull trout
have been the subject of listing petitions, which the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service has found
warranted but precluded by its other priorities.
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There were many similarities between the Fisheries Service’s biological
opinion and the Council’s 1994 program, but there were also important
differences. The Council’s 1994 program emphasizes solutions for Snake
River fish in the Snake River Basin. Not only does the program call for
Snake River reservoir drawdowns, but it proposes to use hydropower
revenues to fund Snake River water leases, water conservation and other
measures that could leave an additional million acre-feet in the Snake River
for salmon. In contrast, the biological opinion offers a limited endorsement of
these measures. Instead, it relies more heavily on barging juvenile fish out of
the Snake River and augmenting Columbia River flows. It establishes no
specific target for additional water from the Snake River Basin for flow
augmentation.
In April, 1997, the same federal judge who had thrown out the Fisheries
Service’s 1993 biological opinion rejected challenges to the Service’s revised
biological opinion. In American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries
Service,408 environmental groups argued that the Fisheries Service’s new
biological opinion was arbitrary and capricious and that, even if the opinion
passed muster, the federal agencies had not implemented the biological
opinion’s reasonable and prudent alternative. The court rejected the
challenge. On the biological opinion’s adequacy, the court observed that the
new biological opinion was significantly different from the opinion the court
had struck down, particularly in acknowledging the need for substantial
change in the configuration of the Columbia River dams: “NMFS has
concluded that without major modifications to the Snake and Columbia River
dams, it is unlikely survivals can be sufficiently improved to ensure that the
operation of the FCRPS [Federal Columbia River Power System] does not
impede the survival and recovery of listed Snake River salmon.”409 Absent
this finding, the court would have faced a very different issue. The court also
found that the Service had significantly altered its jeopardy analysis based
on its consultations with the parties, state and tribal fish analysts, and
independent peer review. The court rejected technical challenges to the
Service’s analysis, emphasizing the court’s obligation to defer to the Service’s
evaluation of risk to the species:
[T]he scientific data and analysis available for these listed species is
complex and poses questions for which there are currently no complete
answers. . . . The fact that NMFS selected the least attractive option from
the states and tribes point of view does not make the decision an arbitrary
or capricious one; the ESA requires consideration of the best scientific
American Rivers, et al. v. National Marine Fisheries Service, et al., Civil No. 96-384-MA (D.
Ore., April 3, 1997).
409
American Rivers, et al. v. National Marine Fisheries Service, slip opinion at 11, 23.
408
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information available, it does not require that federal agencies select the
‘best’ conclusions among a range of options which even the plaintiffs
conceded at oral argument are not driven by scientific considerations. . . .
I find that NMFS’ selection of an acceptable probable recovery range is
largely a question of policy rather than science as it necessarily depends
upon the agencies’ comfort level for risk tolerance. No further explanation
of this recovery standard is required under the law.410
The court’s opinion is likely to be only a respite in Endangered Species Act
litigation on the Columbia. The same group of environmental plaintiffs plans
to challenge the Bureau of Reclamation’s failure to consult under the
Endangered Species Act regarding the effects of the Bureau’s Snake River
projects, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s failure to consult
on the operations of the Idaho Power Company’s Hells Canyon projects. Nor
is the field going to be left to environmental plaintiffs. With the U. S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Bennett v. Spear,411 a coalition of industry groups
has mounted what promises to be a spirited assault on the Endangered
Species Act process.
Meanwhile, not fully satisfied with the Council program or the National
Marine Fisheries Service plan, the Columbia River treaty tribes undertook
their own planning process, issuing a draft plan in May 1995. While the plan
was not developed pursuant to a specific statute, the tribes characterized it
as “a foundation for the United States and its citizens to honor their treaty
and trust obligations to the four tribes.”412 The plan’s introduction explained
the tribes’ view of the problem:
Much of what is recommended to benefit salmon is what has been needed
for a long time and what many have known was needed. More than
50 years ago, federal biologists warned that the consequences of continuing
habitat degradation and additional hydroelectric development would be
devastating to salmon populations. They were joined by tribal leaders
and, over the years, by government commissions and citizen groups.
However, until the enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and
Conservation Act of 1980 and its fish and wildlife program, there was no
comprehensive salmon restoration for the Columbia Basin. Had Northwest Power Planning Council’s salmon plans been implemented, the people
of the Northwest would not be facing a salmon crisis as today’s.

American Rivers, et al. v. National Marine Fisheries Service, slip opinion at 11, 24.
1997 WestLaw 11956 (March 19, 1997).
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Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi-Wa-Kish-Wit: The Columbia River Anadromous Fish Restoration Plan
of the Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs and Yakama Tribes at 1-2 (Review draft, 1995).
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It was known then that passage conditions in the mainstem Columbia
River were inhospitable to salmon. Yet changes in river operations were
minute especially given the prevailing drought conditions. It was also
known that many salmon runs and stocks had declined to such an extent
that their best hope was the application of artificial production strategies.
But hatcheries were eschewed without regard to the best available science.
Instead, some of the stocks that might have been helped by enactment of
fish program measures became listed under the Endangered Species Act.413
Like the National Marine Fisheries Service Recovery Plan, the tribal plan
addresses a range of issues, including institutional structures, economic
considerations, and a spectrum of measures to help salmon. The plan called
for one to three million acre-feet of water from the Upper Snake, water to
meet ambitious flow targets in the Columbia, year-round reservoir
drawdowns at several projects, and termination of the salmon barging
program. Additional water withdrawals from salmon tributaries would be
prevented, water meters would be required, and water rights enforced.
Because the tribes are skeptical that habitat restoration alone can save
declining wild populations, hatchery-produced fish would be planted in the
wild, with the hope that naturally-spawning populations would be
reestablished in recovering habitat.414
So, the Northwest now has three major salmon restoration plans: the
Council’s, the National Marine Fisheries Service’s, and the treaty tribes’.
The three plans differ in key respects regarding the merits of fish barging,
the balance between providing water for salmon and protecting fish in
upriver reservoirs, water contributions from the Snake River Basin, and the
risks and benefits of hatcheries.415 The Council’s and the Fisheries Service’s
are mandated by statute, while the tribes’ plan embodies their view of treaty
requirements. But the three plans also have much in common. All three
portray a salmon ecosystem that is in trouble from its headwaters to the
ocean; dedicate a high volume of water to the river for salmon flows; call for
serious limits on water withdrawals from tributaries; and emphasize that
these measures can work only if they are part of an effort that encompasses
the entire ecosystem.

7. State Water Moratoria and the Inland Lands Biological Opinion

Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi-Wa-Kish-Wit at 1-2.
See, e.g., Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi-Wa-Kish-Wit at 5B-21.
415
See M. Blumm, “Columbia Basin Salmon and the Courts: Reviving the Parity Promise,”
25 Env’t’l Law 351, 362 (discussing differences between the Council and NMFS plans).
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In mid-1997, two developments pulled river policy in opposite directions. One
was legislation in the State of Washington that lifted the state’s moratorium
on processing new water diversion permit applications from the Columbia’s
mainstem.416 Washington’s newly-elected Governor Locke wrote to Idaho’s
Governor Batt promptly after the legislation’s enactment to say that
although Governor Locke would sign the new legislation, “the State of
Washington will not process any pending or future applications for new
appropriations until instream flows are established and a determination is
made that water is available for withdrawal. . . Washington will not make
decisions for new appropriations that would jeopardize regional salmon
recovery efforts, or undermine your state’s conservation efforts to add to
stream flows in the upper Snake River basin.”417 Governor Locke also
suggested that the states renew efforts to coordinate interstate water issues.
Almost simultaneously, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a new
Endangered Species Act biological opinion on the Boeing Farms water
diversion,418 now called the “Inland Lands” project.419 The Fisheries Service
became involved in the Boeing Farms case because the Clean Water Act
requires a dredge-and-fill permit before the diverter could install pumps and
other facilities for the proposed diversion. The Army Corps of Engineers,
which administers the permit program, initially found that the permit would
not jeopardize listed salmon, and in the Inland Lands opinion, the Fisheries
Service disagreed.
The opinion is based largely on a Bureau of Reclamation evaluation of the
streamflow effects of cumulative water withdrawals from the Columbia
system. The study evaluated streamflows with and without diversions, to
compare natural conditions to current conditions, and identify the extent to
which power operations, flood control operations and irrigation withdrawals
have contributed to the river’s flow problems. The study showed that for the
Snake, “[i]rrigation withdrawal is the principal reason for missing flow
objectives.” Without irrigation withdrawals, summer flow objectives at
Lower Granite would be met 100% of the time; with withdrawals, the
objectives are met less than 15% of the time. In the lowest eight water years,
the Snake at Lower Granite would be 250% greater without irrigation
withdrawals than it is with irrigation withdrawals. Spring flow objectives
would be met 94% of the time without irrigation withdrawals, compared to
64% with withdrawals. In the Columbia, power and flood control cause the

Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1110, May, 1997.
Letter from Hon. Gary Locke to Hon. Philip E. Batt, May 19, 1977.
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See page 97, above.
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National Marine Fisheries Service, Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation,
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largest reductions to flows at McNary. Nevertheless, without irrigation
withdrawals, summer flow objectives would be met 74% of the time, versus
26% with withdrawals. In the spring, flow objectives would be met 92% of
the time without withdrawals, compared to 72% with withdrawals.
The Service put these rather dramatic figures together with several other
factors. First, the Service observed that the environmental needs of the listed
populations are not currently being met, and so there must be significant
improvements if they are to recover. Second, the biological opinion on
hydropower operations puts “heavy burdens on upstream storage and
irrigation,” and downstream diversions tend to vitiate the results of
upstream contributions. Moreover, the fact that a single diversion may itself
have a small impact on listed fish ignores the cumulative effect that the
proposed diversion has in combination with preexisting diversions. If this
diversion were approved, additional diversions could be expected, which
would only exacerbate stream flow problems for listed fish. Writing in words
that may have been directed at state legislatures, the opinion observed:
The states of Oregon, Washington and Idaho all have in place moratoria
on further withdrawals in the Basin. In some cases, however, these
moratoria have significant exceptions. For example, the action considered
under this Opinion involves a pending right that has been repeatedly
extended. These moratoria are also subject to legislative modification. As
the interior Columbia Basin grows and develops it is foreseeable that
demand for water will continue to grow as well. For the Federal agencies
to allow additional future withdrawals to proceed, on the logic that each
one by itself has a small impact, would undermine one of the major
improvements in habitat conditions and further degrade the
environmental baseline.
In view of the Service’s jeopardy conclusion, it was obliged to suggest a
“reasonable and prudent alternative” operation that would avoid jeopardy.
The Service decided to condition the permit on a requirement that the
applicant provide an equivalent amount of water from other sources. In
other words, the reasonable and prudent alternative is a “no net depletion”
requirement. This requirement applies only when flow objectives are not
being met. Finally, in a non-binding “conservation recommendation,” the
Service asked the Corps to develop a list of existing dredge-and-fill permits to
consider their impacts on listed salmon.
The Inland Lands biological opinion is important in several ways. It
illustrates the disconnect between the traditional thrust of state water law
and the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. Indeed, the gulf
between the Inland Lands opinion and the Washington legislature’s
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suspension of its water diversion moratorium is so wide that it is hard to
imagine it being bridgeable. The spotlight now will be on the Washington
Department of Ecology, which will have to give serious attention to Inland
Lands when the department determines water availability in light of the new
state legislation. Inland Lands also points to a much broader set of issues,
however. Before Inland Lands, by far the primary culprit in the mainstem
was the dams. No doubt they will remain the primary culprit, but not by so
large a margin. For the first time, data seem to point to irrigation diversions
as a significant contributor to the Columbia’s streamflow problems.
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V. Watershed Initiatives
Hydropower is much less a factor in the tributary streams than in the
mainstem. Tributaries are more often dried up by water diversions, warmed
and polluted by agricultural use and grazing, and silted up by timber harvest
and other land uses. An entirely different set of strategies is needed to
address these problems, and many people look to watershed initiatives for
answers. Watershed initiatives have been in some cases linked with the
Northwest Power Act or the Endangered Species Act, but in many cases the
connection was incidental and in some cases there was no connection at all.
Some grew directly out of long-standing tribal efforts to restore salmon to
particular tributaries. Others originated in the independent activities of
conservation groups and local communities.
This section first gives a quick survey of watershed initiatives in the Basin,
to give the Commission a sense of their diversity. That survey is followed by
an extended account of the watershed program in Oregon’s Grande Ronde
basin, which provides a deeper sense of the organizational, scientific and
political challenges involved in these initiatives.

A. General Survey
The Yakima River Basin. As discussed earlier, the Yakima Basin had a head
start. By the early 1990s, the Yakama Indian Nation had been addressing
salmon issues for years, developed working relationships with the
Washington State Department of Ecology, the Bureau of Reclamation and
local irrigators, and had begun a lengthy series of negotiations to identify
opportunities for supplying water for salmon with tolerable effects on
irrigators. One of the early milestones was the development of a “flip-flop”
approach to managing the basin’s water storage facilities. The flip-flop
program was designed to avoid operations that dried up salmon redds in the
winter when water was being stored in anticipation of irrigation needs, and
then flooded them with artificially high water levels during irrigation season.
Under this operation, storage facilities on different branches of the Yakima
system are managed to ensure that the redds are watered in a way that more
closely corresponds with their needs and to minimize the water required to
keep the redds viable.420
The same parties collaborated in water conservation measures to address
instream and out-of-stream needs. Working with the Environmental

See L. MacDonnell, “The Yakima Basin, Washington,”in Natural Resources Law Center,
University of Colorado, Restoring the West’s Waters: Opportunities for the Bureau of
Reclamation, vol. II (1996); D. Getches, “Changing the River’s Course: Western Water Policy
Reform,” 26 Env’t’l Law 157, 167 (1996).
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Defense Fund, they developed a water marketing pilot project to work in
conjunction with Washington’s Trust Water Rights law to save water for
instream uses.421 In July, 1994, Congress adopted the Yakima River Basin
Water Enhancement Program to provide federal funding for many of the
same purposes. In December, 1994, the Power Planning Council approved
Bonneville funding to match federal funding.422 In the spring of 1996, as part
of the water marketing pilot project, irrigation water rights were transferred
temporarily into the Teanaway River, a tributary of the Yakima.423
Currently, an advisory group of four biologists is preparing a report to
Congress on what would be needed to establish biologically-based flow
targets in the Yakima River, which could become part of an operating
strategy that the Enhancement legislation calls for.424
The political base for water initiatives broadened in 1994 with the creation of
the Yakima Watershed Council which grew out of a smaller group interested
in pumping water out of the Columbia into the Yakima Basin.425 In its
broader incarnation, the group aims to “integrate a broad spectrum of waterbased interests” to address the basin’s long-term water needs.426 Its August
1996, draft plan identifies ambitious goals for irrigation water supply and an
instream flow goal higher than that of the Yakima River Basin Water
Enhancement Project. In order to meet these goals, the Yakima Council sees
the need for 170,000 acre-feet of new storage. The Council also supports
conservation and watershed restoration, but contends that new storage is
essential too.
Plenty of questions remain in the Yakima. Throughout the development of
the water conservation initiatives, environmental groups expressed concerns
that conserved water would find its way into fields rather than the river.427
The same groups worry that new storage would come to be seen as a panacea
that would supplant conservation and other nonstructural measures.428
While these concerns need to be addressed, the Yakima remains one of the
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basins in which forward momentum is being maintained on difficult water
issues.
The Umatilla. Oregon’s Umatilla River is similar to the Yakima in that it
rises in a mountainous area with good habitat, runs through an Indian
reservation whose tribe has treaty fishing rights (the Confederated Tribes of
the Umatilla Indians), and has been dried up by irrigation diversions in the
summer and fall.429 Like the Yakima salmon runs, the Umatilla runs were
significant before development but were decimated by irrigation diversions
relatively early.430 By the 1930s, salmon were gone from the river.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Umatilla Tribes began building coalitions,
working from the premise that the tribe’s future was inseparable from the
future of the surrounding community.431 The coalition-building approach
began to pay off in the early 1980s. In its 1982 fish and wildlife program, the
Northwest Power Planning Council approved significant ratepayer
investments in fish passage and production facilities. In 1988, a coalition
consisting of the Tribes, the State, the Bureau of Reclamation and local
irrigators proposed a water exchange, whereby the Bureau of Reclamation
would reallocate irrigation water in McKay Reservoir to instream uses,
irrigators would forego diversions at critical times of the year and be supplied
with water from the nearby Columbia River. The exchange could be
implemented on a small scale with temporary pumps and a commitment of
free electricity for the pumps.432 For the long term, a large-scale federal
investment was required. Congress approved this investment in the 1988
Umatilla Basin Project Act.433
Implementing the Umatilla Basin water exchange was harder than might
have been expected. Because the Umatilla Basin Project Act contemplated
changes in water rights, approval by the Oregon Water Resources Department was required. However, when the change applications were filed,
environmental groups protested. The groups supported the Act’s stream flow
restoration objectives but were concerned, among other things, that water
users in the Umatilla Basin would “spread” exchange water to unauthorized
See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Umatilla Basin Project Final Environmental Statement
1-1 (Feb. 1988).
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lands, as they had in the past. Water spreading is a long-documented
problem in the Umatilla Basin and in other parts of the West. In general, it
involves the distribution of Bureau water to land with no state water right or
Bureau contract, and that is outside official irrigation district boundaries.434
Oregon WaterWatch, an environmental group, had documented occurrences
of water spreading even while irrigators were purportedly helping to restore
streamflows for fish.435 WaterWatch’s protests led to extended efforts to
settle the controversy.436
The water-spreading controversy has west-wide implications and this makes
it an especially difficult matter to resolve. However, in the absence of a
stable solution, the Umatilla parties could only piece together fragile,
temporary settlements. In early 1992, after a mediation process, the parties
reached one agreement: the Bureau and irrigators committed to negotiate
contracts to temporarily supply irrigation water outside district boundaries;
and irrigators agreed to support fish and wildlife releases from the Bureau’s
McKay reservoir for fish flows in the Umatilla River. The long-term water
spreading issues were not directly addressed, however, and the settlement
turned out to be only a temporary cease-fire. In 1993, the parties were again
at swords’ points until another temporary settlement was reached. This
settlement fell apart in 1995.
In 1995, the parties finally began to address the substantive water spreading
issues, and a more enduring settlement may have been reached. The
irrigation district that was most vulnerable to spreading claims agreed to pay
the Bureau of Reclamation compensation for past water spreading.
Irrigators withdrew their objections to fish-passage releases from McKay
reservoir, and WaterWatch withdrew its objections to some out-of-district
irrigation water rights. The Oregon Water Resources Department crafted
water permits to implement the settlement.437
Not all of the water issues are resolved in the Umatilla, obviously. Issues
still remain regarding further expansion of irrigation district boundaries, for
example. However, once all the parties were at the table and the substantive
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water spreading issues were addressed, they were able to clear up questions
that had plagued prior settlement efforts.438
Oregon Watershed Programs. The Oregon legislature established a
watershed enhancement program in 1987, administered by the Governor’s
Watershed Enhancement Board.439 The program’s goal was to “[e]nhance
Oregon’s waters through the management of riparian and associated upland
areas of watersheds in order to improve water quality and quantity for all
beneficial purposes.”440 The Board administered a small grant program for
watershed education and demonstration projects, and by the mid-1990s, had
distributed almost $2.3 million.441 Under separate legislation, the state
created a Watershed Health Program directed by the Strategic Water
Management Group (consisting of state agency heads) to initiate watershed
management projects. The latter process led to the creation of local
watershed councils in 36 basins, and two pilot watershed programs, one in
the Grande Ronde area of the Columbia River Basin. In 1995, the legislature
merged the Watershed Enhancement and Watershed Health programs under
the aegis of the Governor’s Watershed Enhancement Board.442
After Oregon passed laws encouraging water conservation and allowing the
conversion of consumptive water rights to instream rights, one of the central
questions was whether anyone would take advantage of them. In 1993, a
nonprofit group called the Oregon Water Trust was formed to make sure
these laws did not just gather dust. The result has been a series of
transactions that in some ways are important models of how state programs,
water users and conservation organizations can work together to find water
for streams. In 1994, four leases were negotiated with water users. There
were ten in 1995, and more than 25 in 1996.443 In 1996, the Trust acquired
the first water right under Oregon’s conservation statute. Funding was
supplied by the Oregon Watershed Health Program, the Trust contributed a
thousand dollars, two farmers’ crop consumption was cut in half, and all of
the saved water was returned to the stream with an 1896 priority date.444
The Trust has also obtained its first permanent water rights transfer, a .16
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cubic feet-per-second irrigation right for $8,800.445 It is working as well with
the Bureau of Reclamation on a Snake River water acquisition.446
In general, Trust transactions are relatively small in scale, targeted to
benefit small tributaries with critical fish populations or other ecological
values. The increasing pace of these transactions has helped to iron out
kinks in Oregon’s instream flow mechanisms, but the kinks are still a
concern. After all, it took nine years for the first transaction to be conducted
under Oregon’s conservation statute. All but one of the transactions to date
are leases, and the lack of long-term instream water acquisitions is a
concern. Enforcement remains an issue. As the Trust’s director put it,
“[p]rotecting instream water rights consistent with priority dates is one of
the biggest challenges.”447 Some people think that water marketing is a
mistaken enterprise: Water is a public resource. Irrigated agriculture is a
subsidized use of water, they argue, and irrigators should not be paid to leave
water instream. There also is skepticism that such transactions can make
much of a dent in the region’s dried-up tributaries.448 Nevertheless, in a
Basin that is looking for new approaches to restoring streamflows, the Trust
is an important experiment.
The Deschutes Basin. The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation, working with the Environmental Defense Fund, the Oregon
Water Resources Congress and local irrigation districts, developed a strategy
for improving instream flows and water quality in Oregon’s Deschutes River
through market-based water transactions. The proposal involves a basinwide implementing entity with authority to invest public and private funds in
a variety of conservation projects.449 In 1996, Congress passed legislation
authorizing “Deschutes Basin Ecological Restoration Projects,” including
such an organization.450 The project also negotiated an innovative leaseoption contract with an irrigation district by which varying amounts of
conserved water will be returned to the stream. Funding responsibilities are
to be determined based on an after-the-fact evaluation of amounts actually
conserved through district efficiency improvements. The arrangement is
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designed to address concerns that water users had expressed about
participating in the Oregon conserved water program (discussed above).451
The Methow Valley. Washington has several watershed programs, including
one in the Methow Valley, a test basin for the Chelan Agreement (see
pages 78-79). The Methow and most of its tributaries are heavily
appropriated, but they still support salmon.452 The basin’s scenic beauty has
attracted real estate development and put increasing pressure on its
streams. Before the watershed process, the state Department of Ecology had
established instream flow levels, suspended groundwater permitting in some
areas, and established a system of priorities for future diversions to protect
fish and senior water rights.453 Few were satisfied with these measures,
however. The Methow watershed planning process brought together
representatives of tribal, state and local governments and private interests to
address these problems. The process produced a draft plan in 1994.454 One
of its major conclusions is that instream flows need to be restored “to
improve fish and wildlife habitat and preserve and enhance the unique water
quality of the Methow Valley while allowing for growth.”455 The plan recommends efficiency standards for water use, a water bank to administer saved
water, a commitment to return 90 percent of saved water to streams,
increased enforcement and requirements for measuring devices.456 The
Department of Ecology is in the process of adopting rules to implement these
recommendations.
The Henry’s Fork. The Henry’s Fork Watershed Council in northeast Idaho,
near Yellowstone National Park, is one of the Basin’s better-known
watershed planning processes. The Henry’s Fork is a world-class trout
stream, cherished by anglers. The Watershed Council was formed by an
alliance between the Henry’s Fork Foundation, a local fish conservation
organization, and the Fremont-Madison Irrigation District. The Council was
formed with no government involvement. Rather, the irrigation district
accepted the Foundation’s invitation to co-chair a watershed council to
implement a state water plan for the basin. Reportedly, the Council has
approved several projects in which farmers are proposing to restore water to
streams. However, finding a way to fit these actions into Idaho’s water law is
evidently proving to be a problem.457
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The Lemhi Basin. A watershed effort has succeeded in restoring limited
amounts of water for salmon in Idaho’s Lemhi River. The Lemhi Basin is a
predominantly agricultural area in east-central Idaho. The Lemhi River is
completely appropriated for irrigation.458 Working with the Idaho
Departments of Fish and Game and Water Resources and other parties,
irrigators agreed to forego diversions for a 12-hour period up to three times a
year if low flows cause problems for fish in a particular reach of the Lemhi.
Reportedly, the agreement produced impressive flows in the summer of 1994.
As promising as the agreement is, the National Marine Fisheries Service has
noted its limitations: “(1) The river is over-appropriated for irrigation, and
(2) major tributaries are regularly dewatered for irrigation. No significant
improvement in spring/summer chinook salmon passage and rearing habitat
for the Lemhi River as a whole is likely to occur unless changes in local
agricultural practices are made.”459 Nonetheless, the parties involved,
including the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, want to build on their successes in
the belief that watershed efforts are likely to achieve better solutions than
litigation.
The Middle Snake. The “Two Rivers” concept, whereby the Snake is one river
above Milner Dam and another river below Milner began to show cracks in
1993. Under a 1988 law, Idaho’s Comprehensive State Water Plan is written
by the Idaho Water Resources Board with substantial local input, watershed
by watershed.460 The 1993 plan for the Middle Snake noted that the State
Water Plan specifies zero flows at Milner, but committed to work for higher
flow levels to “improve some aspects of water quality and fish habitat, and
restore some of the scenic beauty to Twin Falls, Shoshone Falls, and many of
the smaller, less famous waterfalls within the reach.”461
The Upper Clark Fork. Although salmon do not reach Montana and
watershed efforts in Montana may have little direct impact in the salmon
disputes, innovations are transferable. One innovative process is in the
Upper Clark Fork, a Montana stream that has long been fully
appropriated.462 In 1989, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and
Parks was preparing to file a request to reserve instream water in the Upper
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Clark Fork, which raised concerns among out-of-stream water users. The
Northern Lights Institute convened discussions which led first to a
temporary moratorium on out-of-stream water rights from the Clark Fork.
In 1991, the Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee was created
by legislation.463 The Committee’s 1994 plan recommended closure of the
Upper Clark Fork to new diversions, investigation of structural and
nonstructural storage options, water quality measures and a ten-year
instream water leasing pilot program.464 In 1995, the Montana legislature
codified most of the plan’s elements (except a moratorium on groundwater
permits) and called on the Steering Committee to continue its work.465

B. The Grande Ronde 466
1. The Setting
The Grande Ronde and Imnaha rivers drain 5300 square miles in the far
northeast corner of Oregon. Both rivers empty into the Snake River’s Hells
Canyon, which forms the basin’s eastern boundary. The watershed is typical
of basins in the arid west, with substantial snowpack in upper elevations
melting in a spring freshet, then diminishing to summer flow levels sustained
by groundwater seepage and upwellings. The Blue Mountains bound the
drainage to the southwest, while the Wallowas, with peaks close to
10,000 feet high, form a central spine. Three large valleys are spaced
between Hells Canyon and the Blue Mountains: the Imnaha, the Wallowa
and the Grande Ronde. The last is the largest and most developed, an open
bowl of a valley through which the Grande Ronde River once meandered in a
wide circle of grasslands, wetlands and lakes; hence the name.
Settlement of the Grande Ronde Basin followed the general pattern of many
other basins: early trapping, followed by mining, agriculture and timber
harvest. The basin is different from the Snake, Umatilla and Yakima Basins
in one sense, however: there are no major federal water projects. The basin
is far more influenced by federal land management than by federal water
management. Water development consists of private diversions,
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groundwater pumping, and an extensive system of irrigation and drainage
ditches.
The U. S. Forest Service, and to a lesser extent the Bureau of Land
Management, manage a sizable amount of federal lands in the Grande
Ronde. The Forest Service is the principal federal landowner in the
watershed, managing some 45 percent of the drainage, principally in the
Wallowa-Whitman and Umatilla national forests. The Bureau of Land
Management has small, scattered holdings.
Some 20,000 spring chinook were estimated returning to the basin in 1956,
declining to 8,400 in the early 1970s. Twenty-one major streams throughout
the basin provided spawning and rearing habitat for these fish. Fall chinook
occupied the lower reaches of the system, but few specimens have been
observed for the last 25 years. Historically, the Grande Ronde provided the
largest production of coho in the Snake Basin, the furthest inland in the
Columbia Basin.467 Since 1986, Snake River coho have been considered
extinct. Sockeye disappeared from the Grande Ronde when the dam at the
outlet of Wallowa Lake was raised in 1916, preventing passage to lake
spawning sites. Summer steelhead runs of 15,000 or more may have
occurred prior to the construction of the Snake River dams and the low runoff
period that began in the 1970s, but they have declined dramatically since.468
2. The Wallowa County-Nez Perce Initiative
Watershed efforts first took shape in Wallowa County, the ancestral home of
the Wallowa band of Nez Perce Indians (also known as the Joseph band).
Headwaters begin in the steep canyons in the northern Grande Ronde Basin
and flow to the open country where they join the Wallowa River. From the
mountains just east of Wallowa Lake, for example, Prairie Creek flows
around the town of Joseph, along the highway to Enterprise, then through
town to join the Wallowa River. The stream, now hardly more than a ditch
itself, primarily irrigates fields along its short length.
In 1991, the Power Planning Council called on the Bureau of Reclamation to
undertake three water conservation projects in the Columbia Basin (see
“Water Conservation Pilot Projects,” above). In Oregon, the Bureau dusted
off a plan to enclose Prairie Creek in pipe, dramatically reducing water loss.
Irrigators agreed to the project after assurances they would lose no water
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and might gain some. Some savings would also go back into the Wallowa
River for salmon.
When the plan was disclosed to the communities of Joseph and Enterprise, it
quickly unraveled. Prairie Creek was not only an irrigation ditch, it turned
out. It was a stream that wandered through backyards and graced a city
park. Seepage along its course fed groundwater that supported domestic
wells. The biggest complaint, however, was that a watershed decision had
been made for the community by regional and federal agencies, in
consultation with some local water users but not a broadly representative
group. City and county officials invited the agencies to go elsewhere. The
stage was set for one of two classic scenes: a full-scale retreat, as occurred
with the Forest Service’s Upper Grande Ronde Plan (discussed below), or a
classic confrontation between local interests and distant governments.
The Council and the Bureau backed away from the Prairie Creek project, but
on condition that the community come up with comparable water savings and
improvements that would pass scientific and technical review. The
community agreed, and set about organizing the committee that would
develop the Wallowa County-Nez Perce Tribal Plan.
In 1992, County Commissioner Pat Wortman and Nez Perce representative
Si Whitman agreed that organizing to cope with anticipated Endangered
Species Act listings made sense. The Nez Perce sought the return of
harvestable salmon. Wallowa County wanted fish back, but also to protect
livelihoods, many of which depended on the forests, pastures and streams of
this scenic, isolated valley.
From this meeting a process emerged, at first informal, involving landowners,
business representatives, county and tribal officials, and one environmental
representative. State and federal officials provided technical assistance and
data to produce, in August, 1993, the Wallowa County-Nez Perce Tribe
Salmon Habitat Recovery Plan. The Plan acknowledged State of Oregon
standards for salmon habitat, and surveyed deficiencies in each stream reach
of the Wallowa and Imnaha subbasins. Potential solutions were proposed,
including “upstream impoundments, commercial timber thinning, exclusion
fencing, weed control, woody material removal, grazing rotation, surfacing
roads and relocating campgrounds.469
A 1995 proposal by the Nez Perce Tribe was not part of the country-tribal
recovery plan, but it illustrates the value of the working relationship that
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began in the planning process. The Nez Perce Tribe proposed to acquire a
10,000-acre private ranch in Joseph Creek Canyon for fish and wildlife
habitat. If the proposal had come from the state or the environmental
community, it could have been threatening to local interests. Wallowa
County supported the Tribe, however, with a few conditions: although the
land would be managed principally for fish and wildlife, it would also be
managed as range; a noxious weed control program would be allowed; and “in
lieu” taxes would be paid to the county. With the Tribe’s agreement to these
conditions, it acquired land in its ancestral valley for the first time since the
Joseph band left in the 1870s.
The Wallowa County Plan has been recognized for its initiative and its
inclusive review of watershed problems.470 It has been criticized for
emphasizing active intervention by land managers.”471 While the plan has
measures to reduce human impacts, it does not propose setting aside a
stream reach and allowing natural restoration processes to unfold.472
The tribe and county sent the Wallowa County Salmon Plan to the National
Marine Fisheries Service for review, but generated little response. Finally, in
the summer of 1995 a series of meetings among local, state and federal fish
and wildlife officials began talking about developing a watershed-wide
Habitat Conservation Plan under section 10 of the Endangered Species Act.
Such a plan could give private landowners protection against “take”
violations of the Endangered Species Act for a range of species. The federal
agencies assigned a staff member to work with local parties for a period
expected to last six to twelve months. Eighteen months later, there was no
working draft of a Wallowa County Habitat Conservation Plan. The
Fisheries Service offered a “framework” for a Habitat Conservation Plan
process, but there are many substantive issues. Local representatives would
like the plan to include national forest lands, protect the local economy
against new injunctions, and provide assurance against ever-changing
constraints on federal land. The Fisheries Service is receptive to linking
federal management plans to the plan, but the Habitat Conservation Plan
process is statutorily limited to private parties, not federal agencies. Local
interests are unreceptive to setting aside land from active management and
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economic use. Wilderness areas already claim too much of their county, they
argue. But this poses a problem for species recovery: wilderness headwaters
are often the least productive salmon habitats. It is more often the lowgradient stream habitat and river valleys that are most productive.

3. The Grande Ronde Model Watershed
As Wallowa County and the Nez Perce were developing their plan in 1992,
both were cooperating with Union County and the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Reservation to organize watershed recovery for the entire Grande
Ronde Basin. In April, 1992, Governor Barbara Roberts designated the
Grande Ronde as part of Oregon’s Model Watershed Program. It became one
of three state programs developed in response to a Power Council proposed
for cooperative “locally-based, bottom-up, voluntary approach” to habitat
restoration on private lands, and coordination of activities on federal and
private lands to achieve comprehensive watershed management.473
The Model Watershed Board, appointed by the Union and Wallowa County
governments, met for the first time that summer. Representatives of local
economic interests filled the largest numbers of seats, but the Umatilla and
Nez Perce tribes also were represented. A Union County Commissioner
chaired the board; a representative of environmental interests was named
vice-chair.
Union and Wallowa counties had a history of cooperative community
activities in the Grande Ronde watershed. Although much of the basin’s
development has been individual, irrigation ditches and flood control works
were often cooperative efforts among farmers. In Union County, the
community came together in the 1870’s to cut the first increment of what
became the State Ditch, to open new farmland and reduce seasonal flooding
from the sinuous Grande Ronde. In modern times, flood control has been
high on the community’s agenda. The Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation, and
the local Soil and Water Conservation District developed plans for dikes and
headwater dams to control flooding and accommodate irrigation diversions.
An extensive diking system completed in 1975 has not put flooding concerns
to rest. Landowners surveyed by the Union County Soil and Water

Northwest Power Planning Council, Strategy for Salmon, at 71 (1994). Idaho designated
the Lemhi watershed and Washington named the Tucannon watershed in response to the
Council recommendation.
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Conservation District in 1996 still list upstream storage and levee
modification as preferred solutions.474
Two county commissioners assumed the task of organizing a local watershed
policy board, which convened in June, 1992. The board’s composition was an
issue from the outset. Its membership closely resembled that of the Wallowa
County group: representatives from the county commissions and tribes,
farmers, ranchers, timber interests and an environmentalist. This
composition was criticized as being heavily weighted toward local economic
interests, interests that were, after all, responsible over time for degraded
watershed conditions. The Governor’s office was openly critical of board
makeup. It asked the board to add seats for environmentalists and
community activists from LaGrande as a condition of funding from the state’s
new Watershed Health Program. Local representatives resisted. It was hard
to argue that the makeup was unrepresentative of these communities.
Arguably, tribal representation and the board’s one environmental
representative provided adequate breadth of perspective. The impasse was
finally resolved through creation of a new Union County-only watershed
advisory committee with broader representation. Locals left with a bad taste
in their mouths, however.
Suspicions were further stimulated by staffing issues. The local community
first looked locally, to the Soil Conservation Service (now the Natural
Resources Conservation Service) and its district staff, but neither group was
equipped to take the staffing lead. The default was a state interim
coordinator paid for and assigned by the Oregon Water Resources
Department. The board’s minimal involvement in the hiring and the
coordinator’s accountability to the state raised local concerns. At its first
official meeting in June, 1992, the Watershed Board moved to take control of
the hiring process for a permanent staff director, to be paid by the board with
funding from the Bonneville Power Administration. Unhappily,
disagreements over state efforts to influence the board’s staff and processes
continued over the next two years.
In membership and staffing issues, the board and the state grappled with
questions of control. What are the lines of accountability? How much
deference should the state give to a local board? How much authority can
outside funders demand before a local reaction sets up? How could state or
federal standards be applied without eclipsing local efforts? How could local
efforts avoid diluting legal standards?

Soil and Water Conservation District, Draft Grande Ronde Cooperative River Basin Study,
at 7.2 (1997).
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In 1993, the Oregon legislature enacted Governor Roberts’ watershed health
proposal, and allocated $10 million for the Grande Ronde and a second
watershed project on Oregon’s South Coast. The Water Resources
Department was given the state lead, a director was hired, and a strategy for
watershed assessment and project development was adopted. While local
councils were expected to play a central role in the program, the state/local
relationship was ill-defined. One important feature was that the state would
have both a core team of technical experts in Salem, and a field team to work
in-basin.
In the Grande Ronde it was a rocky relationship from the start, beginning
with confusion over which would come first: technical assessment or
projects. Although most participants agreed that investing in additional
assessment would produce better-targeted projects, there was pressure to get
projects on the ground soon. Enough was known about sources of salmon
mortality (e.g., passage barriers; unscreened diversions) to justify early
projects that would generate momentum.
The question of who decides which projects merit state funding also erupted.
The state generally agreed that local approval should be required, but
reserved authority to disapprove projects. The core and field teams, which
could have been used as technical tools by both the State and local decision
makers, became gatekeepers for a series of approval gates the board had to
negotiate. Projects approved by the board and field team would be subject to
review by the core team, the Water Resources Department leadership, and
the Governor’s Strategic Water Management Group. What might have been
a collaborative decision-making model became cumbersome and hierarchical.
Frustration, bruised feelings, and “top down/bottom up” arguments ensued.
The dynamics of state government influenced this. On the one hand, the
Watershed Health Program was under pressure to show results for the
legislature’s $10 million, two-year investment. On the other, it would be held
accountable for money badly spent. On top of this, the state’s Strategic
Water Management Group was composed of agency heads who did not
always agree among themselves, and were not always capable of delivering
their agency’s cooperation.
To the board, already wary of outside pressure, the slow approval process
and perceived second-guessing became sources of discontent. These
problems simmered through the first twelve months of the program, finally
coming to a boil when the state changed signals and insisted that no projects
would be approved without a completed assessment of sub-basin conditions.
The Board agreed that assessments were important, but took exception to
the unilateral declaration, and to a tortuous process that first slowed project
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approvals, then stopped them altogether. It required a summit meeting in
Portland of local and state policy leaders, facilitated by the Power Council, to
resolve the immediate conflict. The Board agreed to continue to forward
projects for state approval on an interim basis. When sub-basin assessments
were in place, the State’s field team would be authorized to approve projects
without further state review.
The agreement addressed an immediate cause of friction, and appeared to
promise a more stable basis for state and local collaboration. Meanwhile, the
field team was building a solid local working relationship. There was
substantial agreement on a process for rating and ranking projects.
Technical experts assembled the subbasin assessments and plans. In April,
1994, a report from Clearwater Biostudies consultants provided a more
complete technical survey. With the pressure for immediate results eased,
state and local teams focused on identifying the critical subbasins and
planning recovery strategies. Local staff and board recruited among private
landowners in the two counties, seeking project volunteers.
In 1995, the Grande Ronde experiment came up for legislative review, where
it was criticized for its apparent lack of on-the-ground progress. The South
Coast initiative was held up as a success, having committed funds to projects
far more aggressively. The Grande Ronde responded with a 1995 program of
more than 100 projects, most clustered in five critical subbasins, two-thirds
of them involving private landowner participation. The council obviously
preferred projects that were non-controversial and welcomed by landowners:
reconstructing diversions with screens, for instance, or rip-rapping banks for
stability. Not all the projects were uncontroversial, however. The virtues of
exclusion fencing to prevent grazing in sensitive riparian areas, for instance,
were disputed in the community and on the Board, but fencing projects were
implemented. In general, though, environmental interests were critical of
the watershed council’s approach as giving comfort to local economic
interests. Ultimately, the legislature allowed the Grande Ronde to carry over
some of the uncommitted state funding beyond June, 1995, but no further
state support was guaranteed. It was the end of the legislative experiment.
A new Governor adopted a watershed strategy that still emphasized local
councils but spread funding in smaller amounts across the entire state. The
Grande Ronde field team was disbanded, although the watershed council
itself continued in operation.
4. Instream Flow Initiatives
In the area of water rights and instream flows, the Grande Ronde plan
acknowledges that water leasing should be considered a tool. However, in
1995, on a closely divided vote, the watershed board turned down its first
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voluntary water lease proposal. Early in 1996, a second proposal, at the
Dawson ranch on Crow Creek in Wallowa County, was supported. The
Board is now working with the Oregon Water Trust, which arranged the
Dawson lease, on additional opportunities in the Grande Ronde. In
December, 1996, the Trust was invited to join the Model Watershed process
and to submit their proposals through the Board, qualifying them to compete
for Bonneville funding. The watershed board and the soil and water
conservation districts in both counties have supported this collaboration with
the Water Trust. As a side benefit of the Dawson lease, the local
watermaster agreed that a gauging station should be installed on Crow
Creek. This helps ensure that no other water user would be disadvantaged
by the lease and collect badly needed flow data useful to stream restoration
over time.

5. The Grande Ronde and Federal Agencies
The Forest Service is the primary federal player in the drainage. Most of the
headwater streams that feed the river originate in the high valleys of the
Wallowa-Whitman National Forest. Cooperation with the Forest Service is
critical to addressing downstream watershed conditions associated with
logging and grazing, and protecting refuge in wilderness areas where good
habitat can still be found.
The Forest Service’s principal planning tools are forest plans adopted under
the National Forest Management Act.475 For the last ten years forests such
as Wallowa-Whitman have been managed in the shadow of Endangered
Species Act implementation west of the Cascade Mountains. Anticipating
Endangered Species Act challenges on the east side, the Forest Service has
developed and superimposed new requirements on its east-side forest plans.
The so-called PACFISH strategy applies to anadromous fish-occupied federal
areas in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. It seeks to set watershed
standards and practices for the ecosystem needs of anadromous fish.
Because its habitat standards are often stiffer than those in adopted forest
plans, it is controversial in the Grande Ronde and elsewhere.
On their Oregon and Washington lands east of the Cascades, the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management propose to supplant PACFISH
with standards developed in the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem

475

Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified at 16 USC 1600-1614).
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Management Project.476 The project aims to develop ecologically sustainable
management standards (as opposed to managing for economic production, or
for sustaining one species).
Relations with the Forest Service vary at different levels of the bureaucracy,
generally with much better cooperation at the forest level than at the
regional level. The Forest Service made an abortive attempt to address
salmon concerns in 1992. The Forest Service and the Umatilla Tribe jointly
documented conditions and proposed recovery strategies in the upper Grande
Ronde subbasin. The proposed Upper Grande Ronde Plan evoked a chorus of
criticism from logging interests and others. Instead of arranging for further
review to address these concerns in a public process, the Regional Forester
shelved the document. In another instance, a 1994 commitment of regional
forest funds to high-priority Wallowa-Whitman habitat projects was offered
and then retracted; apparently west side forests and owls were considered
more important.477
The summer of 1994 also witnessed an intramural conflict between the
Forest Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service that nearly
derailed the local watershed process altogether. The Fisheries Service had
been seeking to consult with the Forest Service under the Endangered
Species Act on timber sales in the Wallowa-Whitman and other east-side
forests. The Forest Service argued that it had provided sufficient
consultation. Four environmental groups went to court to compel
consultation. In Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas,478 the federal court
ordered the Forest Service to consult, and the order threatened to shut down
large sections of forest. Ranchers feared they would have to pull their cattle
off the range without forage alternatives. Town meetings were held.
Newspapers quoted a local rancher: “If you play with a rattlesnake, you are
guaranteed to get bit. . . . And that’s who we’re playing with, a rattlesnake,
the government.”479 One watershed board member threatened to quit, and
more were thinking of following suit. In the end, the Forest Service complied

See U. S. Department of Agriculture and U. S. Department of Interior, Interior Columbia
Basin Ecosystem Management Project, A Framework for Ecosystem Management in the
Interior Columbia Basin and Portions of the Klamath and Great Basins; An Assessment of
Ecosystem Components in the Interior Columbia Basin and Portions of the Klamath and
Great Basins; Integrated Scientific Assessment for Ecosystem Management, all summarized in
Status of the Interior Columbia River Basin: Summary of Scientific Findings (November
1996).
477
See letter from Angus Duncan, Northwest Power Planning Council, to the Regional
Forester, John Lowe (taking exception to “Forest Service policies that will expend millions to
clean up a train wreck in the west-side forests but can’t come up with a penny of new money
to prevent one in the Columbia Basin east of the Cascades”) (July 21, 1994).
478
30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
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The Oregonian, (Portland, August 13, 1994).
476

128

Watershed Initiatives

with the order and matters were worked out, but not before local citizens’
images of remote and indifferent government forces were reinforced.
The National Marine Fisheries Service has been much less involved in the
Grande Ronde. Apart from the Pacific Rivers litigation, the Fisheries
Service’s role in the Grande Ronde has been limited primarily to negotiations
over the Wallowa County habitat conservation planning process, discussed
above.
The Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers had been involved in
flood control efforts in the Grande Ronde for decades, despite the absence of
any significant civil works by either. In the 1990’s, the Bureau provided
funding and technical support to assist local community and Soil and Water
Conservation District officials in water efficiency and watershed activities of
the kind discussed in “Water Conservation Pilot Projects,” above.
Outside of Oregon’s Watershed Health Program, the largest share of funding
for the Grande Ronde Model Watershed Program came from the Bonneville
Power Administration. The Grande Ronde council competes with tribes and
fish agencies for Bonneville fish and wildlife funds under the Power Planning
Council’s fish and wildlife program. In 1977, Model Watershed staff,
administrative costs and project funding added up to $325,000. Bonneville
has been more than a banker, however; it has been a visible and engaged
participant as well. It has largely avoided the impulse to second-guess at a
project level, while contributing actively to development of tools for stream
assessment, monitoring and evaluation.
The Environmental Protection Agency operates in the Grande Ronde
directly, and through Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality. The
EPA has Clean Water Act enforcement responsibilities for streams in the
basin. With the state, it establishes total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for
certain pollutants and for excessive water temperatures. It also mandates
measures to bring streams into compliance with these standards. It appears
to have several hundred thousand dollars in active projects in the basin, but
is largely disengaged from the model watershed process. It provides
technical and financial assistance through the state and, often, through the
Umatilla tribal staff.

6. Watershed Science in the Grande Ronde
Data on the status of fish stocks and watershed habitats have been gathered
in the Grande Ronde for decades. Historical changes in river ecosystem
conditions have been documented. Yet because of the complexity of such
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ecosystems and scientific disagreements over the requirements of
sustainable fish habitat, the work of the Model Watershed began without a
solid, detailed scientific foundation.
Some fish killers, such as unscreened diversions and passage barriers, were
obvious. Some, such as high late-summer water temperatures, were equally
obvious, but there were gaps in the data and complications in distinguishing
causes and designing cures. How much of the problem was low flow and how
much absence of shade? Is it more important to reduce water withdrawals,
add upstream storage, or reduce grazing and timber harvest?
The Watershed Board and the Wallowa County committee began by
surveying stream reaches for limiting conditions, adopting “desired habitat
conditions” using state and other standards, and prescribing site-specific
fixes. The resulting plans were reasonably well grounded in available data.
Suggested remedies were conventional, sometimes controversial and not
always grounded in cutting-edge watershed science.480 The plan proposes
fencing, water leasing, and other potentially divisive measures. It also
assumes active management rather than allowing natural restorative
processes to operate.
The Grande Ronde group saw itself as facing three scientific issues. First,
how could it translate the data it had into a practical strategy for identifying
and prioritizing projects? Second, how could it fill in the gaps in stream reach
data, and then maintain the data base to measure results? Third, what more
sophisticated scientific model could it adapt to give a more complex view of
watershed conditions and dynamics?
Local residents and fish and resource managers acknowledged from the
beginning that their plans had to be dynamic and able to change with new
knowledge and changing conditions.481 In March, 1994, a day-long board and
staff session resulted in a project-prioritization matrix. Highest priority was
given to measures that would protect existing high quality “biodiversity
areas” that would be addressed before damaged reaches. Next were projects
that addressed major limiting factors (passage obstacles, high temperature,
and so forth), and projects that were part of “a comprehensive solution.”482
Other criteria, including costs, cost-sharing, maintenance requirements, and
public support, would help rank projects at the margins. In practice, this
apparently objective project-selection process was often compromised,

See, e.g., R. Doppelt, et al., Entering the Watershed: An Action Plan to Protect and Restore
America’s River Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Pacific Rivers Council, 1993).
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Wortman, supra.

Grande Ronde Model Watershed Operations-Action Plan (1994).
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particularly as opportunities arose that might evaporate if not seized upon
(e.g., a private landowner wanting to install a permanent diversion screen to
replace a less effective screen). Ultimately, the 1994 matrix became a
checklist. Priority is now given to projects in “focus areas:” Catherine Creek,
the Upper Grande Ronde, Bear Creek, Big Sheep Creek and others in which
more sophisticated analysis has been completed. Greater recognition is given
to connecting spawning and rearing areas with migration corridor conditions.
Filling gaps in the data has proceeded more fitfully, as funding allows. In
1993 the Model Watershed contracted with Clearwater Biostudies Inc. to:
(1) compile and synthesize recent fish habitat data on salmonid streams in
the basin; (2) identify data gaps in the information; and (3) provide a basis for
prioritizing near-term restoration activities.”483 The Clearwater study noted
the absence of standard data from reference sites in the basin. In the
absence of these data, the study identified “five habitat parameters common
to all available stream survey databases.” The study also established stream
reference conditions based on fish habitat requirements: stream shading,
bank stability, fine sediment, pool frequency, and woody debris. Each stream
reach was measured against the reference standards, and problems were
indicated. The report also identified priority stream reaches: healthy aquatic
ecosystems, or areas with “sensitive” fish stocks at risk of extinction.484
Recovery activities within these areas were then ranked.
The Clearwater study reinforced awareness that scarcity of data affected
project selection. In the absence of good data, sub-optimum projects would be
selected, and funds would be invested inefficiently. This observation
highlighted a difficult choice in watershed recovery: whether to spend
resources on data collection or in getting projects on the ground. The
dilemma may be little noticed in the beginning, when obvious problems
require attention. However, as the most obvious projects are completed and
project choices become less obvious, data gaps become greater handicaps.
The Model Watershed staff now uses a related “patient/template” description
of environmental attributes in each basin stream reach to indicate the
collection of actions needed to close the gap between existing conditions (the
“patient”) and those needed to sustain salmon populations (the “template”).
The effects this more refined approach has on project selection are not yet
clear. Project selection remains opportunistic to a significant degree.
However, the usefulness of objective scientific methods in bypassing

Huntington, Stream and Riparian Conditions in the Grande Ronde Basin, at 12
(Clearwater Biostudies Inc., 1993).
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ideological problems is undeniable. If the data say low streamflows and high
temperatures undermine productivity, there is less room to evade the obvious
solution.
Bonneville is funding the development of a more sophisticated analytic tool
for the Grande Ronde called “Ecosystem Diagnosis and Treatment.”485
Rather than focus on limiting conditions in freshwater habitat, the
methodology prioritizes stream reaches, and describes an inventory of
threshold conditions for salmon. The methodology accounts for upstream
migration, spawning, hatching, rearing and outward migration. In this
manner it seeks to address the cumulative effect of many mortality factors
operating on salmon.486
The hope is that as people understand the science better, and are more
capable of evaluating data and opinions, they may be able to focus on
problems and solutions rather than politics and control. For example, in
October 1996, the Board heard a proposal from the Oregon Department of
Fish and Wildlife to dump hatchery salmon carcasses in several basin
streams. The Department sought to replicate the nutrient replenishment in
streams historically provided by salmon spawning and dying. The
Department is viewed with suspicion throughout much of eastern Oregon.
Some ranchers refuse entry to department scientists and technicians. The
board’s first reaction reflected this distrust. Did the Department propose to
intentionally pollute basin streams, floating carcasses downstream into
people’s backyards? Then the questions became more searching. Where
would the carcasses come from, inside the basin or out? What was the risk of
introducing exotic pathogens? What kind of baseline data collection and
monitoring had the department prepared? The tone of the discussion
changed. One board member agreed that introducing the carcasses could
restore a measure of the department would measure nutrient levels before
and after? Would reference streams (without carcasses) be monitored? Was
the department prepared to make its case in a public meeting? In the end the
board took the question under advisement, but the board did not bog down
in ideology. Science not only informed the discussion, but shifted it to a level
that would have been difficult to imagine four years earlier.

Lichatowich, Mobrand, Lestelle and Vogel, “An Approach to the Diagnosis and Treatment
of Depleted Pacific Salmon Populations in Freshwater Ecosystems,” 20 Fisheries no. 1, at 1018 (1995).
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C. Summary
The Grande Ronde, Clark Fork, Henry’s Fork and other processes are
heartening for the trust and cooperation they have built between what are
too often warring factions in the West. They have resulted in innovations
that might be unattainable through lengthy and costly litigation. Yet, they
are clearly works in progress. They leave many questions unanswered, not
the least of which are their seriousness, their sustainability, and their “fit”
with federal statutory requirements and agency activities. I return to these
issues in Section VII of the study (see pages 181-190).
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VI. Seismic Events in Salmon and Hydropower Policy
Many of the activities of the 1980s rested on a certain set of assumptions
about the relationships of rivers, salmon, and human activities. In the 1990s,
three developments called these assumptions into question, and raised new
issues about river-related policy. The first is a development the mechanics of
which have already been described: the Endangered Species Act listings,
which substantially rearranged the Basin’s policy landscape. The second is
recent scientific reports that call for a re-examination of current approaches
to salmon recovery. The third is a revolution in the electric power industry
that is recasting the financial foundations of current river operations.

A. The Endangered Species Act, the Northwest Power Act and Water
Management
The Endangered Species Act has had significant effects on federal power
system operations and federal land management, especially through the
biological opinions that resulted from the Act’s federal consultation process.
The Act’s impacts beyond the federal system, including effects on water
diversions and tributary water uses, are uncertain but potentially
substantial, evidenced by the Inland Farms biological opinion (see page 110).
It remains to be seen what role the Act will play in the FERC relicensing
process for the Hells Canyon and other tributary hydroelectric facilities.
There have been no consultations regarding the Bureau of Reclamation’s
storage facilities in the Snake River Basin, and this has become an issue in a
lawsuit filed by environmental groups against the Fisheries Service and
other federal agencies.487 It is likely, then, that the Act will have an
important effect on diversions and tributary water management.
To date, however, the Endangered Species Act’s effects on tributary water
management have been through what has been called the Act’s “incentive
structure”: the “perception that the ESA’s mandate is absolute and
nonnegotiable,” which prompts other actors, including state water agencies,
to address the problems that cause species declines.488 It is no coincidence
that state water agencies have become much more sensitive to species
declines since the Endangered Species Act listings. In 1996, out of 600
applications for new water diversions, the Washington Department of
Ecology denied 300, which is probably as many denials as were issued in the
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last 100 years.489 It would be an oversimplification to say that the
Endangered Species Act caused all of these denials, or all the salmon-related
developments of 1991-1994. Others did much of the heavy lifting; the
region’s political leaders in the Salmon Summit, the Power Planning Council
and state and tribal fish managers in the Northwest Power Act processes,
litigants in the court proceedings, water administrators in water permitting
processes, and a wide range of interested parties throughout. Yet the
Endangered Species Act certainly provided a powerful impetus for these
actions.
The Act also changed the burden of proof in salmon restoration. Protecting
salmon from the effects of development is difficult and costly. Often, the
short-term economic benefits of development are obvious, while the benefits
of environmental recovery are harder to predict, rarely appraisable in
economic terms, and easy to discount. Although the Northwest Power Act
tended to shift this burden, the Endangered Species Act listings made the
shift unmistakable. For essentially the first time, federal proponents of
development must prove to a fisheries agency that weak salmon populations
will not be jeopardized by the development.
It is also important to understand the limitations of the Endangered Species
Act. One of the important limitations of the Act in the Columbia River is that
its implementation is focused more on individual salmon populations than on
ecosystem functions that support a range of species. The salmon listings
were premised on the idea that an individual salmon population may be an
“evolutionarily significant unit,” i.e., a population that is important in and of
itself. Much of the Act’s machinery is geared to protecting these individual
population units. Thus, the Snake River sockeye program is investing
millions of dollars in a captive broodstock program in which the fish never
see the wild, so that their genes can be incubated and cultured to increase
their numbers.
As will be more apparent later in this paper, this salmon-centric approach
can be a problem from the perspective of ecosystem science. To conservation
biologists, microorganisms may be more significant than animals, and the
overall structure and complexity of an ecological system are more important
than individual species.490 Salmon protection can tend to emphasize what
Aldo Leopold called “show pieces”: individual species like salmon, which

Personal communication with Ken Slattery, Washington Department of Ecology,
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people treasure. In focusing on show pieces, we pay attention to one set of
issues and neglect others that may be more important.
The Endangered Species Act does not completely ignore the importance of
ecosystems. One of the Act’s purposes is to “provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species or threatened species depend
may be preserved.”491 For many years, however, this seemed to be primarily
a rhetorical principle, and critics contended that the Act actually diverted
attention from the more important task of preserving biodiversity.492 This
emphasis may be changing. In a July 1994 policy statement, the
departments of Interior and Commerce committed to develop recovery plans
in a way that “restores, reconstructs, or rehabilitates the structure,
distribution, connectivity and function upon which . . . listed species
depend.”493 However, implementation of the Act remains focused on
individual species, and to this point there have been only limited efforts to
take an ecosystem approach to the Columbia.
Another limitation in the Endangered Species Act’s implementation is its
emphasis on federal resources and activities rather than the broader
collection of federal, state and private activities that an ecosystem approach
to restoration would suggest. The point is illustrated by the contrast
between the approach to the Snake River taken in the Power Planning
Council’s 1994 program and that in the Endangered Species Act biological
opinion. The Council’s 1994 program emphasizes solutions for Snake River
fish within the Snake River Basin. Not only does the program call for Snake
River reservoir drawdowns, but it proposes to use hydropower revenues to
fund water leases, water conservation and other measures that could leave
an additional million acre-feet in the Snake River for salmon. The biological
opinion offers limited Snake River measures and instead relies more heavily
on barge transporta-tion and infusions of Columbia River water to augment
flows. In one sense, the biological opinion’s approach is entirely
understandable. The number of hurdles that have to be leaped for the Power
Planning Council’s approach to succeed—the legal, political and social
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barriers to acquisition of private water rights, and the difficulty of shaping
any water that is acquired—is daunting. The biological opinion follows a
path of less resistance, pointing to federal resources and activities. But this
path also indicates a key problem for ecosystem recovery. The salmon
ecosystem is a patchwork of federal and private property interests. If an
ecosystem approach is essential, some way must be found to provide an
ecosystem for fish even in the face of divided jurisdictions and diverse
property interests.494
A third limitation is that much of the problem faced by salmon is due to
development that has already occurred. Where ecosystem recovery requires
that development be undone, legislation is likely to be required and the
Endangered Species Act cannot require legislation. The problem is
illustrated by the reservoir drawdown debate. Reservoir drawdown
advocates argue that lower reservoirs will increase the speed of the river
(hence of fish migrating downstream) and help reestablish productive
riparian areas at the edge of the river—a benefit to fish and wildlife, listed
and otherwise. But drawdowns require significant changes in the dams
themselves. Depending on their nature and timing, drawdowns could
interfere with and perhaps preclude river transportation. Even
intermediate-level drawdowns can adversely affect the operation of juvenile
and adult fish passage facilities at the dams. As noted above, the Power
Planning Council program calls for drawdowns while the National Marine
Fisheries Service remains undecided. Congress, seeing risks and
uncertainty, has withheld funding for some drawdown evaluations. If a
biological opinion issued under the Endangered Species Act endorses
drawdowns, implementation would probably require Congressional action,
either through authorizing legislation or appropriations or both. Biological
opinions do not bind Congress. For proposals such as reservoir drawdowns,
the Endangered Species Act can provide impetus for change, but it cannot
require change.
The fact that the Act takes little account of economic considerations495
reflects problems of a different kind. Species are in trouble because of the
habitat impacts of economic development. If the Endangered Species Act

See J. Volkman and K. Lee, “The Owl and Minerva: Ecosystem Lessons From the
Columbia,” 92 Journal of Forestry 48 (April 1994).
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were well funded (which it is not in most parts of the country),496 it might
contend with some of the effects of this development. But there are limits to
the effectiveness of even the best-funded regulatory programs.
Acknowledging this, some students of the Endangered Species Act have
suggested that the Act’s regulatory tools should be augmented with economic
incentives, so that economics work for species recovery.497 Addressing
economic problems of this kind requires tools that are rarely in evidence in
agency-administered species conservation processes—analytical capacity to
explore the economic implications of alternative recovery strategies,
financing to reshape existing development, and economic incentives for
appropriate development. The Endangered Species Act has not had these
tools in abundance, and no one has a very clear idea of whether they could
compete with the powerful engines of economic development. Yet, ignoring
economic issues simply means that large obstacles to recovery remain
unaddressed.
A further, increasingly problematic aspect of the Endangered Species Act
process in the Columbia is procedural. Decisions in the Endangered Species
Act consultation process are strictly federal, made by the federal agency that
is proposing to act and the federal agency that administers the Act, in this
case the National Marine Fisheries Service. If there is reason to think that a
federally-licensed, privately-developed project will affect a listed species, a
federal permit or license applicant may also participate.498 However, there is
no explicit provision for participation by a broader range of parties.
There is a rationale for a relatively closed process: the consultation process is
supposed to last for only 90 days and broad participation could make this
impossible, particularly if involving outside parties requires compliance with
the Federal Advisory Committee Act.499 The judgments that are made in the

There are several analyses of the funding history. See Campbell, “The Funding History,”
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consultation process are primarily scientific and technical, an area where
expertise would seem more appropriate than the views of interested parties.
In the Columbia River, however, a closed process poses special problems. For
ten years before the Endangered Species Act listings, the Columbia River
treaty tribes, the Power Planning Council, the region’s fish and wildlife
agencies, utilities, environmental groups and others worked to open up the
federal process in which river management decisions were made. The result
was no doubt messy—endless meetings, reams of issue papers, noisy debate
and friction—but the decision making process was at least accessible. Under
the Endangered Species Act process, interested parties, unable to watch or
participate in the decision making process, have had little trust in Fisheries
Service determinations. Indeed, the court in Idaho Fish and Game v.
National Marine Fisheries Service attributed the hydropower litigation to this
factor as much as any other: “The underlying root of the litigation problem is
the feeling of these parties that the federal government is simply not
listening to them.”500
The reality is that the problem is not just procedural. Some of those affected
by Endangered Species Act decisions are not just looking for a process in
which they can make their concerns known, but a process in which their
concerns will be accommodated. If the problem were only procedural, it
might be easier to address. The Administration has adopted a policy
intended to involve a broader range of interested parties in recovery plan
development generally.501 Since 1995 the Fisheries Service has made a
concerted effort to bring state and tribal fishery managers into an organized
structure for hydropower system operations and recovery plan
implementation.502 But, in 1997 after the federal court upheld the Fisheries
Service biological opinion on hydropower operations based in part on the
Service’s implementation process, the process began to fall apart. The State
of Montana withdrew, saying that the process had failed to account for
resident fish and other values residing in its headwater reservoirs.
Montana’s seat was still cooling when the four Columbia River treaty tribes
withdrew. “The process does not facilitate collaborative decision making

Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Espy, Civ. No. 93-1621 (D.D.C., March 21, 1994)
(declaratory judgment that Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team was an
advisory committee that should have been constituted and conducted under the Advisory
Committee Act).
500
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Implementation Under the Endangered Species Act,” 59 Fed. Reg. 34272 (July 1, 1994).
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A challenge to the process based on its failure to observe the requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act was rejected in Aluminum Co. of America v. NMFS, 92 F.3d 902 (9th
Cir. 1996).
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among sovereigns,” said the director of the tribes’ fish commission. “It only
provides a shield to cover ongoing federal hegemony.”503 These things are
evidence not just of a procedural failing in the law, but a range of deeper
concerns: the concerns of headwater areas that are taxed by downriver
power, flood control and salmon flow augmentation uses; the sense of
Montana and the tribes that their sovereignty is being treated too lightly; the
tension between the tribes’ interest in fish harvest and the Endangered
Species Act’s interest in protecting particular, listed fish populations; and,
probably, the tribes’ sense that the federal process is not headed toward
salmon recovery, but continued decline.
The Endangered Species Act process has had profound effects on the
Columbia River. The Act’s “incentive structure” has played a major role in
the Basin’s recovery activities, and has gone a long way toward coordinating
formerly disparate federal activities on the river. However, the Act can
either bring nonfederal activities into the recovery effort or scare them away,
depending on how it is administered and perceived. New thinking in
ecosystem science poses a challenge to the Act’s traditional focus on
individual species. Depending on how these pluses and minuses are
balanced, the Act may be a catalyst for salmon recovery, or a prescription for
gridlock.
The Northwest Power Act process can play an important role in achieving a
more workable balance. Because the Northwest Act addresses both listed
and unlisted species affected by hydropower, it can more directly account for
diverse species than can the Endangered Species Act. Moreover, the Power
Planning Council brings a different set of political constituencies, the
governors of the four states and the managerial interests of the region’s fish
and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes, into the recovery effort. And because
the governors’ influence is maximized by Council unanimity, the Act has
built-in incentives to find broader political consensus. The Northwest Act
can soften the Endangered Species Act’s more intimidating aspects by
looking for solutions that take into account impacts to all species, including
humans, and to the regional power system.
However, while it is easy to see how the two statutory processes could
complement each other at one level, the reality is that there are also real
differences between the two. The Endangered Species Act has legal muscle,
but also has the potential to rivet the region’s attention on individual, weak
populations at the expense of many other populations and species, even as it
Ted Strong, Executive Director, Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission, see “Tribal
sovereignty, treaty rights at core of tribes’ rejection of NMFS’s salmon management forum,”
The Northwest Salmon Recovery Report at p. 11 (May 30, 1997).
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raises political hackles. The Northwest Power Act process can incorporate a
broader range of ecological and political considerations, but it also could lock
the region into a single-minded effort to pump up salmon populations to
harvestable levels and give short shrift to controversial limitations in land
and water use. Both processes have potential for relying more on
technological solutions than restoring essential ecological functions. One
important question is whether new species recovery advice from ecosystem
science provides a more stable and productive ground for these two processes
to work together.

B. New Advice From Ecosystem Scientists
In 1996, the Power Planning Council’s Independent Scientific Group,
commissioned in early 1995 to review the Council’s fish and wildlife program
(see page 105), filed its report. The Independent Scientific Group is
comprised of scientists, but not social scientists. They were not asked to
evaluate the economic or political issues in salmon policy. They were asked
only to look at the Council’s fish and wildlife program, evaluate the scientific
assumptions that underlie it, and offer an alternative set of footings for the
program if an alternative approach is needed. They approached the task
from the point of view of a fish, not a policy maker, a utility ratepayer, or any
other kind of homo sapiens.
The Independent Science Group’s report, Return to the River, is in some ways
unremarkable. Much of it echoes a body of thought that took root in
ecosystem science long before 1996, which is also reflected in an important
1995 report by the National Research Council, Upstream: Salmon and
Society in the Pacific Northwest.504 Indeed, some of Return to the River’s
recommendations closely resemble not just those of the National Research
Council study, but also the National Marine Fisheries Service’s proposed
recovery plan, the treaty tribes’ restoration plan, and the Council’s own
program.
The Return to the River report portrays two competing views of the Columbia
as a “working river” and explores the consequences of each view. The
contemporary working river does the work of power generation, irrigation,
flood control and navigation, and it works because we have simplified the
natural river’s complexity. The dams’ storage capacity enables us to manage
flow releases to respond to human demand for electric energy, protect against

National Research Council, Upstream: Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest
(1995).
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floods, and float over the cataracts that once made the river so difficult to
navigate. Dams have made the river simpler and more manageable. With
hatcheries, barges, water budgets, turbine screens and other mitigation
programs, we have followed a similar path. We have aimed for a simplified
salmon population, one that migrates in time periods that fit with harvest
plans and minimize conflicts with hydropower generation. Over time, we
have achieved a simpler working river with simpler, more manageable
species. It is more of an industrial river.
The biological problem, according to Return to the River, is that biologicallyproductive rivers are complicated. They have braided channels, intricate
hydrologic processes, and huge populations of insects. They have rapids and
falls. They may flood and recede, change channels, and push sediment and
gravel around. These more complex rivers are “working rivers” because their
natural functions work to transform energy into nutrients and support a rich
diversity of species and a bountiful food chain. If the Columbia were this
kind of working river, there would be a resilient salmon population with
many salmon stocks migrating at different times, returning to different
habitats, and interacting in obscure and unpredictable ways.
In Return to the River ’s view of the world, we are spending hundreds of
millions of dollars a year on a fish and wildlife effort that tries to make up for
the work that the natural river could perform gratis. Whether or not a
natural river makes sense industrially, Return to the River argues that the
industrial river cannot work for salmon over the long run, even with the
technological and other fixes we have devised over the last twenty years. The
choice, Return to the River maintains, is between a more complex working
river with healthy salmon populations and a simpler river without them.
Return to the River urges that salmon recovery be premised on the
restoration of a working salmon ecosystem, a collection of healthy salmon
habitats connected by healthy rivers. Return calls this a “normative river,”
one that meets specific functional norms that are essential to productive
salmon populations. The report takes the Basin to task for the mechanistic
ideas that have characterized recovery programs to this point, and thereby
poses a central problem for species recovery policy: How can normative
conditions be restored when the wild ecosystem has vanished, replaced by an
ecosystem that has been reengineered to meet the consumptive demands of a
large human population?
Insofar as the questions posed by Return to the River are site-specific,
answers may be relatively clear. In a dried-up tributary, it may be obvious
that stream flows and riparian cover need to be restored before fish
populations can survive. But larger questions, for example, the benefits of
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flow augmentation above certain threshold levels in the mainstem of the
river, or the interactions between tributary, mainstem, estuary and ocean
conditions, will rarely be this clear. And, because the connections between
site-specific and ecosystem-scale questions are obscure, even the advisability
of site-specific measures may be questioned: What if water and riparian
habitat were restored in a tributary, but no fish returned to spawn because of
problems elsewhere in the system?
Moreover, Return to the River’s prescription is more ambiguous than it may
sound. The report’s idea of a normative ecosystem was developed by looking
at less constrained river systems with productive salmon populations.505 But
what do these norms imply for a developed system like the Columbia? The
report does not argue that the river must return to its pre-development
condition. Nor does it try to spell out exactly how far toward “normative”
conditions the river should go. Rather, the report suggests a direction: if
productive salmon populations are to be reestablished, the rivers’ natural
functions have to be restored to some degree. This is an important statement,
but it is not definitive. It tells us that natural functions, not technology, have
to form the backbone of recovery efforts. But it only hints at where we
should focus our efforts, and how far we need to move toward specific norms.
Deciding whether to focus effort in this geographic spot, with these
techniques, in this community, will depend not just on a conception of a
normative river, but on a complex of scientific, economic, legal and equitable
questions.
For example, the scientific arguments for reservoir drawdowns may be
relatively clear in some places and not in others. And even where the
scientific logic is clear, currently the case is made by argument, not actual
data. Does this suggest a cautious approach to the subject, experimenting
with drawdowns where their theoretical merits are relatively clear? Or do
the salmon declines require a bolder gamble, and if so, what of the river’s
value as a navigation channel, hydropower generator and irrigation ditch?
Return to the River raises these questions, but does not resolve them.
To take a second example, what does Return to the River imply about areas
like the Umatilla Basin? In the Umatilla, fish were extirpated decades ago
by irrigated agriculture. Efforts to restore salmon to the Umatilla have
relied on large investments in technology, such as the water exchange
project, fish passage facilities, and a hatchery. These arrangements would be
more recognizable to Rube Goldberg than Mother Nature. And the Umatilla
is not unique. In other over-appropriated tributaries, getting water and fish
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back in streams without seriously threatening surrounding communities
suggests a willingness to invest in technology. Return to the River does not
say that relying on technology in such instances is necessarily unjustified,
but it suggests that restoring ecological conditions that are healthy for
salmon will require a good deal more than technology. Whether it is
politically, socially and economically possible to mount such an effort is a
political judgment, not a scientific one.
Weighing these considerations, shuttling back and forth among policy
makers, scientists, affected communities, financing agents and lawyers will
remain central to the enterprise, and these considerations will shape results
even in an ecosystem framework. Nevertheless, Return to the River points to
questions that have not been at the top of the Basin’s list, and it suggests the
need for a new set of ecological ideas to guide recovery efforts. In this sense,
Return to the River may be more valuable for the questions it raises than the
answers it gives.

C. A Brave New Energy World
Many of the most difficult questions that face the Basin have to do with the
hydropower system. Decisions over river operations and reservoir
drawdowns are coming. Science notwithstanding, these decisions involve big
stakes for the hydropower system. As Return to the River was being
finalized, the Basin found itself having to comprehensively rethink the
energy system, the Columbia River and, necessarily, the financial future of
salmon recovery.
The continuing availability of hydropower funds as a source of financing for
salmon recovery, irrigation assistance and other public purposes has been a
basic assumption about the way the river operates, and the assumption has
deep roots in law. The pattern was established early in the Basin’s
development. The first projects in the Basin were not built for hydropower,
but for reclamation in the Upper Snake Basin, the Yakima Basin and
elsewhere. Although these projects were originally intended to be selffinancing, over the course of several decades they became a dependency of
Congress and the hydropower system.506 Hydropower dams are often called
“cash register dams,” capital investments that generate revenues with which
to repay the U. S. Treasury and subsidize activities that do not pay for
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themselves.507 The authorizing legislation for Grand Coulee is characteristic:
the project was authorized for flood control, navigation, reclamation “and for
the generation of electric energy as a means of financially aiding and
assisting such undertakings.”508 Since the turn of the century, federal
hydropower dams have been the locus of a large collection of obligations,
benefits, subsidies and cross-subsidies, some running in favor of the
hydropower system and some not. When the dams were built, the federal
government paid the cost. Hydropower ratepayers were expected to repay
the cost of hydropower facilities, but the nation bore the cost of flood control
and navigation features. And the hydropower repayment would occur over
long time periods at low, non-market interest rates. In turn, the hydropower
system is statutorily obliged to repay the cost of the dams’ irrigation
features.509 Hydropower rate structures have their own set of benefits and
concessions, often established by statute, such as the public power
preference, preferential rates for irrigation pumping, and the “residential
exchange” for customers of investor-owned utilities510 and sometimes
established for business or other reasons. Similarly, the hydropower system
was used as security for investments in defunct nuclear plants that eat up
more than $500 million in hydropower revenues annually.511 Most recently,
the Northwest Power Act required the system to invest in energy
conservation initiatives to help meet the region’s energy demands, and to pay
the cost of offsetting the system’s fish and wildlife impacts.
Columbia River fish and wildlife policy was particularly influenced by the
availability of hydropower revenues during the 1980s. Because the market
for hydropower generation has so much influence on the dam operations that
affect salmon,512 because mitigating fish and wildlife impacts is a cost of
producing power,513 and because we don't know how to fully offset the dams’
M. Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water 140 (Penguin
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508
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effects, it has been thought fair to look to the hydropower system to fund a
large share of fish and wildlife mitigation. A similar phenomenon occurred in
the way the Columbia River fish and wildlife issues have come to be
characterized. Although some of the federal dams were built primarily for
non-hydropower purposes,514 the Northwest Power Act refers to the projects
generically as “hydroelectric facilities” or “hydroelectric projects.”515 The
Columbia River debate is often characterized as “hydropower versus
salmon.”516 Some argue, however, that hydropower has borne a disproportionate part of the burden. Programs such as those promised by the Salmon
and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act were never funded.517
Other beneficiaries of the dams such as irrigators, navigation interests and
flood control beneficiaries pay little if any of the cost of fish and wildlife
mitigation. But with federal deficit pressures acting as a wolf at the door,
Congress has been satisfied to see hydropower revenues as the primary
financier for fish and wildlife measures on the Columbia River.
Since 1990, any number of long-settled assumptions of the hydropower
industry have been thrown into a cocked hat. Beginning around 1990,
changes in technology, law, and the availability of large supplies of cheap
natural gas began to transform a highly regulated electric industry into a
competitive industry.518 A utility executive recently described a transaction
in the new, competitive energy world:
Last week my company, Portland General Electric, bought a supply of
power from the Palos Verde Nuclear Plant in Arizona. We then sold it to
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP). LADWP sold it
to Louis Dreyfus, a trading company that got in the electric business a
couple of years ago. Louis Dreyfus in turn sold it to a Canadian utility.
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The Canadian utility resold that power to Washington Water Power
Company. And then, we bought the same power back from Washington
Water Power Company, for less than we originally paid.519
This, from an industry whose past adventures rarely strayed from the
seductive pleasures of building a generating plant and persuading a public
utility commission to adjust rates.
For the first time, Bonneville Power Administration is expected to compete
for customers, and in an open market that was unthinkable ten years ago.
For decades, hydropower was the cheapest energy source on the block by a
good measure, and potential competitors had to face the reality that building
power plants was a risky, expensive undertaking. In recent years, natural
gas prices have fallen through the floor, and advances in generating
technology have removed much of the risk in building power plants.
Hydropower is now more expensive than some of the alternatives, and
building an efficient power plant that burns cheap natural gas is relatively
simple.520
These developments touched off a series of cost-control efforts on
Bonneville’s part. Near the top of Bonneville’s list of concerns were projected
increases in fish and wildlife recovery costs, which had risen dramatically
since the Endangered Species Act listings in the early 1990s. In 1995 and
1996, some members of Congress proposed to help out by legislating a cap on
Bonneville’s fish and wildlife expenses. The idea became more complex,
however, as more utilities sought to hang ornaments on the tree, and to
secure their own fish and wildlife funding caps.
To offer an administrative alternative, federal and regional parties,
encouraged by Senator Hatfield and the Clinton Administration, agreed to a
six-year budget for Bonneville fish and wildlife funding.521 The Agreement
A. Alexanderson, “Rethinking the Federal Role in a Competitive Electric Market,”
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commits Bonneville to use $252 million per year in hydropower revenues for
fish and wildlife projects arising under the Council program and the ESA
biological opinion. In addition, Bonneville agrees to bear the financial
consequences of implementing project operations, flow augmentation and
spill aspects of the biological opinion. Finally, under certain circumstances
Bonneville may tap a federal “contingency fund” aspects of the biological
opinion: several hundred million dollars in Treasury credits for Bonneville’s
financing of fish and wildlife measures not allocable to the dams’ hydropower
features.522 The U. S. Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget,
jealous guardians of the contingency fund, played significant roles in the
agreement’s development. Not incidentally, the Agreement commits the
federal agencies to collaborate much more closely with the region in
developing federal funding requests. The Agreement also incorporates an
annex in which the parties agree to collaborate in federal budget matters and
in monitoring and evaluation of fish and wildlife recovery.
The Memorandum of Agreement adds an important element of stability to
fish and wildlife costs, but it is limited stability. The agreement is an
interagency understanding, not legislation. It lasts only through 2001, and
even in this period it is possible that a court or Congress could impose other
obligations on Bonneville. Perhaps more important, the agreement was
negotiated before Return to the River was published, before any clear
understanding of the implications of the “normative river” concept, and
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Power System.” 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(C). The House Interior Committee Report’s analysis
of this provision noted that “[a]ll expenditures by BPA are to be made on a reimbursable
basis vis-a-vis other project purposes, although BPA will have the flexibility to treat
expenditures in excess of its allocated share as being payments for other project costs for
which BPA is responsible under existing law.” 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Rept. 96-976, Part II at
page 45. This section and its legislative history have been interpreted as authorizing
Bonneville to credit fish and wildlife expenditures for which hydropower is not strictly
accountable against sums Bonneville owes the Treasury for the dams’ construction. The
theory was first raised by a law student, adapted by Bonneville (see S. Brown, “Breathing
Life into a Drowned Resource: Mitigating Wildlife Losses in the Columbia Basin under the
Northwest Power Act,” 18 Env’t’l Law 597 (1988); Memorandum from Harvard Spigal,
General Counsel, to Randy Hardy, Administrator and Chief Executive Officer of the
Bonneville Power Administration, regarding Interpretation of Section 4(h)(10)(C) of the
Northwest Power Act (June 6, 1994)) and, ultimately, endorsed by the Administration in the
Rivlin letter, cited in the prior note.
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before any decisions about major changes in the Columbia River dams were
made.
These uncertainties about the implications of the Endangered Species Act,
ecosystem science, hydropower finances and ecosystem recovery costs open
up significant questions about the management of the Columbia River. The
next sections discuss what remains to be done to narrow these areas of
uncertainty and develop new approaches to managing the river.
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VII. New Footings for Water Policy on
the Columbia River
If the next generation of water policy requires a river system that is
consistent with the ecological needs of salmon, the new realities of the power
industry, and the constraints of water law, how will we get there? To pose
the question more sharply, recall the observations made in the introduction:
First, 150 years of water developments have fragmented the Basin’s rivers
among federal, tribal, state and private interests. The dams on the mainstem
of the Columbia and Snake rivers are federal or federally-licensed; water
diversions, especially from the tributaries, are mainly managed by the states
and the Bureau of Reclamation. This poses the obvious problem of different
bodies of law governing an interconnected river system, and the conflict to
which it can lead. There is a still more serious problem: not only are the
mainstem and tributaries subject to different regulatory regimes with
different constraints, but the tributaries are fractionated into private
ownerships and the Columbia itself is shared with another nation. Bringing
tributary watersheds and the Canadian projects into the recovery effort
poses a series of challenges that are quite different and in some ways more
imposing than those in the domestic part of the mainstem.
Second, although the Basin has had more than fifteen years experience with
large-scale salmon recovery programs, the salmon declines seem to pose
questions for which we have few good answers. The most recent,
comprehensive scientific advice is that salmon recovery programs cannot
reverse the salmon declines unless human activities are managed to protect
ecological functions vital to salmon, at least in some places and to some
degree. Thus, ecological conditions in mainstem and tributary rivers could
become key variables, but in an equation yet to be worked out.
Third, the federal role in the Columbia River is shaped not only by the needs
of species, but increasingly by market forces. Federal development created
an enormous series of economic assets: the hydropower dams. Efforts to
offset the effects of the dams on salmon are financed in large part out of the
hydropower till. However, as the power industry and the hydropower system
have entered the era of market competition, the costs imposed on the
hydropower system, including the cost of salmon mitigation, affect
hydropower’s ability to compete. If costs are too high, paradoxically, salmon
recovery funding can be threatened. In short, if the river can no longer be
managed to optimize economic values, neither can it be managed in ignorance
of market economics. However, this new ecological/free market equation is
only starting to take shape, and the relationship needs a more stable footing.
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These three points tend to bound the discussion of ecosystem management
for the Columbia Basin: ecosystem recovery measures could demand a great
deal from the current system, yet economic and legal factors impose limits on
the system’s adaptability. What does an ecosystem recovery program
operating within these kinds of constraints suggest about the shape of the
next generation of agreements on the river, and what role does it suggest for
federal water policy?
This section of the study takes a closer look at the scientific, financial and
governmental implications of several questions: Can policy be organized
around ecological functions that are still undefined by an evolving science?
Can the Basin reestablish ecological connections among tributaries and with
the mainstem? How does the Basin make changes in the hydropower dams
without stalling the system’s financial engine? And finally, are there
governance structures that lend themselves to answering these questions
and implementing solutions?

A. Water Policy, Science and Adaptability 523
One of the key lessons of the Columbia is that water policy in western river
basins can be, and increasingly is, driven by scientific and ecological issues.
Questions of this kind, however, draw water policy onto unfamiliar ground.
Some sense of ecological science and its navigational instruments is
essential.
The first major issue is how we can define and measure success for water
management initiatives that are geared to protect ecosystem functions. The
Basin is a big ecological template, and if we shift it, we shift it in small ways
whose ecological significance is debatable. Thus, water management
initiatives have to fit into a much broader series of recovery measures which,
collectively, add up to healthy ecosystem conditions. But how do we define
what those “healthy” conditions are? How do we measure the contribution of

The inspiration for much of this section is Kai Lee’s work in adaptive management, which
he describes in his book, Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science and Politics for the
Environment (Island Press, 1993). For other discussions of adaptive management in the
Columbia River, see K. Lee and J. Lawrence. “Adaptive Management: Learning From the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,” 16 Env’t’l L. 431 (1986); J. Volkman and
W. McConnaha: “Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered
Species Act and Adaptive Management,” 23 Envtl L. 1249 (1993); and W. McConnaha and P.
Paquet, “Adaptive Strategies for the Management of Ecosystems: The Columbia River
Experience,” 16 American Fisheries Society Symposium 410 (1996). The National Research
Council report, Upstream, puts adaptive management on the Columbia River into a useful
institutional context. See Upstream Chapter 13, “Institutional Analysis.”
523
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individual initiatives, and how do we link them analytically with a large
collection of other measures to determine whether they add up, or even if we
have a solvable problem?
These are complex scientific questions. They have to do with how much we
know about ecosystems work and how they respond to human interventions.
Ecosystem science is itself a peculiar science—more like economics or
weather prediction than chemistry or physics, and so we probably will never
have the clear answers we would hope for. Moreover, these are anything but
pure scientific questions. Communities, dams, farms and powerful economic
networks are in place. They can change, but can they change in a way that is
ecologically relevant? This is largely a political question. The fact that the
science is murky makes these issues more complex from a policy perspective.
We have to make judgments about tradeoffs and risks based on a body of
knowledge that is, at best, evolving.

1. The Prospect of Error
History is not encouraging. Political leaders have rarely had much patience
with scientists who urged the world to stop while nature is examined so that
policy can be squared up with scientific theory. John Wesley Powell’s
irrigation survey was intended to identify the West’s best irrigation sites, and
to use this information to organize federal resource policy in the West. After
a hopeful start, the survey was defeated, “stomped to death” by Congress,
due partly to politics and pressures for western settlement.524 But, in an era
in which rain was thought to follow the plow, scientific disagreement also
played a role. Powell and other scientists were divided on important
questions: Were artesian wells viable substitutes for surface irrigation?
Would forests increase rainfall and help control flood waters, or reduce
surface flows through evapo-transpiration? In the public arguments over
these questions, the scientific foundations for resource policy, including
Powell’s survey, were called into question.525 Policy makers wanted scientific
advice, but they lost patience with the slow pace of the irrigation survey and
the messy scientific squabbles that surrounded it.
Yet, if policy makers lack patience for science, they run other risks. The
complexity of marine ecosystems has repeatedly led humans into error, in
which the wrong factors were identified as problems and purported solutions

W. Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian at 337 (1954). Parts of this history are also
described in a U. S. Supreme Court opinion, California v. U.S., 438 U. S. 645, 659 (1978).
525
See Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West at 153-163.
524

152

New Footings for Water Policy on the Columbia River

only compounded error and unfairness. Richard White tells a tale of 19th
century California abalone fishery:
From the 1860s onward, Chinese fishermen harvesting the abundant
abalone of the coast unknowingly benefitted from the earlier slaughter of
otters by fur traders. During the late nineteenth century, however, other
fishermen began to accuse the Chinese of depleting not only the abalone
fisheries but also fisheries in general. Fisheries were declining, but
climatic factors unrelated to Chinese activities were largely responsible for
the decline. Indeed, the Chinese, by eliminating abalone and thus
increasing the growth of kelp, were actually helping to increase the
fisheries. Nevertheless, whites drove the Chinese from the fishing grounds
and believed that they had saved the fishing, as fish increased at the end of
the century. The fish returned not because of a decline in Chinese fishing
pressure but in response to the decline of abalone; the simultaneous
elimination by hunters of marine mammals, such as seals and sea lions,
that preyed on fish; and more favorable climatic variations. In this case,
ecological, social, and environmental change intertwined to influence the
lives of humans who never understood the ramifications of their own
actions.526
Federal fishery policy has its own cautionary tales of the missteps into which
scientists and decision makers can lead each other. In the 1800s, scientists
proposed that fish hatcheries could offset the effects of habitat degradation
and over-fishing. Nineteenth century scientists who supported hatchery
technology had distorted ideas about the “plasticity” of salmon,
misconceptions about salmon life histories, and false expectations about their
ability to improve on nature’s “wasteful” production of fish.527 Prone to
choose the science that offered easier political and economic choices,
Congress accepted hatcheries as a panacea.528 Nineteenth century hatchery
technology rarely performed up to expectations. Yet, more than a hundred
years later, hatcheries remain a linchpin in fishery management.
The Columbia River has a similar history. Hatcheries and other technologies
were offered as the antidote to dams. When Grand Coulee blocked salmon
from the Columbia’s upper reaches, upper basin fish stocks were
transplanted to hatcheries below the dam. The Mitchell Act, passed to
mitigate the effects of other federal dams, began a hatchery-dominated
program. At the Idaho Power Company’s Hells Canyon projects, it took
several years after the projects were built to find out that they could not be
R. White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own at 215 (Oklahoma, 1992).
Taylor, Making Salmon at 129.
528
Id. at 107.
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equipped with workable fish passage facilities; instead hatcheries were built.
The federal government’s primary compensation for the construction of the
Lower Snake River hydropower dams was a collection of hatcheries built
under the Lower Snake River Compensation Program. Even now, some 40
percent of the Bonneville Power Administration’s direct fish and wildlife
program budget is devoted to artificial production.529
The troubling thing in this history is not that risks were taken or that choices
were wrong. Regardless of how closely policy makers listen to scientists,
science is a debate, and policy makers can only get a snapshot of a long-term
dialectic. If hatcheries were the wrong choice, it was hard to fault those who
made it. Alternatives such as harvest reductions and widespread regulation
of activities that degraded habitat were unappealing. Hatchery technology
showed promise. What sensible person would not at least try the hatchery
alternative, and what 19th century body of science would counsel against it?
The troubling thing is that these choices were not seriously evaluated after
the fact to see how they were performing. If they had, policy makers might
have curbed their commitment to traditional hatcheries. It was the lack of
scientific evaluation, not the goofiness of the initial hypothesis, that was
disturbing in the evolution of the hatchery program. As one historian put it,
“the more salmon declined, the less curious Congress seemed about the cause
of decline and the more basic research dwindled and ‘practical’
appropriations increased.”530 Once having found a “practical” answer to a
problem, the program acquired its own momentum. The appeal of a
technological answer that mooted the need to control habitat degradation,
dam building and other forms of development was irresistible. Neither
Congress nor bureaucrats were interested in upsetting apple carts with
research and evaluation.

2. Adaptive Management in the Columbia River
More than one hundred years after the Northwest began these mitigation
experiments, one of life’s bracing experiences is coming to salmon policy fresh
and untutored, and finding out how much is unknown about salmon recovery.
As a newcomer in the early 1980s, the Power Planning Council had this
experience when it faced the task of developing a fish and wildlife program
based on the “best available scientific knowledge.”531 Congress assumed that

Personal communication with Doug Marker, Northwest Power Planning Council (March
7, 1997).
530
Taylor, Making Salmon at 145.
531
16 U.S.C. 839b(h)(6)(C).
529
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this knowledge would be provided by the region’s fish and wildlife agencies
and Indian tribes. However, it was soon apparent that this was disparate
knowledge. Hatcheries were or weren’t a solution; fish barging did or didn’t
work; flow augmentation did or didn’t make sense past a certain point;
degraded habitat was or wasn’t a serious problem. Different fish and wildlife
managers and scientists gave different answers. While it was possible to
listen to a battle of experts and ascertain a center of gravity on some
answers, a center of gravity is not always sound scientific footing.
The science that traditionally informed salmon management tended to be
geared to managing fish harvest.532 The objective of this type of resource
management is “produce commodities and services ‘for the greatest good of
the greatest number for the longest time’ so that wild nature was not to be
preserved, but actively manipulated by scientifically informed experts to
improve and sustain yields.”533 In the context of fish harvest, conservation
could be as simple as ensuring that enough adult fish return to provide eggs
for a hatchery. Conservation in the Endangered Species Act sense was not
the objective. Indeed, as recently as 1987, fish managers were unconcerned
when Snake River coho, seen as more an obstacle than a contribution to
harvest management, became extinct.534
In 1984, Professor Kai Lee, then a member of the Power Planning Council,
suggested that the Council’s job required a brand of scientific skepticism.
Fish and wildlife recovery measures should be seen as a series of
experiments. Experimental designs and monitoring and evaluation protocols
should be an integral part of recovery measures so that critical questions
could be addressed, errors corrected, and successes identified.535 In this
fashion, the Council could work with fish and wildlife managers to
acknowledge their uncertainties, frame their judgments as hypotheses, and
test them. In effect, salmon managers would be asked to challenge their own
assumptions and consciously learn from experience. This is the essence of
what is called “adaptive management.”

U. S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Status of the Interior Columbia Basin:
Summary of Scientific Findings, General Technical Report PNW-GTR-385 at p. 113 (1996).
533
C. Meine, “The Oldest Task in Human History,” in R. Knight and S. Bates, A New Century
for Natural Resources Management at 12 (Island Press 1995).
534
See Transcript of Northwest Power Planning Council meeting at Post Falls, Idaho, at 9-12
(July 8-9, 1987).
535
Lee and Lawrence: “Adaptive Management: Learning From the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program,” 16 Environmental Law 431 (1986). Experience with adaptive
management in fish harvest is described in Walters and Hilborn, “Adaptive Control Of
Fishing Systems”, 33 J. Fish. Res. Board Canada 145 (1976); McAllister and Peterman,
“Experimental Design In The Management Of Fisheries,” 12 North American Journal of
Fisheries Management 1 (1992).
532
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The theory of adaptive management departs from traditional management in
several ways. Traditional managers base action on existing knowledge and
established modes of operation. They will alter unproductive programs, but
managers tend not to put a high priority on questioning their programs. So,
if information is gathered, it is drawn from a relatively narrow range of
conditions.536 In contrast, adaptive management implies a commitment to
actively question programs, to think of programs as hypotheses, and test
them.
To account for social implications in salmon recovery, Lee proposed a
modified approach developed by C. S. Hollings and his colleagues.537 Hollings
called for scientific, economic, and social concerns to be explicitly considered
when experiments are designed. No one would be forced to pretend that
scientific inquiry alone mattered. Scientists, managers, policy makers and
the public, all bringing their own political, economic and cultural concerns,
should be involved in identifying appropriate cases for scientific probing. To
help these parties think through these problems, computer models would be
developed to simulate the ecosystem and analyze the effects of alternative
management actions under different assumptions. So, the adaptive
management model proposed for the Columbia had two special elements.
One was the idea of using computers to simulate an ecosystem. By using an
ecosystem model, participants could see the system-wide consequences of
site-specific actions. The second new element was social—the idea that
subjects for management experiments would be identified in an inclusive
process that involved a range of interested parties.
This model of adaptive management offered the Council two opportunities: a
way to proceed in the face of uncertainty, and a counter-weight to the
assumptions of traditional management. The uncertainty of mitigation
would be explicitly acknowledged, and the easy assumption that technology
could save us from the consequences of development would be open to
question.

3. Obstacles to Adaptive Management

Silvert, “The Price of Knowledge: Fisheries Management as a Research Tool,” 35 J. Fish
Res. Board Can. 208 (1978).
537
C. Hollings, ed., Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management, 3 Wiley
International Series on Applied System Analysis (Chichester, UK: Wiley 1978).
536
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The problematic side of adaptive management appeared in
implementation:538
Difficulties in agreeing on a common model of the ecosystem. Adaptive
management called for the development of a model of the ecosystem, so that
changes in one part of the salmon life cycle could be seen in their systemwide context. And in fact, it was not hard to develop a computer model of the
salmon life-cycle. The Power Planning Council’s first model was developed in
a series of workshops with fish managers in 1987. However, it was difficult
to develop a model upon which people outside the workshops could agree.
The model the Council developed incorporated much of the basin’s thinking
about the salmon life cycle and stirred up a healthy debate about the
assumptions that underlie fish management. But other models emerged
based on other assumptions, and the models had differing levels of detail and
resolution. By the early 1990s, there were at least three models at work in
the basin. The idea that a single model could be a Rosetta Stone that would
ground salmon planning in a common vision has proved elusive.
Moreover, the models developed are based on simplified pictures of the
salmon life-cycle, informed by many of the assumptions of traditional
fisheries management. If, as Return to the River suggests, salmon recovery
should focus on ecological functions rather than salmon per se, it is not clear
that these models are properly geared. If we want to think through how
varying conditions might affect the productivity of a metapopulation, for
example, it is not clear that these models help. And so, just as the premises
that adaptive management hopes to test are in flux, models must be
susceptible to rethinking.
Managing ecosystems for experimental purposes. Adaptive management
seemed to assume that problems in the Columbia River would lend
themselves to laboratory-style testing in which some variables could be
controlled, others manipulated, and changes in population size ascribed to
certain causes. In fact, however, few variables in a complex and changing
salmon ecosystem are controllable, and population fluctuations may be
explained by countless factors. The analogy to laboratory experimentation
may be fundamentally misleading. Trying to experiment in an ecosystem
may be more like trying to experiment with the weather. One ecosystem
scientist described the distinction in these terms:

For a thorough discussion of these matters, readers should consult Lee, Compass and
Gyroscope.
538
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The present capabilities of ecosystem science are quite substantial and are
essential for rational management of public lands. However, they do not
now and never will approach a deterministic pinnacle comparable to
predictions of the attraction of two bodies in space, as shown by Newton’s
law of universal gravitation. Predictions about ecosystems must be framed
in probabilistic terms.
The potential of ecosystem science is most easily shown by analogy with
more familiar disciplines that have similar inherent characteristics. For
example, atmospheric science and economics both deal with complex
integrated systems, are sciences of immense practical importance, and both
show their value primarily through broad-brush analysis, illustration of
mechanisms, and short-term predictions rather than long-term detailed
forecasts. The same will be true of ecosystem science.539
Learning about the effects of various mainstem operations poses problems of
this kind. To test the efficacy of flow augmentation, an adaptive
management approach might suggest that we should radically vary river flow
from one year to the next to generate robust information about the
connection between flow augmentation and salmon survival. Yet, it does not
appear that we could generate such fluctuations even in theory. Recall that
the natural, year-to-year variation in Columbia River flows can be enormous,
as much as a 35-to-1 ratio between high and low flows. However, because
the Columbia system has much less storage capacity compared to total runoff
than do many other western river systems, manipulating the amount of
stored water in the Columbia system can do little in comparison to natural
fluctuations. The dashed line on Figure 2 (page 31) shows the kind of change
in the hydrograph we have achieved through storage releases since the early
1980s. Even with the relatively large amounts of flow augmentation
prompted by the Endangered Species Act, the change is small. The variation
in fish survival that could be expected from the Council’s water budget was
within the margin of measurement error,540 and the same is probably true of
the Endangered Species Act flows. So it is not at all clear that we can
produce experimentally significant variations through flow manipulation.
Moreover, even if there were enough storage, extreme year-to-year
fluctuations would not necessarily make sense in other ways. Consider a
regime that heightens year-to-year flow differences by providing no flow
augmentation in low water years and maximum augmentation in wet years.
Such a regime could run counter to salmon recovery efforts. Magnifying yearW. Lewis, “The Ecological Sciences and the Public Domain,” 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 279,
290 (1994).
540
Compass and Gyroscope at 47.
539
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to-year flow differences could actually hurt prospects for rebuilding salmon.
Fish managers concerned with declining salmon stocks want to augment
flows the most in dry years, when the experimental approach would provide
least.
And, of course, the politics of such an experimental regime would be
daunting. For utilities that had been lining up for a civil war over access to
federal hydropower in the 1980s,541 proposals to manipulate the river for a
salmon experiment could be taken as fighting words.
These were some of the considerations that led to the proposal developed in
the Power Planning Council’s 1994 “mainstem hypotheses” rulemaking
exercise. In that exercise, the Council convened a group of scientists to
clarify two key assumptions underlying the mainstem program related to the
merits of flow augmentation and the merits of barging fish. Instead of trying
to measure the merits of each individually, with something resembling
laboratory-style methods, the Council proposed a head-to-head comparison
between barged fish and fish migrating in the river. A comparison would not
tell us in absolute terms how beneficial a given increment of flow
augmentation or transportation might be, but it should give us a comparative
measure of the merits of each method, which would help resolve one
controversial question in salmon recovery. The same comparison could be
made over several years, to observe the combined effects of human mitigation
measures and fluctuating natural conditions to see if the comparative
efficacy of the two techniques varied with different climatic conditions.
Because natural flow fluctuations are more extreme than artificially-induced
fluctuations, this year-to-year comparison could also provide valuable insight
into the flow-survival relationship. This is a more opportunistic approach to
adaptive management than the pure doctrine might suggest. However, it
more realistically reflects the social, political and legal context in which
adaptive management must function.
The lesson may be as obvious as this: We can rarely expect to manipulate a
complex ecosystem for experimental purposes. We have to look for other
ways to learn. Learning is likely to be a slow, opportunistic process, orders of
magnitude slower than the Powell irrigation survey with which Congress lost
patience in the 19th century.
Confessing ignorance. Adaptive management is premised on an admission of
ignorance, that we don’t really know that what we propose to do will work.

See Blumm, “The Northwest’s Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act,” 58 Wash. L. Rev. 175, 228 (1983).
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This poses a problem recognizable by anyone who has lobbied a bill in a
legislature: “Mr. Congressman, I want you to invest large sums of public
money in ways that may or may not help species at the brink of extinction.
But I can guarantee you that we will learn as much from failure as success.”
No one would express it quite so baldly, but however phrased, emphasizing
the uncertainty involved in ecosystem recovery can erect political barriers.
Why single out ecosystem protection measures to emphasize risk and
uncertainty? Huge sums of public money are invested in national defense
initiatives with little assurance of success and no expectation of learning
whether the investment was necessary. As government budgets are cinched
tighter, the idea that policy can be based on confessions of ignorance may be
hard to sustain.
Yet, if we pretend to know more than we do, we may fail to evaluate results,
and, like the hatchery system, compound the consequences of error. Sooner
or later, error is likely to be too obvious to ignore, and the political
foundations for ecosystem recovery will be the worse for it.
Studying the problem to death. For some people and some issues, adaptive
management is seen as a ruse, an excuse either for taking a misguided
action, or for not acting more boldly. The need for more research, valid
enough in its own right, can be a delaying tactic, like environmental litigation
in which those who oppose development argue for more research and
analysis before development is allowed. On the Columbia River of the 1980s,
the roles were reversed, but the scenario was otherwise familiar. Utilities
who pay for salmon mitigation insisted on more research before undertaking
the most costly salmon recovery efforts, and sometimes for good reason. Fish
managers, who thought they already knew that flow augmentation and
hatchery supplementation were positive goods, saw an experimental
approach as a delaying tactic. When the Council called for research into the
flow-survival relationship to accompany the water budget, for example, or
approved hatchery supplementation projects only on an experimental basis,
it ran into resistance. And because fish managers control crucial aspects of
any research and evaluation effort, they were in a position to block scientific
inquiry.
There is a more subtle variation of this problem. When species are in decline,
funds are limited, and the choice is between funding an on-the-ground
measure that we know will do some good and long-term research and
monitoring, it takes a special measure of commitment to invest in long-term
research and monitoring. Research, monitoring and evaluation are
expensive. They can easily eat up a large part of any budget, and they do
need a budget discipline. But they also can be too easy a mark in budget
debates.
160
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Adaptive management as window dressing. Following the initial enthusiasm
for adaptive management came the realization that virtually anything
anyone wanted to do could be justified as “adaptive management” if a
monitoring component were tacked onto it. Forgotten was one of the
fundamental aspects of adaptive management, that it is supposed to be
organized and directed rather than ad hoc. Two exponents of adaptive
management recently reminded us that an “overt and directed” adaptive
program should have specific elements:
(1) the goals for the management process; (2) the hypotheses, assumptions
and information describing the current beliefs about ecosystem function,
which form the basis for current management action; (3) actions designed
to address immediate biological information needs, including management
experiments; (4) critical uncertainties regarding achievement of
management goals based on the existing belief system; and, (5) research,
monitoring, and management programs (including experiments) designed
to address these uncertainties.542
Nevertheless, during the 1980s these elements were often glossed over, and
adaptive management too easily became a code word for passive data
collection.
Problems of coordination. Organized learning requires an enormous effort of
coordination. In the mainstem, hydropower operators must collaborate with
fish and wildlife agencies, tribes, and constituent groups to conduct any kind
of experimental work. In hatchery reform, fish and wildlife agencies, tribes,
funding agencies and environmental groups each have leverage. Collaboration can be urged but not enforced, and dissatisfied parties can erect
obstacles to implementation or assert other priorities. Experimental
initiatives that emerge from policy debates can be recast or bled to death in
implementation. Initiatives that died in policy debates can be revived and
pushed in over the transom.
Merely calling something a learning process doesn’t absolve it from a burden
of history, mistrust and politics. In attempting to develop mainstem
experiments, the dams’ role as cash registers for other programs, their
enormous energy output, their connections to inland ports, the obstacles they
pose to salmon, and the social and economic problems they create for tribes
and others must be addressed. Experimentation with hatchery techniques
requires us to deal with the history of programs that were not just a fix for

McConnaha and Paquet, “Adaptive Strategies for the Management of Ecosystems,”
16 American Fisheries Society Symposium at 419.
542
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dams, but a rearrangement of the cultural landscape: the movement of
salmon production from upriver to downriver, the powerful lure of the lowerriver fisheries, and the inequities for Indian tribes. There is no easy way to
escape these problems.

4. The Need for Policy Support
Given these problems, what is the prospect that adaptive management will
offer a practical way to refine scientific ideas of the salmon ecosystem into a
meaningful management guide for recovery efforts? The rationale for a
management strategy that puts a high priority on learning is, if anything,
stronger than ever. We know even less about complex ecosystems than we
thought we knew when we operated with mechanistic site-specific
assumptions. There is more support for the idea of adaptive management
among scientists and managers than ever before. By 1995, all of the basin’s
recovery plans, Return to the River, and the National Research Council’s
Upstream report urged an adaptive approach.543
Other essential pieces of an adaptive management infrastructure seem to be
falling into place. An aquatic resource information center called StreamNet,
funded under the Northwest Power Planning Council’s fish and wildlife
program with Bonneville revenues, has gathered, organized, and made
readily available a large body of data on salmon abundance, distribution,
habitat, harvest, and mitigation efforts.544 A group of ecosystem analysts
working with the National Marine Fisheries Service is using salmon life-cycle
models to “mine” data, sharpen alternative hypotheses, and explore key
uncertainties.545 The National Marine Fisheries Service’s recovery plan
implementation process is based in part on an adaptive management model.
In 1995, the Northwest Power Planning Council and the National Marine
Fisheries Service, with help from the National Academy of Sciences, created
an Independent Scientific Advisory Board to help provide scientific advice to

Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River; National Research Council, Upstream,
Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest at 291 (1995); National Marine Fisheries
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the two agencies’ fish and wildlife programs. The board includes most of the
authors of Return to the River, all of whom are strong advocates of rigorous
research and evaluation. The science board’s role was strengthened by 1996
legislation requiring the Council to bring independent scientific oversight to
the allocation of Bonneville fish and wildlife funds. The Council appointed
most of the members of the Independent Scientific Advisory Board to
implement this aspect of the legislation, along with several authors of the
National Research Council’s Upstream report. So, for the first time, a group
of independent scientists with strong commitment to adaptive management
is advising federal and regional policy makers on recovery strategy (Return to
the River and Upstream), implementation issues under Endangered Species
Act and Northwest Power Act programs, and Bonneville fish and wildlife
expenditures.
The 1995-1995 memorandum of agreement that established a budget for
Bonneville fish and wildlife funding546 also imposes a budget discipline that
should create new pressure for accountable fish and wildlife investments. By
establishing a fixed fund for which projects must compete, the agreement
gives fish and wildlife managers an extra incentive to ensure that funds are
invested wisely. Moreover, the agreement explicitly commits the parties to
collaborate in monitoring and evaluating fish and wildlife recovery.
Yet, there are also missing pieces of infrastructure. Part of the reason for
adaptive management’s continuing popularity is that it carries different
meanings for different people. Different interests support evaluation of
different issues (usually, those that don’t threaten one’s own programs). As
a result, what seemed like support in policy debates fades in implementation,
when managers allocate resources. Decision makers have to be willing to live
with the ambiguity that comes with long-term evaluation of a complex,
shifting ecosystem, and resist the impulse to short-circuit research and
evaluation in response to exigencies. Ultimately, they may have to act on the
basis of new information, even if it means less funding for their own
programs. It is by no means clear that adaptive management has hard-edged
support in any of these senses.
It is possible that economic pressures will produce a hardier process for
research and evaluation. There is a rising chorus in Congress and elsewhere
demanding evidence that investments in salmon recovery actually help
salmon. In 1996, a Council fish and wildlife governance review found broad

Memorandum of Agreement among the Department of the Army, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Energy and the Department of the Interior Concerning the
Bonneville Power Administration’s Financial Commitment for the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Costs (September 16, 1996), see pp. 151-153.
546
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consensus for improving accountability in fish and wildlife policy.547 In
October, Congress enacted legislation requiring the Council to form an
independent scientific panel to advise on the efficacy of projects funded with
Bonneville Power Administration funds.548 Near the end of 1996, a regional
energy panel urged greater accountability in fish and wildlife recovery
initiatives.549 There are many different voices in this chorus: Some are
saying that a lot of money is spent on salmon recovery, salmon are still
declining, and so the money must be poorly managed. Others are concerned
that no single entity has responsibility for these investments and so no one
can be held accountable. Some think that True Science, if we would only let
it loose, would tell us exactly what to do. One thing all of these voices have in
common is that none of them can be answered without rigorous scientific
evaluation. It is possible, then, that a well thought-through approach to a
long-term research and evaluation program will emerge from current
managerial efforts, combined with political demands for accountability.
Ultimately, however, it may be naive to expect that scientific, political and
budget pressures will be enough in themselves to bring fractious parties
together into a serious monitoring and evaluation effort. Such an enterprise
will, if it does its job well, periodically threaten agency budgets, challenge
hoary scientific truths, and offend powerful political interests. At any given
time, its enemies are likely to far outnumber its friends. And if this is true,
then monitoring and evaluation will never happen without an extraordinary
effort of political will. Any program that purports to evaluate the
interactions between people and the Columbia River ecosystem, and report
them without fear or favor, will need stable and independent footing.

5. Federal Ecosystem Data and Expertise
In addition to policy support, federal agencies have developed extensive data
and expertise in ecosystem planning in the Basin and in other parts of the
country, which could help the Basin to develop a more coherent model of the
salmon ecosystem.
Common data. The last five years have seen unprecedented federal efforts to
define the meaning of ecosystem management in Northwest forests, and to
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systematize data and analysis of the Basin’s forest resources. The
Administration’s ecosystem plan for westside forests,550 and the reports of
the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project551 on eastside
forests are unique experiments, which attempt to bring science and policy
development together to address difficult and controversial natural resource
issues. There is obvious sense in seeking to join these efforts, which are
aimed primarily at terrestrial ecosystems, with the Basin’s salmon recovery
programs. The development of computerized geographical information
systems has made it possible to overlay information regarding various
resources to generate a more complete ecosystem picture.
The Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project demonstrated
one model of collaborative data development. Rather than inventing its own
data base for the Basin’s rivers, the Project borrowed the StreamNet data
base, which had an organizational structure for the Basin’s rivers borrowed
from EPA’s river-reach system and data on fish, wildlife and other values in
each stream reach. The Ecosystem Management Project improved on the
data base by adding much more extensive data on terrestrial resources and
gave back a more valuable data base than it had borrowed.
Efforts should also be made to build better water information into the data
base. Water gauge information compiled by the U. S. Geological Survey has
long been available. However, many of the region’s tributaries are ungauged,
and a number of water uses are unmetered, so that water availability on
these streams can only be estimated. State water-rights information has
been a missing ingredient. This gap may be remedied at least in part by a
National Marine Fisheries Service-Bureau of Reclamation project that is
gathering water-rights information for the Basin (see page 111).
The important point is that federal, state and tribal agencies could make it a
priority to link their data systems into a growing network of ecosystem
information. To do so, agencies should work toward consistency of data
standards and resource classification systems. At the national level, the
Department of Interior’s National Biological Survey is coordinating
information development by Interior agencies. However, this effort needs to

U. S. Department of Agriculture, et al., Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team,
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Findings (November 1996).
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be both broader and narrower. It needs to be broader because the
Department of the Interior is not the only department generating important
ecosystem information. For example, the National Marine Fisheries Service,
a Department of Commerce agency, is developing a new framework for
describing and identifying essential fish habitat under the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation Act.552 But the effort also should be narrower,
because different areas of the country may already have coordinated data
systems that offer a data template for issues in those parts of the country.
The model, again, is the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management
Project’s productive relationship with the StreamNet data base.
State agencies need to join more actively in this work. Constrained by
agency budgets and internal politics, they have too often been reluctantly
willing to collaborate in data development efforts. However, the states will
pay a price if they are passive participants. Rather than shaping these
efforts, the states will react. The more data and energy the states can bring
to the effort, the more their interests will be addressed.
Analytical tools. The computer models of the salmon life cycle that are now
in use play an important part in salmon recovery. They draw decision
makers’ attention to particular questions. Their quantitative output
influences decisions. The structure of these models is limited, however. The
current salmon models are primarily accounting models. They convert
assumptions about salmon mortality factors into equations, run imaginary
fish through these equations, and tell us how many salmon survive under
varying assumptions. None of these models attempts to look at ecological
functions, or connections between these functions. Existing models make no
assumptions, for example, about connections between the numbers of
juvenile salmon emerging in headwater areas and the carrying capacity of
the Columbia River estuary. Available data may not allow us to quantify
these relationships with much confidence. However, models are important
for their ability to clarify assumptions and point to key questions. An
analytical model focused on ecological relationships is therefore an important
piece of infrastructure. Until we have such models, the debate over
ecosystem recovery is likely to be less rigorous than it should be.
The nuts and bolts of developing such a model are beyond the scope of this
study, but the Basin has a skilled group of analysts who have developed the

Section 305(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 1801, et seq. See National Marine Fisheries
Service, “Framework for the Description, Identification, Conservation and Enhancement of
Essential Fish Habitat,” Jan. 2, 1997
(http://kingfish.ssp.nmfs.gov/rschreib/html/guidev5c.htm).
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current models. Return to the River provides an ecosystem concept in some
detail. It is hard to imagine that these elements can’t combine with federal
expertise developed in forest ecosystem planning and the System Operation
Review to provide a fuller conceptual picture of the Columbia River Basin
ecosystem.

6. Learning and Acting
Assuming we make strides in organizing ecosystem recovery efforts so that
we learn from them, what will we do with the knowledge? Adaptive
management asserts that we have to learn from recovery efforts so that we
can improve on them. But ecosystems are dynamic; they change in response
to human actions; they rebalance themselves to adjust to new conditions. If
we build a dam and create an new obstacle to the salmon migration, the
world doesn’t pause while we try to figure out how to restore fish passage
over the dam. Habitat above the dam does not empty out, it fills up with new
species. If we find that fish passage facilities won’t work, there is nothing
simple about responding to this knowledge. The dam is built. There is a
different web of life upstream. We can’t entirely undo what we have done.
The new world that evolved from our earlier actions puts new constraints on
our ability to adapt.
The dilemma resembles the dilemma of the Administration’s “no surprises”
policy under the Endangered Species Act. The Endangered Species Act
allows private parties to satisfy the Act’s requirements by developing
“habitat conservation plans” that secure nonfederal commitments to species
recovery. Once approved by the federal government, the habitat conservation
plan permits private parties to proceed with development as long as it is
consistent with the plan. But what happens when the habitat conservation
plan fails to protect the species? If new advances in ecosystem science show
that the assumptions of the habitat conservation plan are unfounded, does
the plan and its legal protection for development evaporate? Under the nosurprises policy, the Administration assured developers that if they
implement an approved conservation plan, they will not be required to
commit additional land or financial compensation beyond that required in the
original plan, except in extraordinary circumstances.553 The judgment is
delicate. If habitat conservation plans afford developers little security, why
should a developer make a sizable investment in developing one? The nosurprises policy can help species by encouraging habitat conservation
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, No Surprises:
Assuring Certainty for Private Landowners in Endangered Species Act Habitat Conservation
Planning (August 11, 1994).
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planning, but it also gambles on the validity of current expertise and
judgment. If the plan turns out to be wrong, the species will bear the
consequences.
Adaptive management faces a similar reality. We may learn as we go, but we
cannot act freely based on what we learn. Action, once taken, changes the
ecological and political landscape. After we have learned better, we cannot
go back to the old landscape because there is a new one in its place.
Knowledge may be a form of power, but it is power that can be dissipated by
the consequences of our actions.
Learning to monitor the response of ecological processes and learn from the
results is a task we are only beginning to think through. It is likely that so
far we have approached the task with the wrong tools and perspectives,
expecting something more or different than nature allows. If ecosystem
science is closer to economics than physics, ecosystem monitoring may have
more to learn from the Federal Reserve Board than from the laboratory. The
importance of finding a workable model for sensing our effects on
ecosystems, however, should not be treated as a sidebar in a more important
conversation. It may be the more important conversation.

B. Collaboration Among Fragmented Jurisdictions
With the current degree of fragmentation we see in water management, how
can we achieve the degree of coherence that an ecosystem approach to water
policy suggests? Jurisdiction over Columbia River Basin waters is fractured
between federal, state and private ownerships and jurisdictions in the United
States, and between United States and Canadian governments. Essentially,
the Endangered Species Act program has helped to pull federal programs and
agencies together in the river’s mainstem on this side of the border, and this
is no mean accomplishment. But it still leaves many unconnected pieces:

1. The Tributaries
Even with the persisting frictions in the mainstem, federal, state and private
interests are much better integrated in the mainstem than they are in the
tributaries. Western water rights, which have a firm grip on the tributaries,
are the last word in local control, the result of “a decentralized system of
government that encouraged the allocation of natural resources by users
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rather than by public officials.”554 For decades, state water agencies’ primary
task was to issue diversion permits, not to manage water as a public
resource. By 1898, claimants to the Boise River had asserted rights to
6,361,800 miners’ inches of water, although in the late summer the river had
only 35,000 miners’ inches.555 This laissez faire, decentralized pattern was
carried over into reclamation program in section 8 of the Reclamation Act.
The law of the Snake River (see pages 33-41), the most reclamation-intensive
watershed in the Basin, demonstrates just how deeply tributaries have been
woven into the pattern of local usage and custom.
While the law of the Northwest states and Bureau of Reclamation operations
have begun to evolve in new directions, the legacy of locally-driven water
policy and long-held “prior” claims is powerful. The legacy includes a set of
incentives, state and federal, to take water out of streams and put it on
fields.556 Irrigation water is free. Reclamation projects provide water at a
fraction of the cost of supply. “Irrigation assistance” is provided by
hydropower rate payers. Irrigation pumpers pay lower power rates. State
water law “use it or lose it” principles can discourage conservation. Some of
these factors are now moderated to a degree, but there are still many
incentives for water diversions.

a. Federal and State Presence in the Tributaries.—Federal and state water
agencies both have strengths and weaknesses on tributary watershed issues.
For the states’ part, many state water officials believe that they have a
pivotal role in resolving water disputes.557 In most of the Basin states’
constitutions, water is considered a public resource.558 The property interest
that underlies water rights is in significant part defined by state law. State
doctrines of beneficial use and waste define key parameters of water
rights.559 States control the machinery of water permitting, transfers,
instream flow protection and other matters.560 State legislatures control
purse strings. State courts play a vital role in the continuing evolution of
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water law.561 In these respects, the states are a logical focus for tributary
water issues.
At the same time, however, state assertions of authority in environmental
water rights issues have a mixed history.562 It is tempting for politicians and
water administrators to fall into postures in which federally-sponsored
environmental programs play the role of the outside threat to indigenous
(state) interests.563 Moreover, notwithstanding some progress in instream
flow legislation and programs, out-of-stream water uses have a firm
beachhead in the states. In Washington, the state supreme court has pulled
the carpet from under the state water agency’s ability to administer water
rights,564 its legislature has lifted the moratorium on Columbia River
diversions, and legislative reactions to the locally-initiated Methow Basin
proposals are reportedly chilly. In Idaho, the Swan Falls settlement on the
Snake River establishes minimum flows that are much lower than the river’s
current average flow, leaving plenty of water for new development.565 In the
early 1990s, two Oregon agencies filed applications to reserve more than 4.3
million acre-feet of water from many of the state’s river basins for future
economic development, primarily irrigation.566 The appetite for new water
development is still insistent, and the states’ water rights machinery is well
oiled.
But if the states are ill-equipped to take an ecologically-based approach to
water management, the federal water agencies are hardly better situated.
Congress long ago conceded most water-allocation authority to the states,
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which have in turn over-allocated many streams to private users.567
Tributary water use occurs in large part under a regime of private property
rights. Accordingly, tributary streams are often only marginally influenced
by state and federal water policy. However ambiguous these private property
interests may be, some property interest is there, and sorting it out involves
the most intricate kind of legal tangle.568 Nor are the equities in these
situations clear by any means. Just as ecosystem recovery represents
important values, there is, and ought to be, reluctance to alter water
allocation policies without regard to the consequences for rural
communities.569 Ideas of this kind fall into the category of “the War on the
West,” and the Columbia River Basin equivalent, “the Downstream
Threat.”570
All of the federal water and land programs that affect tributaries have
significant limitations. While the Bureau has been trying recently to shift to
effective and environmentally sensitive water management,571 its history is
in large part the history of western irrigation. The Bureau is a water
proprietor that often seeks to protect its water rights. Its statutory
obligations, once apparently clear, are no long so obvious in the endangered
species era. The Bureau finds itself challenged to undo the effects of prior
programs, and faces ambiguity in its authorities. As the Bureau cuts back on
unauthorized water uses, can it put the water back in streams? Can it
manage reclamation projects to help with fish and wildlife recovery
programs? Can it require water freed up by conservation projects to be
dedicated to instream uses?572 Without answers to these questions, can the
Bureau play much of a role in tributary water issues in which ecosystem
issues are central?
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is playing a growing federal role
in relicensing tributary hydropower projects. The Idaho Power Company’s
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Hells Canyon complex, the City of Tacoma’s Cowlitz River project, and
Portland General Electric’s Pelton-Round Butte project on Oregon’s
Deschutes River all raise significant instream flow and salmon recovery
issues. Many environmental interests see these projects as having supplied
“cheap” electric power only because they have not paid full freight for their
fish and wildlife impacts. Relicensing proceedings supply a forum to address
this issue, but FERC itself has a checkered history in environmental
protection.573
The federal land management agencies play key roles in tributary
watersheds. The U. S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management in
particular manage a large part of the Basin’s salmon habitat. Under
pressure from spotted owl controversies on the western side of the Cascades
and salmon listings on the eastern side, the two agencies have launched
ambitious ecosystem planning processes in an attempt to find new
foundations for land management.574 In watersheds like the Grande Ronde,
the land management agencies are important influences in tributary water
conditions, but have not to this point been effective facilitators of ecosystem
recovery.
The fact that all of these programs are federal can itself be a major
limitation. The extent to which federal agency decisions are influenced by
inside-the-beltway considerations will vary from one situation to another, but
the suspicion in local communities is that Washington, D.C. largely ignores
local values. True or not, this can mean that federal initiatives, especially
federal tributary water initiatives, generate their own political opposition.
If state and federal programs have limitations, coordination between the two
jurisdictions is often spotty. While federal and regional policy makers
consider major investments for ecosystem recovery in the river’s mainstem,
the state water-rights machinery may continue to approve water diversions
from salmon streams; and a Bureau of Reclamation program may spread
conserved water on unauthorized land. As the Bureau leases water in the
Snake Basin, and Bonneville finances the Skyline Farms water acquisition
on the Malheur River, the State of Oregon feels bound to consider Boeing
Farms’ application to divert water downstream. Notwithstanding significant
efforts to avoid these anomalies, many people believe they are inevitable and
See, e.g., F. Bodi, “FERC’s Mid-Columbia Proceeding: Ten Years and Still Counting,”
16 Env’t’l Law 555 (1986); M. Blumm, “Reexamining the Parity Promise: More Challenges
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unavoidable in a pluralistic government with weak central control over
water.
Notwithstanding these limitations, state and federal governments cannot
simply observe tributary water issues with indifference. The large federal
land holdings in the Basin, the interstate scale of the salmon issue, the
strategic connection between salmon and the federal power system, the
obligations of the Endangered Species Act, and the commitments of Indian
and international treaties hardly permit a passive federal presence.
Moreover, the problem is not just federal. Because the federal presence in
the West is so significant, the states are directly affected by any gridlock in
federal resource policy. Controversies like the water spreading conflicts in
the Umatilla can divide communities. State water administrators, legislators
and others cannot sit on the sidelines.
If government agencies find themselves in an awkward position, rural
communities are hardly more comfortable. For one thing, the political
dynamics of this problem are changing as a consequence of the Basin’s
urbanization,575 and rural communities know it:
The rural West feels itself betrayed by the cities with whom its fate has so
long been linked. More than a century of brushing off the last bust and
waiting for the next boom has left scars both upon the land and the people.
Some rural westerners console themselves that amidst the explosive growth
of the metropolitan areas, they alone are the last remnants of a real West, a
true West. But in a region whose people have always defined themselves,
for better or worse, in terms of the future rather than the past, such a
guarding of the flame has an aura of defeat. The small towns, the ranches,
the family farms have come to share with the Indian reservations and the
Hispanic villages that once seemed so separate and alien not only a
common place and a common history but a common anxiety over a future
which seems to belong to someone else. But even in the midst of what
increasingly seems common misfortune, the various peoples of the rural
West seek their own separate solutions.576
All of this boils down to a federal, state tribal and local dilemma. If state
agencies have largely given away their authority, if federal agencies are
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paralyzed by agency missions and considerations of federalism, and if water
users’ only strategy is to guard a “flickering flame,” they all leave themselves
open to the not-so-tender mercies of litigation and political debilitation. The
Pacific Rivers cases577 illustrate the effect the Endangered Species Act can
have on land management near salmon streams. Indian water claims in the
Snake River adjudication are large enough to take most of the water that is
now diverted from Idaho’s part of the river. The Clean Water Act provides
leverage over linked water quantity and quality problems.578 Because
hydropower is predominant in the Basin, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission relicensing proceedings are likely to provide fertile grounds for
contention. The rural timber communities still living through the northern
spotted owl controversies can attest that such issues do not just go away.
Absent meaningful recovery efforts, watersheds with important fish and
wildlife resources can expect to hit these kinds of land mines.
Given the lack of appealing options on all sides, there is obvious sense in
exploring new understandings on tributary water issues. Neither state nor
federal governments can leave local communities to “their own separate
solutions.”
b. Looking for Common Ground in Watersheds.—The prospect that there
may be common ground among federal, state, tribal and local interests is
what gives local watershed initiatives their appeal. The watershed efforts
surveyed in section V of this study are all premised on the idea that local
communities may be as interested in healthy ecosystems as anyone else, and
government may need to get out of the way and let watershed groups
innovate.
The gamble is that rural communities really are willing to make hard choices
in favor of ecosystem recovery. In some ways, the models for watershed
efforts are the Basin’s Indian communities. It is no coincidence that most of
the activity in tributary watersheds in the 1980s, before the Endangered
Species Act listings, was in the Umatilla, Yakima, Clearwater and Deschutes
basins, sites of Indian reservations. Like non-Indians, the tribes are
resource users, not museum conservators. Salmon are food and articles of
commerce, as well as religious objects to tribes. There is a fundamental
difference between Indian and non-Indians’ relationship to salmon, and it
translates into different values. The tribes built pressure for watershed
restoration in many ways: they resorted to the courts, they looked for
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alliances with local non-Indian communities, they established pipelines to
hydropower funding, and they secured legislation. The methods varied, but
the engine was the tribes’ determination to rebuild salmon. The watershed
initiatives that have emerged since the Endangered Species Act listings can
be seen as experiments to see if non-Indian communities have a similar
sense of determination.
It is certainly true that local watershed initiatives have put watershed
conservation on the agendas of non-Indian communities. The innovations
that have emerged from places like Wallowa County and the Methow Valley
could never have been imposed from above, and if they had been, they would
take a long time, if ever, to work. It is also true, however, that these are
tender, budding efforts whose long-term futures are unclear. For all of the
reasons that lead to the dilemmas outlined above, it is critically important
that watershed initiatives have the right kind of support from federal and
state water policy. But in deciding what that support should be, there are
important issues and caveats:
Degree of management. Return to the River encourages “restoration of
natural vegetation and ecological processes that create and maintain fish
habitat.”579 In an area like the Grande Ronde, this might mean reattaching
streams to their floodplains, allowing rivers to flood. These issues are
hardest where human development is most prevalent and human-salmon
competition is most intense, in low-gradient valleys and stream bottoms.
Riparian grazing and logging activities, most economically attractive where
they have the greatest effect on stream conditions, can be nearly as difficult.
Watershed efforts face a difficult task finding ways to avoid such polarizing
differences.580
Balance? A second, and closely related issue is how to reconcile strategies of
“balance” or “multiple use” with the biological requirements of species. A
Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River at 140. The Power Planning Council’s
fish and wildlife program provides: “The Council anticipates that there will be intervention;
otherwise, restoration actions such as removing man-made stream barriers and controlling
road erosion would be precluded. But the Council also cautions moderation in devising
intervention measures where complex and still poorly understood natural systems are at
work. . . . Habitat interventions should seek to restore and employ natural healing
mechanisms wherever possible . . . .” See Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program at
7-35.
580
Likewise, Return to the River recommends “that the region move from a strategy of ‘fixing’
ecosystem damage to one that places greater reliance on re-expression of the natural and
biological processes of the Columbia River. . . .” See Return to the River at xxiii. Huntington
demonstrates that “roadless catchments (in the Clearwater Basin, Idaho), even those that
had intensely burned earlier this century, provided higher quality habitat to more diverse
and abundant native fish populations than did nearby heavily ‘managed’ catchments.” See
Huntington, Eastside Ecosystem Management Project, quoted in Return to the River at 139.
579
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local commitment to find a balance between irrigation withdrawals from a
stream and leaving water for salmon has value, but only if it recognizes that
there can be no compromise with the threshold requirements of fish. Where
a biological threshold exists and is known, a compromise that falls short of
the threshold is a failure. Currently, much of the Grande Ronde Basin is
designated by the state as “water quality limited” for high temperatures and
other conditions, for example. Will the community be willing to establish a
balance that curtails irrigation withdrawals and protects streamside shade
from grazing to meet temperature thresholds?
Private and Public Lands. Land ownership in many watersheds is largely
public on the ridge tops and private in the stream bottoms which are critical
to spawning and rearing. How can a watershed recovery strategy enlist
these private landowners, respecting their histories while persuading them
to modify many of their traditional ideas about using and improving the land?
Equally, there must be coordinated restoration of a drainage from ridgetop to
ridgetop. Can the actions of government agencies, regulators and land
managers, be integrated into a single subbasin watershed strategy, so that
they reinforce and complement each other? Will this result in setting and
meeting standards consistent with basic biological requirements, or in leastcommon-denominator packages?
Us or Them? Is it possible to avoid the false choice between “local control”
and “outside regulation”? Many participants in watershed initiatives will
acknowledge there are legitimate national and state interests in the
watershed. They will comply with the law of the land even as they contest its
interpretation and application by agency officials. Often, “local control” is
code. It will sometimes mean unalloyed defense of the local status quo, but
often it expresses apprehension that people from outside, with little
knowledge and less respect for local values and livelihoods, will impose
drastic change; that the economic and social fabric of the community will be
transformed without its consent.
Leadership for watershed efforts is likely to vary from place to place. In the
Henry’s Fork, the Clark Fork and elsewhere, watershed initiatives are
primarily indigenous, not a creation of government. The co-founders of the
Henry’s Fork initiative emphasize that they organized out of frustration with
government resource agencies, not in response to government leadership.
One of the enduring lessons of the Grande Ronde watershed efforts is that
controversy over state versus local control costs time and good will. In many
cases, it may be important for government agencies to stay out of the way of
such initiatives, except to offer support where it can be given. In other
places, a stronger government role may be needed, and the logical lead is a
federal, state or tribal entity.
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Establishing Government Expectations. Another lesson from the Grande
Ronde is that collaboration depends not on a heavy regulatory hand or
government capitulation to local terms and conditions. It depends rather on
being clear about expectations, both of law and policy, based on standards
that can be defended in terms of good watershed science. Collaboration
involves mutual deference of locals, to federal and state policy on watershed
conservation; and of outside officials, to local knowledge, cultural values,
history, and livelihoods. Officials can establish firm expectations as to
results and timing. In fact, equivocation instead of forthright declaration
leads to local suspicions, fears of hidden agendas, and so on. Watershed
initiatives are likely to function best in response to clear signals.
Funding Projects or Process. Watershed recovery initiatives are always short
on patience. Fish stocks are close to disappearing, while the worst habitat
problems are easy to identify. The first fixes appear straightforward: remove
blockages, screen irrigation diversions, plant willows. The political
leadership demands visible, tangible projects, getting the money out onto the
ground. As opening strategies go, there are worse ones. Early-action
projects are likely to address real problems, although not often the most
critical ones. They will be consensus choices, not controversial ones.
Politically, they afford opportunities to build a collaborative process. Trying
to build landowner understanding of the science and making watershed
recovery part of community values may lead to more durable watershed
recovery than on-the-ground projects. Yet, at some point the choices become
hard. Without careful, scientifically grounded plans, early consensus may
run aground on more controversial issues.
Science and Ideology. If logging and grazing are to be reconciled with stream
health, the mediating agent will be watershed science that can transcend
history and ideology. Aside from its essential technical contribution, science
must also serve as a common currency to which all parties have equal access,
in which they have a shared confidence. A rancher who will resist on
principle ideological pressures, whether direct or disguised as agency
regulations, may find it easier to respond to evidence perceived to be
objective and unbiased.
The limitations of this device are obvious. Where the science is inconclusive,
or the observer more than ordinarily obtuse, good science will have less
impact than it should. Where the science arrives in the hands of one
interested party and is inaccessible to others, it may provoke conflict. If
science is to contribute to solutions, it must empower more broadly. A
priesthood of technical experts may be reluctant to share its knowledge, the
source of its authority. But only by sharing will it enlist the informed support
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of those being asked to embrace change that often seems at odds with self
interest.
Monitoring and evaluation can be orphaned in local efforts. The pressure to
do, not just to study, will always militate against baseline data gathering,
pre-project assessments and post-project evaluations. At some early point,
government agencies and watershed groups must choose a process driven by
technical criteria, stream reach conditions, and objective solutions, or one
that trades off technical merit for political acceptance. Funding sources need
to value the technical elements of watershed recovery, and to fund them
together as a multi-year commitment to selected stream reaches. Absent
such commitments, the biological end of watershed efforts may be
disappointing. This suggests the value of the approach Bonneville has taken
in the Grande Ronde, funding the development of analytical, monitoring and
evaluation tools that can be employed in local efforts. It also suggests the
need for government to act as a backstop for local watershed efforts, to
provide some assurance that on-the-ground efforts are meeting appropriate
standards.
Sustainability. Finally, there is a question about the sustainability of
watershed initiatives. In the Umatilla and Yakima basins, restoration
efforts are spearheaded by tribes, whose history and intentions are
inseparable from salmon. Will watershed efforts in other areas have similar
staying power? Will they ultimately need a permanent home in some level of
government?

c. Federal Support for Watershed Initiatives.—These observations raise a
number of issues for federal agencies. Federal agencies can provide valuable
help for watershed efforts, but they can also frustrate them, either through
indifference or mixed signals from multiple agencies. Gauging the type of
support that helps will require some practice. From a policy perspective,
however, four conclusions seem safe.
First, it is hazardous to generalize about watershed initiatives. They come in
different varieties and capabilities. The hopes for watershed efforts are
fairly clear, but their ability to deliver on these hopes is not. Given this, was
the Grande Ronde watershed initiative more hurt than helped by the high
level of funding and political attention the State of Oregon devoted to it?
Water policymakers need to consider the dangers of putting too heavy a
burden of expectation on watershed efforts. They should support watershed
efforts without expecting them to readily resolve dilemmas that have taken
many decades to create.
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Second, federal agencies should help meet the technical needs of watershed
initiatives. The water conservation pilot projects discussed in section IV
provide a model for the kind of experience. Such federal agencies as the
Natural Resources Conservation Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the
U.S. Geological Survey have shared valuable knowledge about waterconservation technology and water-management techniques. If monitoring
and evaluation are often orphaned in local efforts, one of the constructive
roles government can play is in filling this gap. The approach Bonneville has
taken in the Grande Ronde in development of analytical, monitoring and
evaluation tools for local efforts, is one such model.
Third, if collaboration in these efforts is a priority, it needs to be translated
into clear and consistent federal participation. There should be no illusion
that this will be easy. Even at the federal, inter-agency level, this poses a
formidable challenge, and the problem is not just federal. In the Grande
Ronde and elsewhere, it has been difficult to align state agencies in support
of watershed efforts. In part this has been due to the conflict many agencies
experience as they are asked to reconcile historic missions with new
watershed conservation goals. In part, it is due to the sheer number of
agencies involved. Oregon’s Strategic Watershed Management Group had
nine state agencies with decades of history moving them in nine separate
directions. But if state and federal agencies cannot make such transitions
and find common directions, they cannot possibly play a constructive role in
watershed initiatives. Federal water and land agencies need to work among
themselves and with local watershed groups to arrive at a clear set of mutual
expectations. At this point, it may not be possible to specify precisely how
this coordination should occur, much less to formulate a general policy
structuring it. However, if watershed initiatives are to be encouraged by
government, it is important not just to say so, but to make a policy
commitment to deliver consistent government support and clear expectations.
Fourth, over time, government needs to develop policy on funding for
watershed initiatives. In the short term, funding is likely simply to be
cobbled together opportunistically. Again, the water conservation
demonstration projects provide one model of how federal agencies can act as
brokers for multi-party ventures in which landowner, agency, hydropower
and other funding sources are combined. Bonneville has invested
strategically in the Grande Ronde to develop valuable technical evaluation
tools that help provide focus for watershed efforts. Over the long term,
however, federal and state agencies will need to work out more stable
arrangements. In doing so, it will be important to consider whether there are
sources other than federal appropriations and hydropower revenues with
which to finance recovery measures. One variation was explored in the
Deschutes Basin, which lies downstream from the Columbia River’s
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confluence with the Snake. In 1996, Congress passed legislation authorizing
creation of the Deschutes Basin Resource Conservancy, sponsored by
Senator Mark Hatfield. The Conservancy idea had been proposed by the
Warm Springs Indian Tribe and the Environmental Defense Fund, working
with a coalition of local interests and government agencies. The
Conservancy, with a governing board of public, private, and tribal
representatives, is authorized to develop plans for ecosystem recovery
projects, especially to put more water in the Deschutes River and its
tributaries to address water quality problems. To finance its projects, the
Conservancy is authorized to use $1 million in federal appropriations, which
federal agencies may match dollar-for-dollar. By ensuring agency and private
participation on its board, the Conservancy hopes to use this conservation
fund to leverage federal agency, state, and private funding for ecosystem
recovery projects.
However, it is also instructive to note funding sources that were not included
in the Deschutes Conservancy legislation. Earlier versions of the legislation
would have authorized the Conservancy and federal agencies to impose fees
for activities such as river rafting, hunting, fishing, grazing, irrigation,
logging and water pollution discharges.581 These fees would have put the
Conservancy’s ecological restoration fund on a more self-sustaining basis,
with less reliance on federal appropriations and agency budgets. The
Deschutes bill that ultimately emerged from Congress stopped well short of
this, and adopted a more traditional cost-sharing formula. Moving beyond
traditional financial arrangements is difficult. The reality is that in the
Deschutes, the Umatilla and elsewhere, funding for ecosystem recovery
projects is currently a patchwork that begins with government. The question
is whether it can expand outward.
With innovative state and watershed experiments, it is possible to imagine
leveraging these funds more widely, and government programs should
encourage such entrepreneurial efforts. For example, Washington’s Methow
Valley watershed plan proposes a comprehensive policy framework for
instream flow restoration: efficiency standards and improved monitoring to
discourage excessive water use, a water bank to administer saved water, and
a commitment to return 90 percent of saved water to streams. With the
policy context advocated in the Methow, Bureau of Reclamation technical
assistance, and seed money for water conservation projects could find a ready
home. The hydropower system, seeing an opportunity to leverage
hydropower funds, could see a natural place to make its investments in

The Deschutes River Basin Ecological and Economic Sustainability Act, section 4(h)
(October 19, 1995 draft).
581
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ecosystem recovery. Farmers, who would receive ten percent of saved water
and perhaps better crops from controlled water use, might chip in part of the
cost. The state could provide facilitation, legal protection, and a share of
funding. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to imagine local watershed councils
organizing improvement districts to share the cost of projects that enhance
the Valley’s natural amenities, as proposed in the initial Deschutes bill.
These may be the directions that watershed funding will take if ecosystem
recovery is to become part of the fabric of local communities and economies.

2. Linking Tributaries, Ecosystems, and Federal Mandates
To be meaningful, watershed efforts need some assurance of autonomy: that
they will not be treated as just another input in federal decision-making
processes. Finding real solutions in tributary watersheds is hard work. Who
will be willing to make the effort if they have little influence on federal
decisions?
On the other hand, watershed decisions cannot be made in isolation from
interactions with the larger ecosystem, or from law. If efforts in different
parts of the Basin are going to satisfy legal norms and add up to a healthy
ecosystem, they need to support rather than undermine each other. Thus, it
is not enough for tributary and mainstem actions to make sense in their own
frame of reference; they also need to be linked into a pattern that makes
sense in wider ecosystem and legal contexts.
One set of linkages needs to be made between tributary water issues and
mainstem water operations. Currently, the Columbia River Basin lacks a
complete strategy for the mainstem. Federal, regional and tribal plans
disagree on the need for flow augmentation and reservoir drawdowns,
although all three anticipate the need for significant changes in the dams. As
the discussion of “Interstate Water Issues” in section IV illustrates, a variety
of state water issues, including diversion moratoria, will be influenced by
mainstem choices. In particular, if federal run-of-the-river reservoirs are
operated at significantly lower levels, there may be less need for flow
augmentation from headwater storage projects. Indeed, it is commonly
assumed that drawing down the lower Snake reservoirs would largely moot
demands for additional water from the Snake River Basin for fish. This may
or may not turn out to be true, but the fact that this mainstem decision had
not been made was a primary barrier in the work of the Interstate Water
Committee in the early 1990s. Thus, the sooner decisions are made about
the role of flow augmentation versus reservoir drawdowns, the more
certainty there will be in tributary water policy.
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Pending these mainstem decisions, issues of interstate tributary
management still must be addressed. As the Bureau and others succeed in
acquiring water for flow augmentation in the Snake River Basin, there is a
growing need to avoid surprises stemming from lack of coordination between
state and federal processes. State and federal water agencies should
coordinate operations, air issues of common concern, and consider whether a
more formal set of interstate agreements is needed. They also need to work
closely with state water-rights holders, Indian tribes, and others on creative
solutions to ecosystem-recovery problems created by water diversions in the
tributaries. No single entity, federal or state, public or private, can do it
alone. The duties are mutual.
Allowing watersheds the autonomy they need without sacrificing broader
national mandates will require experimentation. The controversy over the
Prairie Creek irrigation ditch in the Wallowa watershed provides one model.
There, when a regional and federal water conservation proposals stirred up a
storm of local opposition, federal and regional agencies backed off, but only
on condition that the community come up with comparable water savings
that would pass scientific and technical review. Local interests had freedom
in deciding how federal and regional standards they would be met. When
this model works, there may be no inherent conflict between an active and
clearly-defined government presence and a successful watershed initiative.
These situations bear out the observation that an ambiguous governmental
position can itself frustrate local efforts, and that a clearer and more active
federal presence may be an ingredient of success.
The Prairie Creek model assumes that government agencies can establish
clear expectations for watershed efforts, and that local interests will not
bridle in reaction. There is little reason to think that either part of this
equation will come easily, however. Developing a common federal-state
position in areas where there may be unclear or inconsistent statutory
guidance is likely always to be difficult. Expecting local interests not to be
threatened by federal initiatives that are rife with value conflicts may be
naive.
No universal policy solution is in sight for these issues. To a degree, it is
inevitable that state and federal land and water agencies will find
themselves in the middle, with overlapping and sometimes conflicting
responsibilities, which may be a fair reflection of conflicting values in
watersheds. In the face of such conflicts, government agencies can raise the
issues for which government is responsible, and seek to focus government
and private energies on resolving them. After a few false starts, the Bureau
began to handle the Umatilla water spreading controversy by raising the
need to comply with the law, and by bringing parties to the table to explore
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solutions. Raising such issues may be an unenviable task, clouded by history
and ambiguity. It is, however, an important task of government, and it may
be an important way to create momentum for creative solutions in tributary
water conflicts.

3. Sharing the Ecosystem With Canada
Although only 15 percent of the Columbia River Basin’s land mass is in
Canada, Canadian snow pack accounts for about 30 percent of the river’s
total discharge. Excluding tributaries west of the Cascade Mountains in the
United States, Canada supplies about 44 percent of the river’s discharge.582
The Columbia River Treaty was in many ways a remarkable achievement,
but it was not designed to foster management of the river as part of an
ecosystem. The Treaty is a hydropower and flood control agreement, and this
is reflected in the composition of the two nations’ treaty implementing
agencies: British Columbia Hydro on the Canadian side and Bonneville and
the Army Corps of Engineers on the U.S. side.583 The treaty takes no account
of salmon or other environmental values in river management. To date,
when the treaty entities have adjusted hydropower and flood control
operations to account for salmon flow releases, the adjustments have
required economic compensation. Decisions become power versus non-power
trade-offs. Ecosystem operations can only be costs, never benefits. This may
not be the best way of handling decisions on the river in today’s world.
However, because the two countries have never explored other ways to
incorporate ecological considerations into river operations, it is not possible
to say whether other approaches would better serve the countries’ broader
interests.
Both countries see signs of strain in current approaches to river
management: not just the dilemmas posed by the salmon declines, but the
rights and concerns of Indian tribes and First Nations, the interest in more
participatory management processes that allow interested parties insight
into treaty decisions, and the growing pressures on the river from traditional
constituencies.584 Moreover, broader concerns on both sides of the border
motivate such initiatives as British Columbia’s proposed “Sustainability Act,”
K. Muckleston, “International Management of the Columbia,” in Conflicts Over the
Columbia River, at 72.
583
Columbia River System Operation Review, Final Environmental Impact Statement,
Appendix P, Canadian Entitlement Allocation Agreements, at 2-1 (November 1995).
584
See J. C. Day, K. Boudreau and N. Hackett, Binational Water Management in the
Columbia River Basin, prepared for the Commission on Environmental Cooperation
(Montreal, Quebec, January 15, 1997 draft).
582
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a provincial land-use strategy,585 the U.S. Forest Service’s ecosystem
management plans, and the regional and federal programs to restore salmon.
It is by no means clear at this point how the two nations’ concerns, interests
and initiatives may fit together in the Columbia River. However, there are
several mechanisms that might be used to explore these issues. The
Columbia River Treaty was based on the careful, long-term work of the
International Joint Commission and the Columbia River Engineering Board.
The Commission is still functioning. The North American Free Trade
Agreement, or NAFTA, created a Commission for Environmental
Cooperation to work toward cooperation on environmental issues. Its
council, which is composed of environmental representatives of the three
signatory nations, is authorized to make recommendations on cross-boundary
matters. A study conducted by J. C. Day and his colleagues for the
Commission on bi-national water management issues provides a foundation
for further inquiry.586 Recently, environmental groups on both sides of the
border filed a petition asking the Commission to examine the environmental
effects of Canadian hydroelectric projects.587 Ferment on both sides of the
border suggests an opportunity to look for common ground.
As these issues are addressed, moreover, the importance of the mainstem
decisions on the U. S. side of the border should not be overlooked. Just as it
is true that the mainstem flow augmentation/reservoir drawdown decisions
inform tributary water policy, so also will they affect trans-boundary water
management issues.

C. Federal Hydropower Financing and Ecosystem Recovery
1. Hydropower and Salmon
If the scientific and governmental premises for ecosystem management are in
flux, so is another premise for ecosystem recovery: that we have the financial

British Columbia Commission on Resources and Environment, “A Sustainability Act for
British Columbia,” volume 1 The Provincial Land Use Strategy p. 5 (November 1994).
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Day, Boudreau and Hackett, Binational Water Management in the Columbia River Basin.
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Submission Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation.
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wherewithal to make ecosystem recovery work. With the competitive
revolution in the energy industry, a new balance point between hydropower
economics and ecosystem programs is needed.
There are many issues surrounding the hydropower system’s role in salmon
recovery. Reservoir drawdowns, flow augmentation, Snake River water and
other issues remain very much alive. It is likely that big-ticket decisions will
be made over the next couple of years, and these will have an enormous
impact on water policy in the Basin. Regardless of which choice is made, it
will be necessary to address uncertainties in the financial balance of federal
hydropower, ecosystem recovery and other uses of the river.
Competition in the electric energy industry and the Endangered Species Act
listings largely broke the link between the energy system and fish and
wildlife costs that the Northwest Power Act had created. Under the Power
Act, fish and wildlife mitigation was a cost of producing power, but the
Council’s fish and wildlife program had to assure the region “an adequate,
efficient, economical and reliable power supply.”588 This balance between
fish, wildlife and power needs was a key point in the Northwest Power Act.
The balance was expressed in murky terms, but it gave the energy industry a
sense that fish and wildlife costs would be kept within limits.589
This bargain has been superseded twice over. First, the Endangered Species
Act listings meant that the dams simply could not be operated in a way that
jeopardized listed species. Cost can be an issue under the Endangered
Species Act only in limited circumstances.590 Second, if a competitive power
industry allows utilities to choose where to buy their power, fish and wildlife
measures at the Columbia River dams will burden only those consumers who
choose to be burdened, at least in theory. By definition, the marketplace will
ensure the region adequate and affordable power.
In place of the Northwest Power Act limitation on fish and wildlife costs is a
new, more circular one: fish and wildlife costs remain a cost of producing
power; but if fish and wildlife costs drive up the cost of federal hydropower,
power customers may turn to other energy supplies, hydropower revenues
will drop, and funding for fish and wildlife could be undermined. The

16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(5).
“The objective is to give flexibility to all concerned to devise effective and imaginative
measures that are also reasonable and will not result in unreasonable power shortages or
loss of power revenues. Some power losses, with resultant loss in revenues, may be
inevitable at times if these fish and wildlife objectives are to be achieved. Such losses,
however, should not be a burden on the consumers of the region.” 96th Cong., 2d Sess., H. R.
Rep. No. 96-976, part I, 57 (1980).
590
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
588
589
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circularity of this formula leaves power generators and fish and wildlife
interests with a large area of uncertainty. As the implications of competition
in the energy industry have become clearer, so has the need for more clarity
in the relationship between the industry and salmon.
In 1996, public and private energy officials considered challenges posed by
the transition to competition in a process called the “Comprehensive Review
of the Region’s Energy System.” After a year’s work, they largely came
together on a proposal that was aimed at protecting a cost-based energy
system for the region while responding to the new opportunities and
constraints posed by national energy competition.591 The Comprehensive
Review proposed that regional utilities and other customers should subscribe
to the hydropower system’s output, agreeing to new, long-term contracts for
the system’s power. Even though federal hydropower is more expensive than
other energy now available on the market, it is likely to be a bargain again
ten or fifteen years from now. By then, the system will have retired its
$600,000,000 per year nuclear debt, and gas prices may have risen. Those
who pay more for hydropower subscriptions now may pay less in the longer
term, and the benefits of the hydropower system would be kept in the region.
The proposal also called for a legislative separation between Bonneville’s
transmission and generation functions, to ensure against undue market
power in Bonneville’s hands.
But, as important as the Comprehensive Review proposal is, retired Senator
Mark Hatfield recently pointed out some limitations: “[T]he current debate
is being driven by money,” he said.
Now don’t get me wrong. I’m not saying there is anything inappropriate
about the current debate, and I strongly agree that a free market is the most
efficient way to allocate resources. I only want to make sure everyone is
clear about what’s driving the discussion. And to make sure that in our
hurry to reconfigure the financial pie, we not lose sight of two important
things: First, any changes to current national laws or regulations will
have to be balanced. In other words, changes to current laws and
regulations that will benefit primarily the monied interests will not be
made unless concessions are made to the so-called “public interests.” To
put it more bluntly, revisions that allow the industry to compete will not be
acceptable unless provisions are included that: protect our environment;
provide for recovery of salmon and other fish and wildlife; ensure that the
nation’s poor are not denied access to affordable electricity; prevent rural

Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System, Toward a Competitive Electric
Power Industry for the 21st Century, Final Report (December 12, 1996).
591
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communities from being gouged; promote conservation and renewable
resource; ensure that the security of the nation is not diminished; and
protect the interests of native Americans.592
In other words, the viability of the Northwest’s proposal for energy system
restructuring will hinge in part on how well it addresses equity and
environmental issues. And at this point, there is no regional consensus on
one of the most important of these issues: the balance between salmon
recovery, hydropower production, and other uses of the Columbia River.
Finding this balance is likely to be anything but straightforward.
Hydropower customers must see that they will share in the long-term
dividend, or they will have little incentive now to subscribe to the system.
They might just as well pay the market price. Salmon advocates have to see
that salmon will share in these long term benefits, or they have little to gain
from the subscription proposal. They might just as well oppose the proposal
and gamble that the Endangered Species Act or other strategies will more
effectively push ecosystem recovery.
Both sides run a risk. If the region comes to gridlock on this question,
national energy legislation may allocate the system in ways that benefit
neither the region’s energy interests nor fish and wildlife. As one of the
participants in the Comprehensive Review put it:
It appears certain that there will be national energy industry restructuring
legislation in the next Congress, perhaps in the next year. [We have] been
told by members of Congress and the Clinton Administration that the
region has a chance to write the Northwest chapter of that legislation, but
only if there is a clear consensus in the region. If there is not, we have been
warned that forces outside the region will have a field day. They will
figure out that there are billions of dollars of long-term benefits in the
Columbia River hydrosystem and they will take those benefits.593
Because of this threat, energy and fish and wildlife interests risk a lose-lose
proposition, the “field day” in which national energy entrepreneurs and
federal deficit cutters would revel, if the Northwest fails to unite. Regional
energy transactions and ecosystem recovery initiatives both need stable
footing that they are unlikely to get from national energy legislation.

Address by Mark O. Hatfield to the “Energy Restructuring in the Northwest” conference,
May 30, 1997.
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R. Applegate, “Much to Change, Much Remains the Same” an address to the Northwest
Water Law and Policy Project’s “Who Runs the River?” conference, November 15, 1996.
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2. Hydropower, Salmon and Other River Users
These issues have the potential to go well beyond the usual hydropowersalmon debate. Hydropower’s role as the primary financier of salmon
recovery tends to mask the contributions others make to the salmon declines.
The dams themselves serve purposes other than hydropower: flood control,
navigation, irrigation and recreation, for example. Moreover, the dams are
not the only source of salmon problems: habitat conditions, harvest and
hatchery operations also contribute.
Many of these activities have economic incentives, concessions and subsidies
of their own. Navigators on the river pay lockage fees at the federal dams,
but taxpayers finance the capital cost of the dams that is attributable to
navigation. Downstream cities pay nothing for federal flood control.
Irrigators divert free water from streams. When they receive reclamation
water, part of the cost is defrayed by hydropower revenues. Miners pay little
for minerals taken from public land. Timber harvesters benefit from road
subsidies; grazers from low-priced grazing allotments.594
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with these benefits. Foundations,
churches, homeowners and others have concessions too. These are either
subsidies, a word that is often considered pejorative, or sensible and fair
arrangements, depending on one’s perspective. The beneficiaries guard these
arrangements jealously. However, when the beneficiaries contribute to an
ecosystem problem, it is fair to ask whether they should make some
contribution to ecosystem recovery.
The reallocation of benefits and subsidies is not a new issue. The landscape
is littered with the wreckage of past battles over mineral royalties, grazing
fees, and the like. However, there are reasons why these issues should not
be completely closed. One is a central theme in this study: financing a
scientifically credible ecosystem recovery program may be a precondition to
the new agreements on the river. If the cost of an ecosystem program goes
beyond the financial limits of hydropower, it would be particularly logical to
spread the responsibility to others who contribute to the problem.
A second reason has so far attracted little attention. Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada and the United States
committed to cooperate in the conservation, protection and enhancement of

See Majority Staff Report, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House
Committee on Natural Resources, Taking from the Taxpayer: Public Subsidies for Natural
Resource Development (August 1994).
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transboundary resources.595 The Commission on Environmental
Cooperation, which the two nations organized to carry out this commitment,
has already begun to survey the prospects for bi-national water management
of the Columbia. That survey is likely to provoke debate regarding resourcesubsidy issues, of the kind currently brewing in Canada over whether the
Columbia River Treaty favored American agriculture at the expense of
Canadian agriculture.596 It is hard to imagine that this and other subsidy
issues will not emerge in negotiations between the two countries. United
States interests might be in a stronger negotiating position if they have
analyzed such questions domestically. Their position might be stronger yet if
they had adjusted benefits in favor of a recovery program for a
transboundary species covered by another treaty between the two nations,
the Pacific Salmon Treaty.

3. Establishing a New Economic Formula
The politics of reestablishing an entente between hydropower and salmon
recovery, much less those of reexamining a fuller range of the river’s benefits,
are daunting. But the degree of uncertainty in current financial
relationships is a problem that will be solved either in the region or by
default. A new regional balance will likely have to address at least three
considerations: Clearly, hydropower’s financial contribution to ecosystem
recovery needs to be put on more stable footing. It is equally clear that
improved accountability in ecosystem recovery programs is needed. In view
of the broad areas of uncertainty in ecosystem science, establishing systems
of accountability is likely to be slow and frustrating, but the mounting
investment in salmon recovery is already requiring it. Finally, it is likely that
some broadening in the financial basis for ecosystem recovery will be needed.
If the limits of this last point are primarily political, they are no less real. It
is possible that squeezing a contribution out of navigation, irrigation and
other water users will prove too politically unappealing. But if so, federal
budget deficits mean that the financial responsibility for ecosystem recovery
is likely to remain squarely on the shoulders of the hydropower industry in
the Columbia Basin.

Canada, Mexico and the United States of America, North American Free Trade Agreement:
Draft Side Accord on Environment (http://iisdl.ca/trade/cec.htm, September 1993).
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Agricultural Land Commission, dated January 16, 1995.
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D. Ecosystem Recovery, Water Policy and Governance 597
1. The Uneasy Transition
All of these themes raise issues of governance. Adaptive management
requires an extraordinary degree of collaboration among diverse interests,
and has been slowed by the absence of any single entity with power to
implement systematic research, monitoring and evaluation programs.
Tributary water issues and watershed initiatives are difficult to negotiate
absent a level of inter-governmental and public-private coordination that
verges on the super-human. The management of the federal hydropower
system is inextricably linked to decisions made in salmon recovery, and vice
versa, and yet energy policy is increasingly drive by market forces and
decreasingly by environmental considerations (See Attachment A for a
snapshot of current arrangements for managing key parts of the salmon
ecosystem.) All of these points underscore the need for better-integrated
government institutions that can mandate collaboration, establish consistent
government policy, and manage dams and recovery efforts in ways that
complement each other.
The Columbia has joined this debate more than once. Up to this time, the
course of the river governance debate has gone through three phases.
Early proposals for comprehensive authority, and the reality of ad hoc
management. The early debates over river governance, the Columbia Valley
Authority debate and the Columbia River Compact negotiations, were
focused on controlling river development, and both ended in stalemate. In
place of integrated river government, the river was simply developed.
Management was shaped by the nature of this development and the ad hoc
agreements that attended it.
Remedial legislation and ad hoc management in fishery policy. After the late
1970s, salmon and their advocates played a growing role in the river’s
development and management: the Columbia River Indian tribes became
For further reading on institutional issues surrounding the Columbia river and salmon,
see Naiman, Magnuson, McKnight and Stanford, eds., The Freshwater Imperative: A Research
Agenda at chapter 5 (Island Press 1995); National Research Council, Upstream; Nez Perce
Tribe, et al., Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi-Wa-Kish-Wit, vol. I, sections 4 and 5; National Marine Fisheries
Service, Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon, chapter III; Illahee, vol. 10 (Winter,
1994, discussing proposals for governance of the Columbia River and its watersheds);
Bonneville Power Administration, et al., Columbia River System Operation Review, Appendix
Q, Columbia River Forum (July 1994). One of the most thoughtful discussions of river basin
governance issues generally is G. Weatherford, From Basin to “Hydrocommons”: Integrated
Water Management Without Regional Governance (University of Colorado Natural Resource
Law Center Occasional Paper No. 5, January, 1990).
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significant influences in salmon management and river operations. Federal
and state salmon recovery efforts, managed largely by fish and wildlife
agencies, burgeoned. The states acting together became an important force
in energy and fish and wildlife policy for the hydropower system, acting
through the Northwest Power Planning Council. No formal or explicit
mechanism was provided for integrating ecosystem-wide activities under one
roof. Rather, parties with interests in particular issues coalesced to work out
coordinating mechanisms.
Endangered Species Act listings and energy competition. In the 1990s, the
Endangered Species Act listings and competition in the hydropower industry
eclipsed or called into question important parts of the region’s role in
managing the river. The Endangered Species Act listings integrated federal
activities to a degree, but it is at best an open question whether the ESA
process can integrate state and tribal salmon management jurisdictions, or
pull other constituencies into a broad salmon recovery effort.
If restoring ecological functions is the point of departure for the next phase in
the river management debate, then the question is: how can human
activities (including government) be organized to allow the rivers and their
watersheds to reestablish important ecological functions? This question has
direct implications for mainstem river operations, tributary water usage, land
use, and fish and wildlife management. It raises a legion of issues bristling
with controversy, and all of it goes by the name “river governance.” It is
worth surveying the current debate not because the Basin has arrived at any
answers, but because the questions recur in water policy.

2. Proposals for Institutional Reform
The debate over river governance, dormant in the 1980s, was renewed in
1994 by former Senator Mark Hatfield in an article commenting on the
“Long’s Peak” national water-policy proposals.598 Senator Hatfield urged that
river basin management should encompass “all natural resources, air, fish
and wildlife, land and, most important of all, water.”599 However, the federal
government’s deficit problem means the river basin initiatives will have to
rely more on non-federal funding. Accordingly, the Senator proposed a series
of trusts organized by river basin boundaries. Government funds would be
used to leverage corporate and private financial contributions; the trusts
would be governed by “community- and regionally-based citizen/government
M. Hatfield, “The Long’s Peak Working Group and River Basin Trusts,” 24 Env’t’l L.145
(1994).
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groups” and guided by “general river basin management and conservation
goals” established by the federal government, with water and resource
conservation as the central investment theme.600 He used the Northwest
Power Planning Council as a model, and urged that further pilot projects be
launched at the watershed level. The Deschutes Conservancy discussed
earlier in this paper was successfully sponsored by Senator Hatfield in 1996,
with many elements of his 1994 proposal.
These ideas were taken up by Angus Duncan, then a member of the
Northwest Power Planning Council, in another 1994 journal article. Mr.
Duncan reiterated Senator Hatfield’s ideas and added to them. He proposed
that the Northwest Power Planning Council (possibly expanded with tribal
representation) be charged with “setting forth a general plan for the
conservation and efficient use of the waters, and lands affecting those
waters, of the Columbia-Snake River Basin.” The plan would include
regional standards that “describe the threshold ecosystem needs of species
for survival as healthy populations and for conservation of the species’ gene
pools.” The plan would incorporate individual subbasins plans, filtered
through regional standards. In developing the plan, the Council would
analyze costs, economic consequences, the cost-effectiveness of investments
given “the complexity of biological systems,” and propose an allocation of
costs among communities and industries.601 The plan would be implemented
with hydropower revenues and financial contributions from state and federal
agencies.
The differences between the Hatfield and Duncan proposals are worth
noting. Senator Hatfield’s proposal made no presuppositions about ecological
constraints in river basin management. His proposal was concerned with the
appropriate geographic scope of management (river basin), range of resources
(water, land, air, fish and wildlife), level of government (regional, not
federal), and management tools (money and water conservation). These
features would serve regardless of the mix of conservation and development
objectives. The absence of any reference to ecological limitations reflects a
common assumption about the shifting nature of water management policy:
Today’s prevailing water-related values, however impressive and
apparently well-grounded, will survive only through processes of
adaptation that will leave them changed in relevance and, to some extent,
form. Basin-oriented management schemes that do not anticipate and

Hatfield, “The Long’s Peak Working Group,” 24 Env’t’l L. at 153, quoting from the Long’s
Peak Report, 24 Env’t’l L. at 128.
601
A. Duncan, “Proposal for a Columbia Basin Watershed Planning Council,” 10 Illahee 287,
299 (Winter, 1994).
600

192

New Footings for Water Policy on the Columbia River

accommodate change are doomed to short or ineffective institutional
lives.602
Senator Hatfield assumed that multiple use is the enduring reality of the
Basin’s water use and that interest in ecological thresholds is likely to wax
and wane with changing values. The Duncan proposal included many of the
same considerations, but added “ecosystem health” and the “threshold
ecosystem needs of species” as foundational elements. Duncan argued that a
basin that fails to meet threshold biological needs for its species is not a
viable basin, and not the basin Northwesterners want. Diverse species are
baseline resources that will sustain us over time, goes the argument; we
should make a value judgment that government should be organized to
protect these resources.
The Hatfield and Duncan proposals both reflected ambivalence about
allocating government authority in these matters. There is a pervasive sense
that too many entities have authority in salmon policy. Because salmon and
other resources are managed separately, power is dispersed and no one can
truly be “in charge” of salmon recovery. However, few people want anyone
else to have full authority over all of the natural resource decisions that
affect salmon. Reflecting this ambivalence, neither Hatfield nor Duncan
proposed a super-agency. Both proposed hybrid organizations with broad
scope but ambiguous power.
The depth of this ambiguity came out in the reception that met a series of
other institutional proposals in 1995. First, the National Marine Fisheries
Service proposed a recovery plan that would centralize management of
salmon recovery in the Fisheries Service itself.603 In part, the proposal
responded to the strong opinion of the Snake River Recovery Team (on whose
recommendations the proposed recovery plan was partly based), that a single
entity needed to be “in charge” of salmon recovery. Next, the lower Columbia
River treaty tribes’ offered a set of institutional proposals. Their proposals
were less concerned with centralizing power in a single place. Instead, they
called for increasing emphasis on watershed efforts, more management
control to tribes, transferring Bonneville’s fish and wildlife fund to a fish and
wildlife entity, and establishing a dispute resolution process for salmon
management issues.604 Finally, in 1995 Congress directed the Power
Planning to report within 180 days “regarding the most appropriate
governance structure to allow more effective regional control over efforts to

Weatherford, From Basin to “Hydrocommons at 4.
National Marine Fisheries Service, Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon,
chapter III.
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conserve and enhance anadromous and resident fish and wildlife within the
Federal Columbia River Power System.”605 In response, the Council initiated
a compressed public process to consider alternatives. The Council explicitly
set out a range of alternative governance structures, starting with a model of
the status quo, progressing through several intermediate options, and ending
with one that took in virtually the full geographic range of salmon, with
sweeping powers. The Council’s 1996 report, however, recorded resounding
ambivalence in the region: everyone agreed that someone needs to be in
charge, and no one wants it to be anyone other than themselves. Ultimately,
the Council urged a limited shift: an executive order committing federal
agencies to implement the Council’s program if permitted by statute, and
enactment of legislation if the executive order were ineffective.606
In 1996, the Comprehensive Review of the Energy System (discussed above)
served as a barometer of the persuasiveness of these proposals. Parties
involved in the Review concluded that the governance issues had not been
convincingly addressed, and then, following a grand tradition, left the issue to
the Northwest states’ governors.607

3. The Continuing Debate
It is probably true that a more integrated approach to salmon recovery would
solve some of the problems that plague us. There are too many plans and too
many chefs in the kitchen. It is hard to implement a coherent, scientificallybased strategy; individual parties can stop the action too easily. Local
communities are forced to sort through a bewildering array of messages from
government agencies. Mounting a long-term, well-focused monitoring and
evaluation program sometimes seems virtually impossible. The question,
however, is whether a new institution could solve these problems.
The National Research Council put these ideas in broader context in its
report, Upstream. Upstream suggested that government for ecosystem
problems focuses on three ideas: bioregionalism (government should follow
natural rather than political boundaries, taking in the mainstem, tributaries
and the ocean), cooperative management (a broad range of interests at basinwide and watershed-specific levels must be engaged in debate and
implementation), and adaptive management (systematic learning). However,

Fiscal Year 1996 Energy and Water Appropriations bill.
Northwest Power Planning Council, Report to Congress: Fish and Wildlife Governance and
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607
Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System, Final Report: Toward a
Competitive Electric Power Industry for the 21st Century at 5-6 (December 12, 1996).
605
606

194

New Footings for Water Policy on the Columbia River

in exploring these ideas for the Columbia, the Research Council saw real
tensions between different uses and areas of the ecosystem, and concluded
that these were tensions that could only be worked out politically, not
academically. Resolving them would take a political consensus that the
Research Council did not see.608
The Research Council’s three-part formula is plainly right. Ecosystems have
natural boundaries, and governance systems that encompass them are likely
to be more effective than those that don’t. Because these boundaries take in
so many different jurisdictions and interests, government cannot dictate, but
must be geared to maximize cooperation. Because we are relatively
unfamiliar with ecosystem processes and even less familiar with the idea of
managing for them, governance systems that can learn and adapt will be
better than those that can’t.
However, while integrating governance along these lines might help with
ecosystem problems, there would be a price. We might find that emerging
problems have different ecosystem boundaries than we had assumed.
Perhaps we think of the problem as a river-related salmon problem now, but
later we find it has more to do with ocean conditions. Our institutional
design, in other words, is likely to be hampered by our ignorance of
ecosystems. Another part of the price would be in concentrating government
authority. Integrating resource agencies in support of ecosystem protection
would create a degree of government authority that we may or may not be
willing to accept. In fact, in the American tradition of government, it is not
clear that fragmentation in salmon recovery is something we should dislike.
If history is a guide, fragmentation in government will continue, and river
basin governance will take shape piecemeal as it has in the past. Policy will
emerge in many decisions involving salmon, hydropower, irrigation, and
navigation, influenced by economics, the Endangered Species Act, Indian
treaties, water rights, international relations, and organizational and
political maneuvering. As we make these decisions, we will know more about
whether we should collapse boxes together on organization charts or rewrite
laws to establish an ecosystem algorithm for existing jurisdictions.
If we are concerned with ecosystem integrity, perhaps we should be less
concerned with fragmentation per se than with whether our institutions help
us adapt to the changing ecosystems that are, ultimately, our support. If
government institutions do not help us sense important ecological changes
and respond to them, they fail us in important ways. The difficulty that
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current institutions are experiencing making adaptive management work
suggests that change is needed. The precise nature of the change is,
however, not yet apparent.
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VIII. Conclusion
It is fair to ask if the Columbia Basin offers models that could be of use to
other western river basins as they take on conflicts between traditional
water uses and environmental needs, and it is just as fair to answer this
question yes, no and maybe.
The answer is yes in several respects. The Basin offers many innovations
that merit attention in other parts of the west:
Tribal involvement. Indian tribes, backed up by federal treaties and more
than twenty-five years of litigation, are playing an active role in developing
policy for the river. In this sense, decision making in the Columbia Basin has
been opened to a broader set of interests and values than in some other
basins. While the genesis of the Columbia Basin tribes’ involvement in the
river is not something other states should consider duplicating, the
outcome—a broader set of values within which to evaluate tradeoffs—is
important for other basins to consider.
Power Act model. The Basin states exercise substantial influence over the
hydropower system and in the use of hydropower revenues to mitigate the
system’s fish and wildlife impacts under the Northwest Power Act. The
infusion of hydropower funds alone makes the Northwest Power Act model
one that has to be considered in other western basins, particularly as the
federal belt is cinched tighter.609 But in addition, the Northwest Power Act
provides a way for a collection of states to begin to transcend jurisdictional
boundaries, and to bring government more in line with natural ridgetops.
Adaptive management. The adaptive management model, while not yet fully
functioning in the Columbia, is a model that must be made to work if we are
to achieve clarity about the ecological implications of the choices that face us.
Management of investments. The innovative systems that have been created
to manage the Bonneville Power Administration’s fish and wildlife budget,
the independent scientific review, and the budget memorandum of
agreement, provide important foundations for managing ecosystem recovery
investments (see Attachment A for detail).
Local initiatives. Finally, a large number of site-specific initiatives deserve
attention: watershed initiatives in the Deschutes, the Clark Fork, the
Wallowa and Methow valleys, and elsewhere; the Bureau of Reclamation’s
water conservation pilot projects; the federal/tribal/WaterWatch work on
water spreading in the Umatilla Basin; and many others.
1609
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If the test of a model is an enterprise that holds promise for addressing water
conflicts, each of these efforts offers lessons for emerging water policy.
On the other hand, if the test is whether these initiatives have solved the
broader problem, the salmon declines and the ecological problems that
surround them, the answer is no. Neither the treaty fishing litigation, nor
the states’ involvement through the Northwest Power Act, nor the infusion of
a sizeable stream of hydropower funds, nor the Endangered Species Act
listings has solved this problem. Nor, frankly, have many of the individual
water initiatives described in the study put a great deal of water back in
dried-up salmon tributaries. In this sense, the Basin offers limited victories,
two steps forward and one step back (and sometimes vice versa), and no
models of ultimate success.
In other respects, the answer is maybe. The overlapping Northwest Power
Act and Endangered Species Act programs may prove to be a model if they
can succeed in establishing a scientifically credible working collaboration
that gains significant popular and political support. The collaboration has
been touchy, and it is by no means clear that the two programs will learn to
complement each other, that either will be able to establish a meaningful
ecological framework for itself, or, if they do, that they will be implemented.
But they represent a level of legal and financial muscle for environmental
recovery that is rare in natural resource policy.
In truth, there is no simple formula for judging success in ecologically-based
resource management. To a certain extent, natural resource management
has always involved managing dilemmas: the Basin’s residents want salmon,
but they also want inexpensive electric power, flood control protection, timber
harvest, grazing, and a clear navigation channel to Lewiston, Idaho. While
resource management requires choices, either/or choices is not something at
which American government excels. Even when policy favors species
protection to the degree the Endangered Species Act does, the results are
likely to be ambiguous.
There is no question that there is room for improvement in all the Columbia
Basin’s mechanisms of government. Yet, even if we had a free hand to
redesign them, our innovations would still reflect the limits of human
perception of ecosystems and of the role of government in American culture.
We would still face problems for which we would find no good answers in
existing science. And if we found scientific answers, we would still face the
values and constituencies that underlie government. Notwithstanding the
Basin’s deeply-felt alarm over the salmon declines, for a long time people
have been choosing dams, timber harvest, ranching, irrigated agriculture and
other features of modern life that undermine salmon ecosystems. However
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much we may think that new statutes, court rulings, or evolutions in policy
can reverse these choices, these are not things that can be reversed with the
stroke of a pen. The choices we have made have altered ecosystems and
cultures. And these are the cultures to which government ultimately must
look for consent.
From this perspective, the task that faces an ecologically-based water policy
is a humbling one. We cannot expect sweeping power or ultimate answers,
and we should probably stop evaluating resource programs in such grandiose
terms. Rather, we should look for policy and institutions that help us retain
a sense of our connectedness to nature even as we are tossed around by
larger forces. And so, when we re-think water policy, we should look for
those devices and tools of governance that clarify ecological linkages and
consequences, and reward human instincts that contribute to the long-term
viability of natural systems.
Even at their most coherent, law and policy alone cannot succeed in anything
as broad as shifting an ecological template. Success in such an enterprise
may have as much to do with cultural evolution as law, and here is a
possibility. One of the romances of the American west is the image of the
drifter. We see it in the boom-and-bust pattern of western economies, and
the idea that we can mine each resource until it plays out and then move on:
Cattle ranchers, conducting their business on the hoof, on 1,300-mile
drives from Texas to Montana and the Dakotas, set the tone for the loggers,
miners and railroad construction gangs who followed them. People got
what they needed from the land, and moved on, like grazing cows. . . .
[W]hen the forest is logged or the seam mined to the point of diminishing
returns, you move on to a new job. When, eventually, you reach the coast,
you go trawling for salmon in Alaska.610
There is a variation of this romance in a sense of technological optimism,
endlessly ingenious and boundlessly promising, which will allow us to
engineer our way through the landscape and reach new frontiers. This
romance has played a central role in the Columbia River Basin and the
decline of salmon. Increasingly, however, it is tinged with the sense that at
the end of the day, the ingenious drifter may settle down in a diminished
world.
Perhaps we are moving to another idea of settlement that is less romance,
more difficult, and more consistent with the way some westerners like to
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think of themselves. It is represented by the people who didn’t move on, who
put down roots and made a life with the land they found. It is a peculiar
irony of modern life that this idea of settlement, if it is the one we are
choosing, may now repudiate some of the solutions of the recent past in an
attempt to save an older resource. And the further irony is that these new
choices can only be made in common, in an urban region whose rivers are
shared with rural communities.
The closing of Columbia Basin rivers to new diversions may or may not be a
sign that the drifter image of the frontier is behind us. Western communities
have often been more divided by water than united by it, and we may not be
headed for a future that includes a healthy salmon river. But one way or
another, one of the important tasks of water policy in the coming decades will
be to help communities make these choices, and look for new ways to make
rivers work.
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A Snapshot of Current Salmon, River,
and Watershed Management
The plethora of salmon recovery initiatives required new management and
coordination systems. They have emerged over the last seventeen years in
pieces, and they are still emerging. The following is a 1997 snapshot:

1. Hydropower Operations and Dams
After the Northwest Power Act, the pre-1980 arrangements for industrial
river operations were still in force. The Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation
and Bonneville still managed the system consistent with project authorizing
statutes and the Columbia River Treaty, for flood control, power production
and navigation. Reclamation facilities were still managed for reclamation
and, with the exception of Grand Coulee, were factored out of hydropower
operations. The three federal agencies coordinated their management with
non-federal project operators through interagency memoranda of
understanding, and coordinated system operations for power through the
Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement.
The Northwest Power Act established new obligations with respect to fish
and wildlife. Under the Council's fish and wildlife program, the primary
river-related measures in the Council program were the water budget (flow
augmentation water that still could pass through turbines and generate
power), spill operations (water that spilled over the dams, bypassing
turbines) and dam modifications (bypass screens) to improve passage
survival. The Council created a Fish Passage Center to give fish and wildlife
agencies and tribes the capacity to make recommendations for managing the
water budget, but ultimate management decisions were made by the Corps of
Engineers in consultation with Bonneville and others. Later, the Council
created the Fish Operations Executive Committee to plan for the water
budget, spill, and transportation; to broaden input into river operations; and
to resolve disputes among the federal agencies, fish managers and others.
With the Endangered Species Act listings in the early 1990s, the Council
continued to include hydropower system operations and dam modifications in
its program, but the Corps, the Bureau and Bonneville determined to operate
the federal projects consistent with the National Marine Fisheries Service's
biological opinion and a Kootenai sturgeon biological opinion produced by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Accordingly, the biological opinions are now
regarded as setting the basic rules for system operations for salmon. The
current biological opinion calls for water from federal headwater storage
projects on the Columbia, with limited contributions from major tributaries
such as the Snake. Non-federal project operators, such as the operators of
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the Mid-Columbia dams and the Hells Canyon Complex on the Snake, are
called upon or forced by circumstance to accommodate these operations. The
federal system operators have also agreed to implement a few operations for
fish and wildlife which not specified in the biological opinions but are in the
Council's program, such as a winter operation to raise the level of Lake Pend
Oreille to protect resident fish. In a 1996 budget agreement, Bonneville has
consented to absorb the financial consequences of implementing the
biological opinions and these other operations.
Within these rules, operating decisions must be made during the year
depending on the size and shape of the run-off, amounts of water still in
storage, and the size and timing of the fish migration. To make these
decisions, the Fisheries Service, the Corps, Bonneville and the Bureau
created a Technical Management Team, overseen by an Implementation
Team and an Executive Committee. The state and tribal fish agencies and
Council staff participate in these groups, although the federal agencies,
especially the Fisheries Service, make the final decisions. The Council
agreed to merge its Fish Operations Executive Committee into these
processes. Currently, the Fisheries Service and others are working on rules
and procedures for dispute resolution. In addition, various parties are
seeking to establish a court-supervised process for disputes involved in
implementing the biological opinion.
The Fisheries Service’s biological opinion not only sets the basic rules for
system operations, it also specifies dam modifications to improve fish
survival: screens and bypass systems; gas abatement measures to
ameliorate spill impacts; and barge transportation improvements. To help
make these decisions, the federal agencies created a System Configuration
Team, which is also overseen by the Implementation Team and Executive
Committee mentioned above. Although the dam modifications are mostly
paid for out of Congressional appropriations in the first instance, Bonneville
reimburses the Treasury for a major part of the cost. The Bonneville fish and
wildlife budget agreement also specifies how the federal agencies will share
budget information with the Council, the tribes and others to help make
regional decisions.

2. Tributary Water Management
The Columbia's major tributaries are mostly outside the federal hydropower
system. For each, there is a separate set of rules or arrangements, described
in sections 3 and 4, above; these include rules and institutions for water use,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licenses and settlement agreements,
and a body of state water law governing individual water rights, instream
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flows and other matters. Idaho, Oregon, and Washington have limitations on
new diversions to protect salmon in some streams. With limited exceptions,
existing water rights are not regulated for fish and wildlife purposes.

3. Expenditures for Other Fish and Wildlife Activities
Hydropower system operations and modifications are one aspect of the fish
and wildlife activities in the basin; expenditures for production, habitat,
research and tributary passage and water projects are another. Most of
these expenditures are guided by the Council's fish and wildlife program.
Council program/BPA funding. When the Council's fish and wildlife program
was first adopted, there was no particular system for overseeing program
implementation, so the Council first adopted an "action plan" into the
program—a collection of measures to be implemented over the coming fiveyear period. When additional policy management proved to be needed,
Bonneville and the fish and wildlife managers developed a process called the
"implementation planning process" to guide implementation. However, that
process proved cumbersome and it was later abandoned. Bonneville, the
Council, and the fish and wildlife managers then developed a “prioritization
process,” which is currently used to allocate Bonneville fish and wildlife
funds. In this process, the Council reviews criteria with which to set
priorities, the fish and wildlife managers review current and proposed
projects, rank them according to the criteria, and make recommendations to
the Council and Bonneville on funding allocations. After public review and
comment, the Council makes recommendations to Bonneville based on the
projects' consistency with the Council program, which the fish and wildlife
managers respond to when they submit their final recommendations to
Bonneville. Bonneville then makes funding decisions consistent with the
program, tending to defer to the Council's recommendations.
In 1996, concerned that the fish and wildlife managers’ recommendations
were too influential in the funding process, Congress called for a scientific
review group to advise the Council in reviewing the managers’
recommendations and providing guidance for Bonneville’s funding decisions.
With this new system, independent scientists review projects proposed for
Bonneville funding, evaluate them for their consistency with the Council
program and for scientific merit, and make recommendations to the Council.
If the Council departs from the scientists' recommendations, it must explain
why in writing.
Other expenditures and implementation. The Fisheries Service’s biological
opinion on hydropower system operations calls for certain Bonneville direct
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fund expenditures, especially for research. These expenditures are
scrutinized during the prioritization process described above, but the
Fisheries Service intends the Implementation Team and Executive
Committee to be forums for implementation of the biological opinion and
recovery plan. In 1996, the Council, the Fisheries Service and the fish and
wildlife managers developed multi-year workplans to provide a longer-term
context for implementation.
A few hatchery programs are included in the Council program, but most are
Congressionally-authorized programs. One of these programs is funded by
Congressional appropriations through the Lower Snake River Compensation
Plan, reimbursed by Bonneville, and administered by the Fish and Wildlife
Service, the Corps of Engineers and the states. The Fisheries Service has
produced a separate Endangered Species Act biological opinion on these
hatchery operations, which includes some provisions for hatchery reform.
Once appropriated by Congress, Bonneville considers these reimbursable
costs to be mandatory. These reimbursements include annual operation and
maintenance expenses and annual Treasury repayments for capital
construction projects. Their repayment takes precedence over
implementation of the Council's program. Another set of hatchery programs
and expenditures is administered by NMFS and the states and funded by
Congressional appropriations through the Mitchell Act. These expenditures
are not reimbursed by Bonneville.
Finally, the settlement agreement in the U.S. v. Oregon harvest litigation
included commitments by the federal government to work with the tribal
governments and the states to reform production policies and
implementation. The parties to the litigation and the settlement set up an
on-going Production Advisory Committee as a forum for reviewing and
recommending production policies. The Production Advisory Committee's
recommendations influence the production activities described above.

4. Harvest
Since the early part of the century, Oregon and Washington have jointly
managed lower river harvest through the Columbia River Compact. The
Compact committed the two states to adopt identical harvest regulations,
which are implemented in annual harvest plans. The Indian treaty litigation
of the 1970s established a de facto set of constraints on the Compact process.
After a good deal of friction, Washington, Oregon and the tribes agreed in
1986 to manage harvest in a common process. Their agreement, called the
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Columbia River Fish Management Plan, was approved by the U. S. v. Oregon
court as a settlement agreement. The process remains under the jurisdiction
of the federal court, which has the power to resolve disputes. Idaho and
several other tribes are parties to U. S. v. Oregon, and therefore bound by the
Columbia River Fish Management Plan, but they object to its terms. Idaho is
not a party to the Columbia River Compact.
Much of the salmon harvest occurs in the ocean, off the coast of the
continental U.S., Canada and Alaska. There are two forums for managing
this harvest. For United States harvest, there are fishery management
councils. The councils, comprised of representatives of fish and wildlife
managers and harvesters, advise the National Marine Fisheries Service
regarding harvest regulations. For Canadian harvest, the US-Canada Pacific
Salmon Treaty of 1985 establishes harvest management procedures. The
Pacific Salmon Commission makes harvest recommendations to the two
national governments. The treaty benefits Columbia River fish by reducing
harvest in Canadian and Alaskan waters. However, the negotiations with
Canada are complicated by the need to make trade-offs in other U. S.
fisheries. For example, further reductions in Canadian harvest of Columbia
River salmon could require decreases in harvest of Canadian fish in Puget
Sound and Alaska.

5. Habitat
A significant amount of the public land affecting the river is federally owned
and managed by the Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Management.
Both agencies must comply with federal land management laws, the
Endangered Species Act and other federal authorities intended to protect fish
and wildlife. In areas with listed salmon populations, the two agencies must
consult with the Fisheries Service to determine if proposed land management
activities will jeopardize listed species, and the Service must produce a
biological opinion. Federal court decisions in the last few years have halted,
at least temporarily, Forest Service activities because they failed to
adequately consider endangered species issues. The Northwest Power Act
does not apply to the land management agencies, although the managers
may follow the program. Most land management activities are funded
through agency budgets, although there is some Bonneville funding for
Forest Service habitat projects.
For land owned by states, tribes and private parties, there are state, tribal
and local land-use regulations, and local watershed groups (which may also
include federal land). All these activities can be subject to the Endangered
Species Act in the sense that no one can "take" a member of a listed species
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without a permit, but this is an indirect form of control. Nonfederal parties
have no duty to consult under the Endangered Species Act before taking
action. Again, the Northwest Power Act does not apply to these lands,
although land owners may choose to follow the program.
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